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The outbreak of the October Revolt in 1931 provided the government in Cyprus with an ideal 
opportunity to act against its political opponents and repress political activity in the island. But 
the authoritarian regime failed to dampen the growing political ferment in Cyprus, which would 
ultimately make British colonial rule unsustainable. This thesis seeks to explore the politicization 
of Cypriot society and to interpret the discourses and dynamics of the emerging political spaces. 
In particular, it focuses on three key themes in the making of contemporary Cyprus: first, the 
confrontation between secular and confessional politics and the consolidation of nationalism in 
the Greek-Cypriot community; second, the processes through which nationalist politics 
eventually prevailed within the Turkish-Cypriot community, at the expense of the traditional, 
pro-British elite; and thirdly, the emergence and consolidation of a ‘Left’ political space, 
dominated by the labour movement and AKEL.  
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s the Orthodox Church sought to claim an ethnarchic 
leadership over the Greek-Cypriot community, promoting a nationalist politics, bonded by the 
claim to enosis, or union of Cyprus with Greece. The confessional politics of the community, 
however, came to be challenged by the gradual formation of a broad secular political space, 
marked by the foundation of AKEL in 1941. The social and political programme put forward by 
the party gained great appeal among the Greek-Cypriot population, redefining the politics of the 
community. However, AKEL employed the increasingly hegemonic nationalist discourse and 
eventually adopted enosist politics. By 1950 ethnarchic enosist politics had prevailed within the 
community, demonstrating the state’s failure to gain Greek-Cypriots’ loyalty.   
By contrast, the Muslim traditional pro-British elite lagged behind the rising nationalist 
politics advocated by a modernist secular Kemalist political force. Despite the Government’s 
attempts to control its appeal, the modernizing leadership had prevailed within the Turkish-
Cypriot community by the end of the Second World War. The new leadership called constantly 
for communal autonomy and for Cyprus’ restoration to Turkey if Britain left the island, while its 
cooperation with the Government would be dependent on the political conjunctures throughout 
the rest of colonial rule. Faced with the increasingly radical Greek-Cypriot nationalism, the 
Turkish-Cypriot community was gradually nationalized, as demonstrated at the end of the 1940s. 
3 
 
Nevertheless, some bi-communal cooperation materialized at the grassroots level: 
throughout the period under scrutiny Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots participated in common 
labour mobilizations. Despite the Government’s legal and administrative precautions and the use 
of repressive measures, the trade unions, supported by the parties of the Left, managed to 
organize a mass labour movement appealing to broad sections of Cypriot society across ethnic 
and religious boundaries. However, the adoption of the enosist politics by AKEL and the 
hardening of the nationalist politics of both the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaderships led to an 
increasing polarization of Cypriot society on ethnic lines, a process which the labour movement 
proved unable to avert. By 1950, nationalist politics had prevailed within both communities, 
leading to the consolidation of the ethnic division of Cypriot society in the following years.
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Introduction: The Historical and Historiographical Background 
 
This study explores the political and social history of Cyprus during the 1930s and 1940s, while 
also taking into account developments in the second half of the 1920s. The period under 
consideration is framed between two major events that conventionally define this period of 
Cypriot history: the revolt of 1931 and the 1950 plebiscite on enosis.  This thesis focuses on both 
the Greek- and the Turkish-Cypriot communities, and particularly seeks to examine how Cypriot 
society became pervasively politicized, despite the attempts of the British to repress completely 
(in the 1930s) and control (in the 1940s) political activity on the island. The aim of this study is 
to view such activity within the context of British colonial policy in Cyprus. 
 
Questions and Objectives of the Thesis 
In the summer of 1878, the Ottoman Empire, following a military defeat at the hands of the 
Russians, signed an agreement with the United Kingdom that ceded the administration of Cyprus 
to the British Crown. In theory, the British recognized Ottoman sovereignty over the island and 
undertook to pay the Government in Istanbul an annual Tribute, deducted from local revenue. As 
the value of Cyprus lay mainly in its strategic importance, which was dramatically reduced after 
Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, the British did not show much interest in the economic 
development of the island. Like all British colonies, Cyprus was expected to be financially self-
reliant and not become a liability on the treasury. Thus, the British tended to restrict their 
involvement mainly to judicial and constitutional affairs. British rule established the equality of 
all Cypriots before the law, regardless of religious identity or social or economic status. The new 
governing authority also granted a limited freedom of press and introduced representative and 
semi-representative institutions.1 Furthermore, the judicial system was reorganized according to 
English Statute Law, yet the Ottoman Civil Law continued to apply for the Muslim population of 
the island. With certain exceptions, men over the age of 21 were given the right to vote in 
                                                 
1 The opening of the first printing office in Cyprus coincided with British arrival in 1878. See Rebecca Bryant, 
Imagining the Modern; The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 33. 
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elections for village and town authorities, as well as for representatives in a central Legislative 
Council.   
 The new administrative structure introduced by the British contributed to the gradual 
redefinition of power structures on the island and facilitated the politicization of local society 
over time. Until the end of the First World War, the relatively limited local political activity was 
generally not impeded by the government, as long as public order was not disturbed. The general 
permissiveness of this period stemmed from the overall indifference of the British Government 
towards the internal affairs of Cyprus. As Britain’s own strategic and political interest in the 
island diminished, the main preoccupation of the Cyprus Government was the maximization and 
parsimonious management of tax revenue. The British authorities even tolerated the Greek-
Cypriot elite’s frequent calls for a union with Greece, although these appeals were either rejected 
without discussion or completely ignored.  
 On 5 November 1914, following the Ottoman entry into the First World War on the side 
of the Central Powers, Cyprus was formally annexed by Britain. A year later in October 1915, 
the British offered to cede Cyprus to Greece, in exchange for the latter’s engagement in the war 
on the side of the Triple Entente, an offer Greece declined. The strategic value of Cyprus, 
however, increased significantly after the war within the context of Britain’s new imperial 
considerations. In July 1923, under the Treaty of Lausanne, the newly founded Republic of 
Turkey officially recognized British sovereignty over the island and two years later, in May 
1925, Cyprus was declared a Crown Colony.     
 This official change of the island’s legal status signalled the determination of colonial 
authorities to abandon their prior laissez-faire policy in local affairs and politics, a shift that was 
initiated after the end of the war. Despite the abolition of the Tribute in 1927, a move that 
somewhat appeased the local population, this period witnessed an increase in popular discontent. 
This can be attributed mainly to a series of reforms introduced in the same period that restricted 
the old autonomy of both the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot communities. The increasingly intense 
confrontation over the control of communal affairs between the government and the Greek- and 
Turkish-Cypriot leaderships culminated in 1931. On 9 September the Governor imposed the 
budgetary estimates for the following year by an Order in Council, overruling the decision of the 
Legislative Council and triggering a great public outcry. A few weeks later, a spontaneous and 
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island-wide but solely Greek-Cypriot revolt broke out. The insurgents put forward a 
heterogeneous set of demands under the slogan of enosis, or union of Cyprus with Greece. The 
October revolt, quite easily suppressed within a week, was followed by the suspension of 
constitutional government in the colony. The repeal of the entire semi-liberal institutional 
framework of the previous period and the imposition of a series of measures that eliminated 
communal autonomy and suppressed political activities marked the beginning of a period of 
authoritarian rule that lasted until the Second World War.   
 The 1931 revolt had a twofold significance for the colonial authorities. On one hand, it 
constituted the first definite proof of the Cypriot Government’s failure to make Cyprus ‘a real 
colony’ and transform Cypriots into content British subjects. To that end, the government 
deployed a new administrative plan with the aim of profoundly reforming Cypriot society, or, as 
Governor Palmer put it in September 1935, the ‘substitution of a British for a Greek atmosphere 
in the colony’.2 In that context, a series of laws were passed in this period, which, among others, 
forbade the flying of foreign flags and prohibited the ringing of church bells (during the October 
revolt, bells had been used to assemble Greek-Cypriots). Additionally, the freedom of the press 
was abolished and strict government control on education was imposed. Most importantly, the 
government attempted to form a reliable faction of local, pro-British politicians from both 
communities. That strategy was in the end largely successful, especially if compared to the 
government’s attempts to cultivate loyalty to the British among the Greek-Cypriot population. 
The total abolition of electoral procedures was a precondition for the implementation of this 
policy goal. The members of the Advisory Council, which was established in 1933 in place of 
the Legislative Council, and of the district and municipal councils, were appointed directly by 
the Governor. Agreement with government policy therefore became a main prerequisite for those 
aspiring to public office.  
 At the same time, the October revolt provided the government with an ideal opportunity 
to implement a series of measures against its political opponents, many of which had been 
debated in British official circles before the revolt, and suppress all political activity on the 
island. Immediately after the suppression of the revolt, the British took action against 
                                                 
2 National Archives, London [hereafter NA], FO 371/19511, Greece, Meeting notes from the Colonial Office, 5 
September 1935.  
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communists, the Church and Greek-Cypriot nationalist politicians who did not collaborate with 
the government. 
 From the beginning of colonial rule, the Orthodox Church strove to maintain within the 
new administrative and political framework the same level of political power it had enjoyed 
during the Ottoman period, in order to maintain its position as the leadership of the Greek-
Cypriot community. To that end, the prelates were forced not only to politicize their discourse, 
but also to participate directly in the elections for the Legislative Council. Furthermore, as the 
position of the lay element was strengthened under secular British rule, the clergy moved to 
appropriate part of the lay discourse and gradually put forward a more dynamic set of policies. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, and especially after 1910, the demand for enosis had 
become a major component of the political discourse of the Church. Although the union with 
Greece was, by definition, anti-colonial, as was mentioned before, the British did not pay much 
attention to these claims. This was provided so long that the instigators limited themselves to a 
policy of petitions that were posed simply as aspirations for the future. From 1925, the Church 
gradually hardened its stance against the colonial government, in an attempt to secure its position 
as the sole and undisputed national authority of the Greek-Cypriots – a role that became known 
as the ethnarchy of the community.3 This process culminated in late 1931 with the resignation of 
the Bishop of Kition from the Legislative Council, followed by the resignations of all his Greek-
Cypriot counterparts on 21 October, when the revolt broke out. Immediately after the 
suppression of the revolt, the colonial government deported two of the island’s three bishops. In 
the following years, a series of laws deprived the Church of its control over communal affairs 
such as education, and intervened within its internal affairs, most notably in the archiepiscopal 
elections.  
    In the same spirit, harsh measures were taken against the Κομμουνιστικόν Κόμμα 
Κύπρου (Communist Party of Cyprus, hereafter KKK), which was considered a ‘growing 
menace’ to British rule on the island.4 Officially founded in 1926, the KKK stood for the ending 
of colonial rule, but did not endorse the cause of enosis, preferring instead the establishment of 
an independent, socialist republic. Its policies questioned the confessional politics of the Greek- 
                                                 
3 Ethnarch: the leader and personified authority of the nation. 
4 NA, FCO 141/2455, Cyprus: spread of communism in the colony; measures taken for its suppression, Attorney 
General’s memorandum on the Cyprus Criminal Code (Amendment) Law, 4 March 1933. 
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and Turkish-Cypriot elites, attempting to fashion an all-Cypriot political space, and developing a 
political discourse that called both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots to the struggle for liberation 
from colonial rule. During the second half of the 1920s, the party began to spread among the 
emerging working class in the towns and mining areas, leading the mobilization of labour, and 
giving shape to a nascent labour movement. Within a few days of the 1931 revolt, the 
government arrested many leading figures of the party. By early November, two cadres, 
including the General Secretary, were deported and 50 others were imprisoned, banished, or 
internally exiled. By 1933, almost all known party cadres had been arrested, tried on charges of 
seditious conspiracy and sentenced to various punishments. In the same year, the government 
banned the KKK and all organizations affiliated to it.     
 Furthermore, the British sought to restrict the influence of Kemalist modernist politicians, 
whose growing appeal within the Turkish-Cypriot community had alarmed the government since 
the late 1920s. Despite increased government control on Turkish-Cypriot communal affairs, with 
respective measures first imposed during the second half of the 1920s, the influence of new 
political ideas became increasingly apparent, to the detriment of the traditionalist pro-
government Turkish-Cypriot elite, and to the concern of the colonial authorities. In 1930, the 
success of the modernists in the elections made clear to the Legislative Council that the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership’s cooperation with the government could no longer be taken for granted. On 
many occasions, the cooperation of Turkish-Cypriot deputies with their Greek-Cypriot 
counterparts created a deadlock in the Legislative Council, forcing the government to legislate by 
Orders in Council. Following the 1931 revolt and the abolition of that body, the government 
assigned the administration of all communal affairs to leading figures of the traditionalist 
Turkish-Cypriot elite. The government also took measures to counter the growing nationalist 
sentiment within the community that was promoted by the modernists, such as banning in 
Turkish-Cypriot schools the use of textbooks produced in Turkey.  
 The government’s strategy in the 1930s enjoyed a certain degree of success. The 
traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite as well as a great part of the Greek-Cypriot elite, having no 
other way to exercise authority over their respective communities, were willing to collaborate 
with the colonial authorities and take up the positions reserved for them. Moreover, the harsh 
implementation of the government’s repressive measures succeeded to a great extent in blocking 
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mass political mobilization in the colony. Throughout the 1930s, however, the political forces 
that opposed the regime continued to gain ground among the population, revealing the failure of 
the government to gain the confidence of the general public. This trend would be vividly 
manifested during the war years, when home and international developments led to the lifting of 
many repressive measures. In 1943, the results of the municipal elections, marked by the success 
of the Leftists and the Turkish-Cypriot modernists, alarmed the government as well as the Greek- 
and Turkish-Cypriot elites. 
 By the end of the Second World War, nationalist politics had been significantly 
reinforced within both communities. In the case of the Greek-Cypriot community the new party 
of the Left, the Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού (Progressive Party of the Working 
People – AKEL), eventually adopted the hegemonic enosist discourse. Greek-Cypriot nationalist 
politics overall had become more homogeneous, and the Church had solidified its place as the 
leadership of the community and the national-liberation struggle. At the same time, the 
modernist camp, now prevalent within the Turkish-Cypriot community, put forward a dynamic 
nationalist discourse that demanded Cyprus be returned to Turkey in the case that Britain left the 
island. Nevertheless, the revival of Cypriot political life in the early 1940s was marked by the 
dynamics of a political force that challenged nationalist politics. A mass labour movement, 
which had been growing in strength since the second half of the 1930s and was led to a great 
extent by the Left, had consolidated its position in local society during the war years, and sought 
to reshape the political landscape of the colony. By putting forward the demands of the Cypriot 
working class, the labour movement brought together large parts of the population across ethnic 
and religious boundaries. As such, the movement constituted the main space of cooperation 
between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, and rejected, or at least downplayed, the importance of 
the nationalist discourse in both communities.  
  
Recognizing the 1931 revolt as a turning point in Cypriot political life, and in that sense 
concurring with the existing literature on the Cyprus Question, this thesis offers a broader social 
analysis of a very turbulent period, and highlights trends within both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot 
communities that have been hitherto largely neglected. This study examines the emergence of 
agents old and new that formed distinct and competing political spaces in Cypriot politics. In 
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other words, this thesis seeks to explore conduits of politicization in Cypriot society and to 
interpret the discourses and dynamics that helped shape the emerging political spaces within 
their own context. In particular, the thesis focuses on the confrontation between confessional and 
secular politics and the consolidation of nationalism in the Greek-Cypriot community. Another 
primary concern is the process in which nationalist politics eventually prevailed within the 
Turkish-Cypriot community, at the expense of the traditionalist pro-British elite. Finally, this 
thesis examines the emergence and consolidation of a Leftist political space, dominated by the 
parties of the Left - KKK and AKEL - and the labour movement. While domestic actors tended 
to redefine their positions according to changing political conjunctures and challenges, the 
colonial government, despite variations in its short-term objectives, followed a generally 
consistent policy. Although the significance of the island was subject to the changing priorities 
of the British imperial project, all administrations of the period sought to gain the allegiance of 
the island’s population. Together with analyzing domestic Cypriot politics, the present study 
investigates the overall colonial policy on the island, with an eye to Britain’s broader imperial 
considerations. This thesis is thus a comprehensive study of the political and social history of 
Cyprus in the 1930s and 1940s as well as, more broadly, a contribution to British imperial 
history. 
 
Historiography and Literature Review 
Cyprus has stimulated the attention of researchers from a variety of academic fields, most 
notably History, International Relations, Anthropology, Sociology and Political Science. Despite 
the existence of many important scholarly works, however, the history of Cyprus remains 
inadequately studied. Much like the island itself since 1974, its history has been largely divided 
into Greek and Turkish narratives. By considering the nation as the main historical agent, such 
narratives ignore the significance of other analytical categories, such as class and gender, and 
omit broader perspectives that would approach Cyprus as part of the history of Eastern 
Mediterranean, or the history of European imperialism. Until the mid-1970s, historiography on 
Cyprus remained completely within the nationalist framework of interpretation. Trapped within a 
historical paradigm of ethnocentric, moralistic and politically biased narratives that dealt solely 
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with the history of Greeks or the history of Turks on the island, Cypriot history appeared as a 
history of mistakes, omissions, lost opportunities, betrayals and violence.5    
 Since 1974, when the reunification of a divided Cyprus became the main Greek-Cypriot 
political goal, a different paradigm has emerged in Greek-Cypriot historiography. It legitimizes 
reunification by suggesting that ‘the past proves that the two communities (or the Cypriot 
people) can live together in the future’ and arguing that the two communities coexisted 
peacefully during the period before the rise of nationalism.6 Nevertheless, the publication of 
studies espousing the pre-1974 historiographical paradigm continued,7 while, on the Turkish-
Cypriot side, where the official policy of partition was maintained, nationalist historical 
narratives remained dominant.8  
 Rather than employing an approach which subordinates historical events and processes to 
a predetermined historical plot, this thesis shall allow – or arrange – them to speak for 
themselves. In particular, the present study examines the development of certain political and 
social dynamics that defined the historical realities on the island and set the stage for subsequent 
historical developments, including the ethnic divide in Cypriot society. The thesis mainly focuses 
on domestic political actors and the policy of the colonial authorities. Thus, together with 
                                                 
5 See Costas Kyrris, Η Κύπρος μεταξύ Ανατολής και Δύσεως σήμερον [Cyprus between East and West today] 
(Nicosia: Kosmos, 1964); Theodoros Papadopoulos, Το εθνολογικόν πρόβλημα του ελληνισμού εις την Κυπριακήν 
αυτού φάσιν [The ethnological problem of Hellenism in its Cypriot phase] (Nicosia: Publications of Cyprus Studies 
no. 2, 1964); Vergi Bedevi, Kıbrıs tarihi [The History of Cyprus] (Nicosia: Halkın Sesi, 1966). 
6 Mete Hatay and Yiannis Papadakis, ‘A critical comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot official 
historiographies’, in Rebecca Bryant and Yiannis Papadakis (eds.), Cyprus and the politics of memory: History, 
Community and Conflict (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 37. The most influential scholars within the Greek-Cypriot 
‘historiography of peaceful coexistence’ are Paschalis Kitromilides and Michael Attalides. See particularly their 
articles in Michael Attalides (ed.), Cyprus Reviewed (Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, 1977): Michael Attalides ‘The 
Turkish Cypriots, their relations to the Greek Cypriots in perspective’; and Paschalis Kitromilides ‘From coexistence 
to confrontation: the dynamics of ethnic conflict in Cyprus’. See also Paschalis Kitromilides, ‘The dialectic of 
intolerance: ideological dimensions of the ethnic conflict’, in Peter Worsley and Paschalis Kitromilides (eds.), Small 
States in the Modern World: The Conditions of Survival (Nicosia: The New Cyprus Association, 1979); Paschalis 
Kitromilides, ‘“Imagined Communities” and the origins of the national question in the Balkans”, East European 
Quarterly 19/2 (1989), 149-172; and Paschalis Kitromilides, ‘Greek irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus’, Middle 
Eastern Studies 26/1 (1990), 3-15.   
7 See Stavros Panteli, A History of Cyprus; From Foreign Domination to Troubled Independence (London: East-
West Publications, 2000, [1984]; Yiorgos Leventis, Cyprus: The Struggle for Self-Determination in the 1940s: 
Prelude to Deeper Crisis (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002). 
8 See Fikret Alasya, Kıbrıs Tarihi ve Kıbrıs’da Türk Eserleri [The History of Cyprus and Turkish Works of art in 
Cyprus] (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştirma Enstitüsü, 1977(; Fikret Alasya, Tarihte Kıbrıs [Cyprus in History] 
(Nicosia: Ulus Ofset, 1988); Vehbi Serter, Kıbrıs Tarihi [The History of Cyprus] (Nicosia: KEMA, 1999).   
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suggesting an interpretative narrative for the period under scrutiny, it seeks to draw conclusions 
on the British colonial system as well.  
 The great majority of studies on Cypriot history deal with the last years of British rule 
(1955-1960) and the post-independence period, while studies of the colonial period before the 
outbreak of the anti-colonial revolt led by EOKA are few. This lacuna can be attributed to the 
great social and political significance that the Cyprus question retains on the island to this day. 
The question has gone through various phases and adopted multiple aspects, including anti-
colonial struggle, inter-ethnic and intra-communal conflict, postcolonial instability, warfare and 
foreign interventions. Having directly involved four states (Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Britain) 
and the United Nations while further triggering the engagement (mainly in the 1970s) of the 
USA and the USSR, the question has been elevated to the status of a major international issue.9      
 Until recently, the majority of studies on the colonial history of Cyprus were mainly 
preoccupied with the discrete periods 1878-1931 and 1955-1960, respectively, the period from 
the British occupation of the island to the October revolt and the period from the beginning of 
the EOKA’s military campaign to independence of Cyprus. Similar to the more general history 
of the British Empire, the 1930s is probably the most understudied period in Cypriot colonial 
history. Fortunately, several substantial works on the period 1931-1955 have recently been 
published, yet still leave a number of themes and issues neglected. The present study contributes 
to bridging an important historiographical gap and, by taking into consideration and advancing 
the premises of recent literature, offers a novel historiographic narrative for the period under 
scrutiny.  
 Despite the growing interest in the colonial history of Cyprus, the overwhelming majority 
of existing works deal mainly with the Greek-Cypriot community. This myopic view can only 
partially be attributed to the fact that most authors come from an English or Greek linguistic and 
educational background, thus limiting their access to Turkish primary sources. In fact, English-
language documents are sufficient for the reconstitution of the basic trends and events of the 
history of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Rather, the dominant focus on the Greek-Cypriot 
                                                 
9 For an outline of the Cyprus Question, see Rebecca Bryant and Yiannis Papadakis, ‘Introduction: Modalities of 
Time, History and Memory in Ethnonational Conflicts’, in Rebecca Bryant and Yiannis Papadakis (eds.), Cyprus 
and the Politics of Memory, 4-6. For the core literature on the Question, see Paschalis Kitromilides, ‘Milestones in 
the Historiography of the Cyprus Question’, The Historical Review/La Revue Historique, 1 (2008), 287-292. 
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community in existing scholarship should be attributed to the ongoing binary division of the 
history of Cyprus into two defined sides, one Greek (or Greek-Cypriot) and the other Turkish (or 
Turkish-Cypriot). This very dichotomy has made the history of one side almost invisible, or 
meaningless, to the other. A national historiography, of which that reflecting Greek-Cypriot and 
Greek views is the most copious, tends to obscure the role of other historical agents, especially 
Turkish-Cypriots, who are strikingly absent from most Greek-Cypriot accounts. Among these 
works, the few references to the Turkish-Cypriot community mostly restrict themselves to the 
emergence of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism, and even that is usually considered as completely 
absent until the late 1940s and as the direct product of Britain’s divide-and-rule policy and 
Turkey’s intervention in the 1950s.10 This thesis addresses this blind spot in the existing 
literature, considering that the absence of the Turkish-Cypriot community in the historical record 
essentially makes the interpretation of Cypriot colonial history incomplete so far.  
 Alexis Rappas’ account constitutes the most in-depth historical narrative of the 1930s.11 
Rappas deals with the politics of the Greek-Cypriot community and the British colonial policy on 
the island by examining the immediate and long-term consequences of the 1931 revolt. He 
contends that the creation of political cleavages, from which opposition to colonial rule emerged, 
set the tone for the radical rift between the Greek-Cypriot community and the colonial authorities 
in the following years. His conclusions regarding the contradictions inherent in the functioning 
of the colonial state and the emergence of new ideologies serve as points upon which this study 
seeks to elaborate. That is, this thesis aims to examine closely two significant yet neglected 
themes of the period: the role of the KKK in Cypriot political life as well as the gradual 
prevalence of Kemalist modernist politics and the advance of nationalism within the Turkish-
Cypriot community.  
                                                 
10 Indicatively, according to Adamantia Pollis the Turkish-Cypriot community remained indifferent to enosis even 
after the appeal of the Greek Government to the United Nations in 1954. Similarly, Michael Attalides places the 
intensification of ‘Turkish nationalism in Cyprus’ in the mid-1950s. Adamantia Pollis, ‘Intergroup conflict and 
British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus’, Comparative Politics, 5/4 (1973), 575-599; Michael Attalides, ‘Οι 
σχέσεις των Ελληνοκυπρίων με τους Τουρκοκύπριους [The relations of Greek-Cypriots with Turkish-Cypriots]’, in 
Yiorgos Tenekides and Giannos Kranidiotes (eds.) Κύπρος: Ιστορία, προβλήματα και αγώνες του λαού της [Cyprus: 
History, problems and struggles of its people] (Athens: Estia, 1981), 421.  




 Anastasia Yiangou’s Cyprus in World War II,12 which is based on previously unexplored 
archival material, offers a very detailed analysis of the period of the Second World War. 
Yiangou particularly focuses on the revival of enosis as a political object, the emergence of 
AKEL and the impact of developments in Greek politics on Cyprus. The significance of the war 
for Cypriot politics and British administrative planning on the island are further analysed in the 
current study, by highlighting two crucial political developments of the war years: the partial 
liberalization of colonial rule (thanks to the lifting of many measures of the previous period), and 
the challenge posed to the traditionalist, confessional politics within both the Greek- and 
Turkish-Cypriot communities, signified by the growing appeal of AKEL and the prevalence of 
the modernist Turkish-Cypriot leadership.    
The events following the Second World War have been examined by Rolandos 
Katsiaounis, who also provides a substantial contextualization within the pre-war colonial history 
of the island. Katsiaounis offers an interpretation of the events leading to the formation and 
dissolution of the Consultative Assembly, taking into account almost all accessible archival 
material. Katsiaounis’ research focuses on British internal debates and moves on granting Cyprus 
a Constitution and on their impact on Cypriot politics.13 This study expands on Katsiaounis’ 
work by focusing on two un-addressed developments in post-war Cypriot political history: the 
decrease of AKEL’s appeal and the consolidation of ethnarchic politics within the Greek-Cypriot 
community on the one hand, and the inauguration of a new period of close cooperation between 
the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and the government on the other.  
Political developments in the 1940s have constituted the main subject of yet another book 
and a PhD thesis. Yiorgos Leventis offers the first systematic narrative of the 1940s, yet his 
approach remains mostly factual and is further hampered by the denial of the historical agency of 
the Turkish-Cypriot community:  
It is true, however, that during this period [the 1940s], the Turkish Cypriots had 
yet to become protagonists in the Cyprus drama. Quite simply, the Greek-
Cypriots … largely overlooked the wishes of the leadership of the Turkish 
Cypriot minority… Yet, it was a reflection of the political realities existing during 
                                                 
12 Anastasia Yiangou, Cyprus in World War II: Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean (London: I.B. 
Tauris & Co Ltd, 2010 [2012]). 
13 Rolandos Katsiaounis, Η Διασκεπτική 1946-1948, Με ανασκόπηση της περιόδου 1878-1945 [The Consultative 
Assembly of 1946-48, With a Review of the Period 1878-1945] (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2000). 
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the 1930s and 1940s, a period in which the Turkish Cypriots were, for the most 
part, apparently reacting to Greek Cypriot advances toward the declared goal of 
enosis.14 
By comparison, Alexis Alekou’s PhD thesis offers a much more substantial and comprehensive 
analysis of the 1940s, yet it neglects British policy on the island and the policies of the colonial 
administration, being based almost exclusively on Greek-language primary sources, and takes no 
account of the Cyprus State Archive documents.15   
Particular aspects of the history of the period under discussion have also been examined 
by several thematic studies, most of which cover a longer period of time. Most importantly, 
Sotos Ktoris has published the most thorough study on the history of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community from the foundation of the Republic of Turkey to Cypriot independence.16 His 
conclusions on the emergence of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism have been significantly useful for 
the examination of how a particular type of Kemalist nationalist politics eventually dominated 
the community. Altay Nevzat’s PhD thesis deals mainly with the period 1878-1931.17 Although 
he provides a less accurate account on the emergence of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism when 
compared to Ktoris, Nevzat offers substantial information on certain un-addressed issues, most 
significantly the impact of early British rule and of the Young Turk movement on Turkish-
Cypriot communal politics in the early twentieth century.18 On the same theme, James 
McHenry’s book and Daniel Wosgian’s PhD thesis deal mainly with Britain’s and Turkey’s 
policies regarding the Turkish-Cypriot community, without providing much further elaboration 
on its political history.19     
                                                 
14 Leventis, Cyprus: The Struggle for Self-Determination in the 1940s: Prelude to Deeper Crisis (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2002), 26. Emphasis in the original. 
15 Alexis Alekou, ‘Οι πολιτικές εξελίξεις στην Κύπρο, 1945-1955 [The Political Developments in Cyprus, 1945-
1955]’ (Panteio Univ. of Social and Political Sciences D.Phil Thesis, 2011). 
16 Sotos Ktoris, Τουρκοκύπριοι: Από το περιθώριο στο συνεταιρισμό (1923-1960) [Turkish-Cypriots: From the 
margins to partnership (1923-1960)] (Athens: Papazisis Publications, 2013). 
17 Altay Nevzat, ‘Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave’ (University of Oulu D.Phil Thesis, 
2005). 
18 Aspects of the history of the Turkish-Cypriot community are also examined in Eleni Mpouleti’s PhD thesis: ‘Η 
αγγλική πολιτική απέναντι στην τουρκοκυπριακή κοινότητα 1878-1950. Η πορεία προς την εθνοποίηση της 
μουσουλμανικής-κυπριακής κοινότητας [English policy towards the Turkish-Cypriot community. The route towards 
the nationalization of the Muslim-Cypriot community]’ (Panteio University D.Phil Thesis, 2008), which also deals 
mainly also with the period 1878-1931. 
19 James McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919-1939; The Political and Diplomatic Interaction 
between Great Britain, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriot Community (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987); Daniel 
Wosgian, ‘Turks and British Rule in Cyprus’ (Columbia University D.Phil Thesis, 1963).  
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The Cypriot Left has been the subject of several historical and sociological studies, each 
discussing different periods or aspects. Andreas Panayiotou’s PhD thesis provides the most 
complete sociological analysis of the activity of the Left during British rule.20 Based mostly on 
secondary sources, Panayiotou examines the systemic origins and the political, cultural and 
organizational aspects of the communist movement in Cyprus, as related to other cases of 
popular movements. Furthermore, trade unionism and the labour movement are thoroughly 
examined by Sotiroula Moustaka in her PhD thesis.21 Although based extensively on primary 
sources, the study does not provide an interpretative context for the significance of the labour 
movement and the Left in reshaping Cypriot politics, nor does it account for the formation of a 
mass, secular, anti-colonial political space, which constituted the main locus of cooperation 
between the Greek- and the Turkish-Cypriot communities. Given that the thesis is the only 
historiographical work which covers the subject extensively and that the remaining studies on the 
subject are essentially biographical accounts of trade union leaders, the history of the Cypriot 
labour movement remains only partially explored. Yiannos Katsourides has contributed to the 
literature on the Cypriot Left by analyzing the politics of the KKK, mostly during the period 
from the mid-1920s to the 1931 revolt.22 Lastly, Thomas Adams has published a heavily biased 
account that reflects the anticommunism of the Cold War period; his AKEL: The Communist 
Party of Cyprus, deals mainly with the politics and appeal of AKEL in the 1960s, and its 
perception by the other political forces.23 Despite the major contribution of these studies to the 
history of the Left and the labour movement, a distinctively historical and contextualizing 
approach of their significance for Cypriot society and politics during 1931-1960 has not yet been 
attempted. The present study seeks to contribute to bridging this gap and providing a narrative 
for the period between 1925 and 1950.     
 A number of important studies cover the impact of British imperial policy and local 
administration on Cyprus, and place colonial rule on the island into a broader historical context.24 
                                                 
20 Andreas Panayiotou, ‘Island radicals: The emergence and consolidation of the Cypriot Left, 1920-1960’ 
(University of California D. Phil Thesis, 1999). 
21 Sotiroula Moustaka, ‘Το Εργατικό Κίνημα στην Κύπρο την περίοδο της Αγγλοκρατίας 1878-1955 [The Labour 
Movement in Cyprus in the period of British rule 1878-1955]’ (Panteio University D.Phil, 2010). 
22 Yiannos Katsourides, The History of the Communist Party in Cyprus: Colonialism, Class and the Cypriot Left 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2014). 
23 Thomas Adams, AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971).  
24 Robert Holland and Diana Markides, The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern 
Mediterranean 1850-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), see particularly chapters 7 and 9; Georgios 
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The impact of British colonial rule on the island’s power structures and the formation of 
nationalist ideologies within the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities are thoroughly 
examined by Rebecca Bryant in her historical anthropological study Imagining the Modern: The 
Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus.25 Her conceptualization of the fundamental differences 
between the Greek- and the Turkish-Cypriot nationalisms helps to trace the process through 
which nationalist politics eventually prevailed within both communities. Nevertheless, Bryant’s 
account focuses mainly on education, giving little attention to other factors, such as the press, 
while significant ideological components and aspects of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism, most 
notably the irredentist element becoming manifest after the late 1940s, are neglected.  
Finally, there are a number of works which deal with government educational policy and 
its impact on the Greek-Cypriot community. Panayiotis Persianis provides some useful 
information on the role of the Church, yet fails to capture how political developments in the 
Greek-Cypriot community affected educational policies.26 A greater emphasis on the policy of 
the British is given by Constantinos Spyridakis, a prominent nationalist and Head of the Pan-
Cypriot Gymnasium from 1936 to 1960 in a politically biased study.27 The Greek-Cypriot 
educational system and its interaction with the shifting political situation on the island are 
thoroughly examined by Antigone Heraclidou in her PhD thesis.28 Heraclidou offers a detailed 
analysis of British attempts to Anglicize education and the reaction of the Greek-Cypriot 
leadership. Considering the colonial authorities’ educational policy as a major part of their 
overall post-1925 policy to reduce communal autonomy and control the advance of nationalism – 
in a way that produced distinct, yet similar results in both the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot cases, 
this study approaches the question of education within this context, examining more closely 
government interventions in Turkish-Cypriot educational affairs.     
As this outline has shown, there are important lacunae in the existing literature on 
Cypriot history during the 1930s and 1940s. The present study seeks therefore to reconstitute this 
                                                                                                                                                             
Georghallides and Diana Markides, ‘British Attitudes to Constitution-Making in Post-1931 Cyprus’, Journal of 
Modern Greek Studies 13/1 (1995), 63-81; and George Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion: British policy in Cyprus 
1939-1955 (New York: 1990).  
25 Bryant, Imagining the Modern, 2004. 
26 Panayiotis Persianis, Church and State in Cyprus Education (Nicosia, 1978).  
27 Constantinos Spyridakis, The Educational Policy of the English Government in Cyprus: 1878-1954 (Nicosia, 
1954).  
28 Antigone Heraclidou, ‘Politics of Education in Colonial Cyprus, 1931-1956, with special reference to the Greek-
Cypriot community’(Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, D.Phil Thesis, 2011).  
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significant and hitherto only partially explored period. On the one hand, the aim is to contribute 
to bridging the historiographical gap on the political and social history of the island. On the other 
hand, this study intends to depart from a traditionalist historiographical perspective that 
conceptualized the two communities as homogeneous and completely segregated, and instead 
situates instances of intra-communal division and inter-communal cooperation within their own 
historical contexts. 
 
Methodology and Sources 
As discussed, the scope of the present thesis is essentially twofold, consisting, on the one hand, 
of suggesting a broad reappraisal of Cypriot history during the period 1931-1950, and, at the 
same time, of examining Cypriot history as a case study of British colonialism. Furthermore, the 
interpretation of the discourses that dominated the political spaces emerging during this period 
requires that they be examined on their own terms. Most notably, even though both Greek- and 
Turkish-Cypriots were faced with the erosion of communal autonomy during the 1920s, the two 
communities were largely treated differently by the British. Moreover, the rise of nationalism 
among Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots made the two communities increasingly introverted, even 
though there was still a high degree of interaction between the two groups.     
 The present structure of this thesis approaches the interactions and competitions among 
different political projects in a systematic manner. On a first level, the approach employed is 
necessarily a synthetic one, as the interaction between both the colonial authorities and Cypriot 
society as well as between the two communities played a major part in shaping Cypriot politics. 
On a second level, the thesis is organized thematically: following the first chapter, which deals 
with the early period of British rule on the island, the next two chapters examine the politics of 
the Greek- and the Turkish-Cypriot communities respectively, while the last chapter focuses on 
the forms and dynamics of bi-communal politics.  
 The thesis is based on research in a wide range of English-, Greek- and Turkish-language 
primary sources held in the United Kingdom, Cyprus and Greece. In the United Kingdom the 
greatest part of the research was conducted in the National Archives at Kew. Study of the official 
correspondence between the Colonial Office and the Cyprus Government (Colonial Office 
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records – CO 67) allowed for the reconstruction of a major part of the events analysed in the 
thesis, and also yielded insight into the logic and operation of the colonial administration. Special 
attention was given to non-official documents – such as memoranda, newspaper articles, trade 
union resolutions and other documents mainly of Cypriot origin – attached to the despatches of 
administrators in Cyprus to the Colonial Office, so as to ensure that the suggested historical 
narrative does not reproduce the official version. Overall, the majority of official and non-official 
documents were cross-checked, through studying different sources on the same subjects.  
 Extra care was taken to survey the records of former colonial administrations (Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office records – FCO 141), that is the migrated archives, kept secret until 
2012 and released from April of the same year to November 2013.29 Among the 2,860 records 
that relate to Cyprus, 816 cover the period 1925-1949, while the bulk of the material dates from 
the 1950s and concentrates on 1955-1959 (the period of the Cyprus Emergency). Additionally, 
records from the Foreign Office (FO 371), the Cabinet Office (CAB), the Mediterranean 
Department (CO 926), and the Confidential Correspondence (CO 537 and CO 883) have proven 
useful for this study. Lastly, British Parliamentary Papers and reports of proceedings in the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords have assisted in examining imperial considerations 
and debates on the status of Cyprus, as well as controversies over its administration.  
 In Cyprus, the official archives of the Cyprus Government (Secretariat Archives - SA1), 
held at the Cyprus State Archive in Nicosia, were particularly useful. Their significance and 
treatment in this thesis are equal to those of the Colonial Office and Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office records. Furthermore, the archives of the Cypriot press constitute a very important corpus 
of material. Studying articles from newspapers that cover the entirety of the political spectrum 
has allowed for the reconstruction of political developments and public debates. This is 
especially valid for the 1940s, less so for the previous period, as newspapers were subject to 
                                                 
29 This archive, kept secret by the British Government, contained 19,950 files and volumes from 41 former colonies, 
which were sent back to Britain on the eve of decolonization. The records cover a wide range of information relating 
to colonial administration, yet a major part of them consist of incriminating evidence. A great many similar 
documents were destroyed, either in the colonies themselves or at some point after their despatch to Britain to avoid 
disclosure and subsequent embarrassment to the British Government. See Richard Drayton, ‘Britain’s secret archive 
of decolonization’, History Workshop Online (19 April 2012); The National Archives, ‘Colonial administration 
records: The “Migrated Archives” – record series FCO 141’, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/colonial-
administration-records.htm, accessed 3 September 2015; The National Archives, ‘Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office and predecessors: Records of Former Colonial Administrations: Migrated Archives’, 
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C12269323, accessed 3 September 2015.     
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strict censorship in the aftermath of the 1931 revolt and throughout the 1930s. Periodicals and 
other publications often contain valuable material on certain institutions of Cypriot society, from  
Church circulars to trade union proclamations. Greek-Cypriot newspapers and periodicals are 
held in the Library of Archbishop Makarios III Foundation and the Public Information Office 
(PIO) in Nicosia. Turkish-Cypriot newspapers and periodicals are held in the Cyprus (Turkish) 
National Archive in Kyrenia and the National Library within the Atatürk Cultural Centre in 
Nicosia. Finally, the records held by the Pan-Cypriot Labour Federation (PEO), Nicosia, contain 
important documents and periodicals – the most valuable of them in often forgotten and dusty 
boxes - hitherto untouched after being donated by trade unions and individuals. These include 
the proceedings of trade union conferences, trade union charters, KKK/AKEL party documents 
and resolutions and personal testimonies and manuscripts.     
 In Athens, the Contemporary Social History Archives (ASKI) contain valuable 
information, mainly from the late 1940s, on AKEL and its relations with the Communist Party of 
Greece (KKE). The correspondence between the two parties and reports by the KKE have been 
particularly useful for reconstituting the politics of AKEL, especially during and after the period 
of the Consultative Assembly. Moreover, research was conducted at the City Library, a 
department of the Library of the Greek Parliament, and the Diplomatic and Historical Archive of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IAYE).  
Given that there are only a few original documents produced by the KKK and AKEL that 
are accessible to researchers, a great part of the material on the two parties comes from the press, 
the migrated archives and the collections of ASKI. 
Lastly, various published primary sources have been used, such as the Cyprus Gazette, 
the Cyprus Blue Book, international conventions, treaties and party conferences decisions, among 
others. 
 
Plan of the Thesis  
As discussed above, the structure of this study reflects the material under scrutiny, so as to 
capture the interactions between the colonial administration and the local population as well as 
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between the Greek- and the Turkish-Cypriot communities. This inevitably results in a degree of 
overlap between the chapters, while British policy is examined throughout. The thesis is 
composed of four thematic chapters, each broadly chronological in structure. 
 Chapter 1 provides the background of the historical processes analysed in the thesis and 
examines the impact of early British rule (1878-1931) on Cypriot politics. The administrative 
and political framework initially adopted by the British followed closely the administrative 
practices of the Ottomans, allowing the traditional Orthodox and Muslim confessional elites to 
maintain their power. At the same time, the secularization of the government and the 
introduction of representative institutions facilitated the emergence of new political actors, 
initially from within the Greek-Cypriot community. The redefinition of Cypriot politics became 
increasingly apparent during the 1920s, and led to the outbreak of the October revolt in 1931, 
which marked the beginning of a new period in Cypriot colonial history. 
 Chapter 2 explores the tensions between confessional and secular politics and the 
consolidation of the dominant position of nationalist discourse within the Greek-Cypriot 
community. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the Orthodox Church, as the main propagator of 
Greek nationalism on the island, strove to secure its leading position within the community (its 
ethnarchic role) not least by putting forward demands for enosis. This goal would be achieved by 
the beginning of the next decade, despite two major challenges to the political power of the 
Church. In the aftermath of the 1931 revolt and for most of the period under examination, the 
colonial government attempted to restrict the political activities of the Church and control the 
advance of Greek-Cypriot nationalism. An even greater challenge to the confessional politics 
came from the broad secular political space of the Left, which had a key influence on Greek-
Cypriot political life during a great part of the 1940s. Indeed, the communal elites and the 
colonial administration were so afraid of the appeal of radical politics on the island that the 
British would begin to cooperate with the Church against the Left. Nevertheless, the political 
discourse of the Left became increasingly nationalist after the foundation of AKEL in 1941, 
leading to the complete adoption of enosist politics by the party and the eventual recognition of 
the Church as the national leadership of the community. This chapter examines closely the 
emergence of the Church in its ethnarchic role and the process through which nationalist and 
enosist politics became consolidated by the late 1940s.    
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 In contrast to the Orthodox Church, the Muslim religious elite proved more vulnerable to 
the emergence of a secular, nationalist and modernist political force from within the community, 
following the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. From the late 1920s, the authority of 
the traditional pro-British Turkish-Cypriot elite gradually declined in the face of a budding 
modernist intelligentsia that drew inspiration from Kemalist reforms. Chapter 3 deals with the 
gradual prevalence of nationalist politics within the Turkish-Cypriot community, to the detriment 
of the traditional elite and the colonial authorities, which attempted to bolster the latter. From the 
early 1930s until the end of colonial rule, the modernists’ cooperation with the colonial 
government would be dependent on political conjunctures. By the end of the 1940s, Turkish 
nationalism had consolidated its position in the Turkish-Cypriot community, codified in the 
claim of Cyprus’ return to Turkey in case of any change of the status quo on the island.        
Lastly, chapter 4 examines the emergence and consolidation of a political force which 
challenged the nationalist discourse of both communities. The labour movement and the parties 
of the Left put forward a radical set of demands ranging from the enactment of labour legislation 
to the democratization of the administration. Leftist and labour politics succeeded in mobilizing 
large parts of the working population, regardless of ethnicity and religion, despite the 
government’s legal and administrative precautions and the use of repressive measures. Most 
importantly, trade unionism, through which the KKK and AKEL channelled a great part of their 
action, and labour mobilizations constituted the main space of cooperation between the Greek- 
and the Turkish-Cypriot communities. Growing throughout the period under scrutiny and 
consolidated by the early 1940s, the bi-communal labour movement managed to secure many 
demands. The movement, however, eventually failed to avert the ethnic divide in Cypriot 
society. By the mid-1940s, the hardening of the nationalist politics of both the Greek- and the 
Turkish-Cypriot leaderships led to a split of the unions into three factions along ideological and 
ethnic lines, each supported by different political actors. Although the labour movement 
maintained its bi-communal character throughout the decade, Cypriot society was becoming 
increasingly polarized along ethnic lines, as would be indicated at the end of the decade and 
demonstrated in the 1950s.
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Chapter 1: British Colonial Rule: The Administrative and Political Context 
  
This chapter discusses the first period of British rule in Cyprus, from the occupation of the island 
in June 1878 until the 1931 October revolt. It examines the administrative and political context 
introduced by the British and its impact on Cypriot politics, with the aim of setting the 
background for the historical developments presented in the following chapters. It is important to 
note that the British occupiers broadly adopted the administrative practices of their Ottoman 
predecessors, providing the traditional Christian and Muslim religious elites with the means to 
maintain their power. At the same time, the secularization of the administration and the 
introduction of representative institutions contributed to the gradual emergence of new political 
forces, initially mainly within the Greek-Cypriot community, posing a challenge to the 
confessional politics on the island. During most of this period, both the Christian and the Muslim 
traditional elites managed to maintain their supremacy; nevertheless, Cypriot politics was 
gradually redefined, as would become increasingly apparent during the second half of the 1920s 
and demonstrated in 1931.  
       
1.1 The Occupation of Cyprus and the British Administrative Framework  
Britain’s decision to occupy Cyprus in 1878 was motivated by strategic considerations. Ever 
since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the strategic importance of Cyprus was greatly 
enhanced, as it lay on the sea route to India. A base there helped the British secure their imperial 
lifeline. As the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli put it, 
In taking Cyprus the movement is not Mediterranean; It is Indian. We have taken 
a step there which we think necessary for the maintenance of our Empire and for 
its preservation in peace.1   
The British were alarmed by the Russian victory over the Ottoman Empire in the 1877-1878 war 
and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of San Stefano in March 1878, which secured Russian 
influence in the Balkans. Providing support to the Ottoman Empire against Russia and 
                                                 
1 Hansard, House of Lord Debates, 241 (18 July 1878), cc. 1753-843.  
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preventing its dissolution and partition formed the core of British foreign policy in the region for 
most of the nineteenth century. In that spirit, Whitehall acted to preserve, at least temporarily, 
Ottoman stability and prevent any further Russian expansion. The Cyprus Convention, signed 
secretly between the United Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire in June 1878, granted control of 
Cyprus to the former, in exchange for British support in the case that Russia resumed hostilities. 
In theory, the Sultan would maintain his de jure sovereignty over Cyprus and the British 
occupation of the island would cease if Russia restored to Turkey certain territories that it had 
annexed.2 Furthermore, Britain agreed to pay the Ottoman Government an annual tribute, 
equivalent to the excess of revenue over expenditure on the island. British officials, however, 
from the beginning considered the occupation of Cyprus as permanent, and the island’s 
administration was entrusted to the Colonial Office as early as 1880.3   
 In May 1878, Disraeli described Cyprus to Queen Victoria as the ‘key to Western Asia’.4 
For Stafford Northcote, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Cyprus was needed as a ‘place of arms’ in 
the Levant, as the island’s location was seen as ideal for enhancing Britain’s ability to oppose a 
possible Russian attack on Asia Minor.5 Furthermore, the occupation of Cyprus would cause less 
opposition from the other Powers than Gallipoli, Limnos, Lesvos, Astypalaia, Crete, Alexandria, 
Acre, Haifa or Alexandretta, which had also been considered.6 Even at that time, however, the 
island’s strategic significance was doubted by several British politicians, publicists and military 
experts, mainly due to its relative remoteness from key strategic locations such as the 
Dardanelles or Istanbul, its bad sanitary state and the lack of necessary infrastructure (such as 
harbours and railways).7 The strategic value of Cyprus was further diminished by the occupation 
of Egypt in 1882, which gave the British direct control of the Suez Canal and a far more 
advantageous base in the Eastern Mediterranean. Besides, as Russia abandoned its aggressive 
                                                 
2The Cyprus Convention, 1878, Annex to the Convention. 
3 In July 1878, Granville Leveson-Gower, 2nd Earl Granville, stated in the House of Lords: ‘The promise that Cyprus 
is to go back to Turkey if Russia gives back what she has got is of a perfectly illusory character. Looking at it as 
men of business, we must see that the cession of Cyprus is a virtual cession of a portion of the Porte’s Dominions’. 
Hansard, ibid.    
4 William Moneypenny and George Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield (London: John 
Murray, 1929), vol. 2, 1163. 
5 Georgios Georghallides, A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-1926 with a Survey of the 
Foundations of British Rule (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1979), 6. 
6 Holland and Markides, 2008, p. 164. 
7 See the speeches of Granville Leveson-Gower; Edward Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby; Thomas Baring, 1st Earl of 
Northbrook; and John Wodehouse, 1st Earl of Kimberley. Hansard, ibid. 
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policy of expansion against the Ottoman Empire in Asia Minor, British political and strategic 
interests in this region as well as the area between Alexandretta and the Persian Gulf diminished. 
The value of Cyprus in strategic terms was greatly reduced.  After 1882, the main British 
objective became simply to prevent any other power from seizing the island. Cyprus was not of 
particular use or importance to the British until the end of the First World War.8 It remained a 
base that could potentially defend British military and economic interests in the Asia Minor and 
Middle East region, but without any intrinsic strategic value as long as British control over Egypt 
remained uncontested.9   
  Cyprus nominally remained an Ottoman territory administered by the British until the 
Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. On 5 November 
1914, when the island was annexed by Britain, Egypt, which was also a nominal part of the 
Ottoman Empire, was declared a British Protectorate. A year later, in October 1915, Britain 
offered Cyprus to Greece on the condition that the latter would join the war on the side of the 
Triple Entente, an offer declined by King Constantine I of the Hellenes.10 After the war, Cyprus 
saw a significant increase in its strategic importance, as the island then constituted a strategic 
station between Egypt and the mandates of Palestine, Mesopotamia and Transjordan, which all 
had been entrusted to Britain by the League of Nations. The island’s fate was now dependent on 
British strategic interests not in India or the Mediterranean, but in the Middle East. In July 1923, 
the nascent Republic of Turkey formally recognized British sovereignty over Cyprus under the 
Treaty of Lausanne and renounced any rights to the island. Two years later, in May 1925, Cyprus 
was declared a Crown Colony, and, in 1927, the Tribute was abolished.   
 
Administrative Planning 
                                                 
8 For the strategic importance of Cyprus during British rule and its significance in the management of post-colonial 
crises in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, see Klearchos Kyriakides, ‘The Island of Cyprus and the 
Projection of Sea Power by the Royal Navy since 1878’, in Carmel Vassalo and michela D’Angelo (eds.), Anglo-
Saxons in the Mediterranean: commerce, politics and ideas (XVII-XX centuries) (Valletta: Malta University Press, 
2007), 219-236.  
9 In 1887, when a British departure from Egypt was briefly considered, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
Lord Salisbury intended to withdraw to Cyprus: Georghallides, 1979, p. 14. 
10 Ibid.  
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From the beginning of their rule, the British attempted to govern Cyprus by cooperating with the 
local elites, as the resources available for the administration of the island were, as in all British 
colonies, limited. In 1900, the population of Cyprus, consisting of 186,000 inhabitants, was 
administered by 57 British officials.11 As Frederick Lugard, Governor of Hong Kong (1907-
1912) and Governor-General of Nigeria (1914-1919), put it in 1922, 
If continuity and decentralisation are … the first and most important conditions in 
maintaining an effective administration, co-operation is the key-note of success in 
its application, … co-operation … above all between the provincial staff and the 
native rulers.12 
 Although Cyprus formally remained an Ottoman territory until 1914, the British 
administered the island from the beginning as a colony. They applied the same administrative 
system that had been standardized in the British Empire since the early nineteenth century.13 The 
specific administrative structure that was to be applied in Cyprus was determined by an Order in 
Council issued in September 1878.14 As in most crown colonies most of the legislative and 
executive power were vested in a High Commissioner (named Governor after the island 
officially became a colony), who represented the British sovereign on the island. The High 
Commissioner was also assisted in the administration of the island by two councils, the 
Executive and the Legislative. The Executive Council consisted of the highest ranking British 
officials on the island – the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, the Treasurer and the Chief 
Secretary – and up to three prominent figures among the local population, appointed by the High 
Commissioner. The Legislative Council was presided over by the High Commissioner and 
consisted of four to eight members, half of which were British officials (official members), and 
the other half selected by the High Commissioner from among the local population (non-official 
members). The Council had only an advisory role, as the High Commissioner could overrule any 
legislative proposals by introducing legislation directly from London, through Orders in Council. 
The High Commissioner was further assisted by the Chief Secretary’s Office (from 1925 
onward, the Colonial Secretary’s Office), which advised the High Commissioner on questions of 
                                                 
11 Report on the Census of Cyprus, 1881 (London, 1884), p. 6; Georghallides, 1979, p. 14. 
12 Lord Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate In British Tropical Africa (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 
1922), 221. 
13 See John Cell, British Colonial Administration in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: the Policy-Making Process (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). 
14 Unless otherwise stated, the administrative structure presented here is based on information derived from the 
Cyprus Gazette, 1878-1884. 
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general policy. The Secretary’s Office was also responsible for ensuring the implementation of 
the government’s decisions and for coordinating between the various administrative departments, 
such as those of agriculture, education, justice, police and public works. 
At the regional level, the British maintained the Ottoman administrative division of the 
island into six districts, each one administered by a District Commissioner, whose duty was to 
supervise the coordination between the local branches of government departments in his area of 
jurisdiction. The British authorities further maintained most regional administrative institutions 
introduced by their Ottoman predecessors. In particular, the British retained the island’s seven 
İdare Meclisi, or administrative councils, one central and one for each district.15 The Central 
Administrative Council in Nicosia was presided over by the High Commissioner, who replaced 
the Ottoman Governor in that capacity. The council was composed from four elective members, 
two from the Muslim and two from the non-Muslim population. Similarly, each district 
(previously kaza) council was composed of four permanent members (the District 
Commissioner, the Sharia Judge, the Orthodox Bishop and the Treasury clerk) and four elected 
members (two Muslim and two non-Muslim). Their responsibilities were soon reduced to 
granting licenses for the sale of alcohol, examining and approving the work schedule for 
repairing village roads; and issuing warrants for the seizure and sale of movable property of 
defaulting taxpayers.16 
 Furthermore, the Cyprus Convention provided for the maintenance of two more Ottoman 
institutions, which exclusively regulated affairs of the Turkish-Cypriot community: the Sharia 
Courts and the Evkaf, the Muslim pious foundations that administered a vast number of endowed 
properties. Despite the significant reduction of their jurisdiction, the religious Sharia Courts 
remained an important institution for Muslims of Cyprus, and continued to regulate matters of 
property, marriage and inheritance, among others. Equally important, the administration of the 
Evkaf was placed under the dual supervision of an Ottoman and a British delegate.       
 Finally, a High Court of Justice was founded in 1878, composed of the High 
Commissioner, a Judicial Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners, to try all criminal and civil 
                                                 
15 The councils were established in the context of the Tanzimat reforms, introduced in the Ottoman Empire from 
1839 to 1876 and in Cyprus in particular since 1840. 
16 Rappas, ‘The elusive polity. Social engineering and the reinvention of politics in colonial Cyprus, 1931-1941’, 
(European University Institute D.Phil Thesis, 2008), 27. 
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cases according to the Statue Law of England, except for those under the jurisdiction of the 
Sharia Courts. The judicial system was reorganized in 1882. All Ottoman Courts were abolished 
with the exception of the Sharia Courts, whose jurisdiction was further limited. In their place, the 
British established a Supreme Court; six Assize Courts, six District Courts, six Magisterial 
Courts and a number of Village Judge Courts.      
 Following the 1880 elections in Britain, which brought the Liberals to power, the British 
reformed the statues of the Legislative Council in 1882. The new Legislative Council would 
consist of six British civil servants, nominated by the High Commissioner, and 12 elected 
members, three of whom were to be elected by the Muslims and nine by the non-Muslims of the 
island. These representatives would be elected every four years by all male Cypriots aged over 
21 who paid property tax. The High Commissioner, who presided over the Council, had the 
casting vote, and reserved the right to veto any decision of the body. In practice, the distribution 
of the seats favoured the cooperation between the British and the Muslim members of the 
Council, as the number of Muslim representatives, added to that of the British appointees, was 
equivalent to the number of the non-Muslim representatives. The casting vote of the High 
Commissioner ensured that cooperation between the British members and the Muslim deputies 
would secure the majority within the Council. In the few cases that no such cooperation was 
achieved, or in case of a Muslim representative’s absence, the government could – and did – 
legislate through Orders in Council. The composition of the body was slightly changed in 1925, 
with the number of the non-Muslim representatives raised to 12 and that of the British officials to 
nine. As previously, the cooperation between the Muslim and the British members could block 
any suggestion by the non-Muslim representatives. The precarious balance of council politics 
was frustrating not only to the non-Muslim representatives, but for the British as well, as what 
they regarded as important government business often got delayed.   
  Most significantly, the 1882 reform of the Legislative Council combined two main 
political concepts: on one hand, it maintained the central element of the Ottoman 
administration’s millet system, that is, the conceptualization of the Cypriot population as divided 
into distinct religious groups. At the same time, the British administrative system incorporated 
the principles of proportional representation, with the number of each community’s elected 
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representatives corresponding to their share of the total population.17 The very extension of 
communal division to the highest body of local representation, as well as to the election of the 
council’s elected members, constituted in fact a hardening of the millet system. The complete 
institutionalization of communalism reinforced further the ethno-religious division of Cypriot 
society, as well as the paternalistic bonds between the Christian and Muslim populations and 
their respective elites.18  
While the British, by contrast with the Ottomans, did not recognize the political authority 
of the two communities’ religious leaderships as such, the institutionalization of communalism 
allowed the latter to maintain their political power and safeguard their role within the British 
administrative context. At the same time, the gradual extension of the  principle of representation 
to all local authorities of the island, from the town councils in 1882 to the village councils in 
1906, and the freedom of speech and of the press, granted in 1878 and 1884 respectively, 
contributed to the politicization of Cypriot society over time.19 
 
Financial Questions and Communal Autonomy 
The partial rationalization of the tax-collecting system, the decrease of corruption and British 
rigidity in the collection of taxes led to an increase in public revenue, which, was not, however, 
followed by a general growth in the economy of Cyprus. First, a large part of public revenue was 
directed to cover the high cost of the colonial bureaucracy. According to the Vice-Consul and 
manager of the Imperial Ottoman bank, Hamilton Lang, the annual cost of the British 
                                                 
17 In 1881, the British authorities carried out the first census in Cyprus, based mainly on religion and language. The 
religion-based system of representation that was applied in Cyprus was soon to be introduced to other British 
colonial territories as well, such as India in 1909, Ceylon in 1910, and Palestine in 1922. See Martin Wight, The 
Development of the Legislative Council 1606-1945 (London: Faber and Faber, 1946), 88. 
18 Communalism was a staple element of the British colonial administrative system in most regions of the Empire. 
Echoing the very logic of the millet administrative functioning, Lugard stressed: “[T]he native authority is thus de 
facto and de jure ruler over his own people… [G]overnment, by the use of force if necessary, intends to support the 
native chief… The essential feature of the system … is that the native chiefs are constituted ‘as an integral part of 
the machinery of the administration’… [I]t is the consistent aim of the British staff to maintain and increase the 
prestige of the native ruler … and to support his authority… The limitations to independence which are … inherent 
in this conception of native rule … are such as do not involve interference with the authority of the chiefs or the 
social organization of the people” [italics in the original]. Lugard, 1922, pp. 202-205.   
19 Rappas, 2008, p. 35. 
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administration until 1890 was £110,000, compared to the £40,000 spent by the Ottomans.20 Most 
importantly, the British Government imposed a levy on revenues from the island equalling the 
sum of £92,799 a year, which, according to British calculations, represented the Ottoman 
Government’s former profit from the island. The levy amounted to two-thirds of the fiscal 
returns, and, by 1882-1883, the British Government decided to assist the Cyprus Government by 
grants-in-aid of £50,000 so that Cyprus would have to provide only £43,000. This sum was in 
fact used for the payment of the ‘Ottoman debt’, that is, the debt the Ottoman Government had 
contracted with British bondholders in 1855 during the Crimean war. It is indicative that, in the 
first 17 years after the occupation, Britain made a net profit from Cyprus of about £170,000. 
Between 1878 and 1912, the island lost £1,972,054, or 28% of its budget revenues, while the 
annual expenditure on forests was restricted to £2000. Education was likewise limited to £3000, 
and public works to £13,000. By 1927, when the Tribute was abolished, Cyprus had paid to 
Britain over £2,600,000.21     
 In this context, opposition to taxation and the Tribute was a major point of consensus 
among Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot members of the Legislative Council, threatening the basis of 
the British rationale on the composition of the Council, that is, the cooperation of the Turkish-
Cypriot deputies with the British officials against their Greek-Cypriot counterparts. Colonial 
officials themselves urged the metropolitan government to abolish the Tribute, which constituted 
a constant point of severe criticism by Cypriot politicians and journalists. As the then Under-
Secretary of State Winston Churchill wrote in 1907: 
Although the most grinding economies were enforced, although all public works 
were neglected and the whole administration cut down to starvation point, we 
never succeeded, any more than the Sultan, in squeezing out of them the whole 
tribute of £92,800. … [Cyprus] passed under the most rigid Treasury control.22  
Any calls for abolishing the Tribute, however, were bound to be ignored due to the metropolitan 
Government’s position that Cyprus, as any other colony should not burden the British taxpayer 
in any way and thus had to finance all government spending with its own revenue.   
                                                 
20 Robert Lang, ‘Cyprus after twelve years of British Rule’, Macmillan’s Magazine LXIII (1890-1), 20.   
21 Georghallides, 1979, pp. 27-29.; Rappas, 2008, p. 32; Georgios Georghallides, ‘The British Colonial Period’, in 
John Charalambous and Georgios Georghallides, Focus on Cyprus (London: University of North London Press, 
1993), 54. 
22 Cited in Georghallides, 1979, p. 28. 
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Under these conditions, the economy of Cyprus experienced very low levels of economic 
growth. The island witnessed some small-scale development after 1895, when Joseph 
Chamberlain became Secretary of State for the Colonies. Thanks to his more liberal financial 
policy, Cyprus received some metropolitan loans for the development of its infrastructure, such 
as harbours and railways.23 Cash flows on the island only saw a significant increase during the 
years of the First World War, due to the need to supply British forces in the region and the 
growing external demand for agricultural products.  
Under this strict financial policy, the administration of education was left to the local 
communities. Schools were largely dependent on fees from students and private donations, as 
government aid was scarce, though directed to schools of both communities. This constituted a 
significant change of policy, as under the Ottoman administration, only Muslim schools received 
financial support from the government, while Greek Christian schools were exclusively 
dependent on communal contributions, coming mainly from the Church. Under the British, 
Orthodox and Muslim schools continued to follow teaching curricula modelled respectively on 
the Greek and the Ottoman educational systems.  
Both communities had their separate town and village school committees, district 
committees and boards of education, which covered all administrative affairs, such as the 
appointment, dismissal, payment and promotion of teachers; the establishment and maintenance 
of schools; and the drafting of teaching curricula.24 Village and town school committees were 
elected annually by the taxpaying male population of each village or town. At the next level, the 
Christian district committee consisted of the British District Commissioner, the bishop of the 
district, and four more members, again elected by the taxpaying male inhabitants of the district. 
The Muslim district committee was composed of the British District Commissioner, the Sharia 
Judge of the district and four elected members. Finally, every two years the district committees 
elected six members (one from each district) for each of the two boards of education. In addition 
to these elected representatives, the Christian board of education consisted of the British Chief 
Secretary, the Archbishop, and three Greek-Cypriot members of the Legislative Council; 
                                                 
23 Rappas, 2008, p. 33. 
24 Heraclidou, 2011, p. 15. 
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similarly, the Muslim board of education consisted, in addition to its own district-elected 
members, of the Chief Secretary, the Chief Cadi, the Mufti, and a representative of the Evkaf.  
Throughout the period of British rule, the structure and administration of education 
underwent several changes, but always remained inextricably linked to the financial policy of the 
colonial government and the politics of both communities. Most importantly, the British wanted 
to avoid any action that would provoke opposition from the local population. Under this axiom, 
the government was initially willing to maintain to a certain extent the privileges of the 
confessional elites of both communities and accept their control over education. In the following 
decades, however, as Greek-Cypriot schools became a focal point for nationalist mobilization on 
the island, the British attempted to de-nationalize education. One of the first such moves, which 
took place at the end of the nineteenth century, was to attach to the Pan-Cypriot Gymnasium the 
extra role of training elementary school teachers, who were hitherto trained mainly in Greece.25  
 
1.2 The Local Elites in the Face of British Rule 
The withdrawal of the Ottoman authorities and the incorporation of Cyprus in the British Empire 
forced the traditional Christian and Muslim religious elites to find ways to adapt to the new, 
secular political and administrative context so as to maintain their political power.26 Under the 
Ottoman administration, the head of the autocephalous Orthodox Church – the Archbishop – was 
recognized as not only the spiritual but also the political leader of his congregation. Similarly, 
the cadi (judge) and the mufti (interpreter of the Sharia Law) were recognized as the de facto 
leaders and representatives of the Muslims of the island. By contrast, the political privileges that 
the Ottomans had granted to the Christian and Muslim higher clergy were not recognized under 
British rule. All Cypriot subjects of the new administration became equal, irrespective of rank, 
religion, or position at a religious hierarchy. Equality before the English Statute Law meant that 
the clergy would be taxed equally to the lay members of their congregation, and that the judicial 
                                                 
25 Heraclidou, 2011, p. 17. 
26 For a study of the Church’s role as an institution of political power from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth 
century, see Michail Michail, ‘Η διαδικασία συγκρότησης ενός θεσμού εξουσίας: Εκκλησία της Κύπρου 1754-1910 
[The process of formation of a power institution: Church of Cyprus 1754-1910]’, (University of Cyprus D.Phil 
Thesis, 2004). For an overview of the politics of the Church throughout colonial rule, see Sia Anagnostopoulou, ‘Η 
Εκκλησία της Κύπρου και ο εθναρχικός της ρόλος: 1878-1960 [The Church of Cyprus and its ethnarchic role: 1878-
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system would treat a priest or imam the same as an ordinary villager. In a particularly scandalous 
incident in 1879, two priests were arrested for a minor offence and had their beards shaved while 
in custody – for sanitary purposes, according to prison policy.27 Letters of support to the priests 
and of protest to the government were published in the Greek-Cypriot press, while the incident 
was discussed in the House of Lords. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Salisbury 
was forced to admit that there was no justification for the incident and that steps had been taken 
to prevent anything similar happening in the future.28 Nevertheless, a few months later, Salisbury 
stressed to the High Commissioner that it should be made clear to the clergy that any demands to 
be exempted from the ordinary process of Civil and Criminal Law would be rejected.29 
Although the British did not radically reform either the fiscal or the land-ownership 
systems, they did encourage a shift towards the liberation of peasants from big land-owners, 
most notably the Church and the Evkaf. As the Ottoman land regime was undermined during the 
early years of British rule, lands owned by the Church and Evkaf were being claimed by a mass 
of poor peasants, whose rights of usufruct gradually evolved into rights of full ownership.30 Most 
significantly, the new administration made taxes directly payable to the state and abolished the 
tithe for a large number of products, while the tax-farmers of the Ottoman period were required 
to pay in full the revenue that had been collected and owned to the state.31 In the new legal 
framework, ecclesiastical property became subject to state laws and the obligatory levies of the 
Christians to the prelates were abolished, reducing the available revenues of the Church.32 As the 
Church’s control over the Orthodox population was principally based on the dependence of this 
population on the prelates, the reforms threatened its authority at the social level. Indeed, soon 
after the arrival of the British, peasants began refusing to pay their yearly dues to the Orthodox 
Church, indicating the undermining of religious authority in the popular imagination. As early as 
1880, Archbishop Sophronios complained to the High Commissioner that Church’s finances 
                                                 
27 Gail Hook, Protectorate Cyprus: British Imperial Power before WWI (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 130. 
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29 Hook, 2012, p. 131. 
30 Rolandos Katsiaounis, ‘Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the second half of the nineteenth century’ 
(King’s College London D.Phil Thesis, 1996), 220. 
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would fall into ruin unless police assisted them to collect tithes, in the name of their ab antiquo 
privileges that had been codified by Ottoman decree.33 
In the case of the Muslim religious elite, the loss of its direct links with the Ottoman 
Government led to an even greater loss of power, even though Cyprus nominally remained an 
Ottoman province until 1914. As the new administrative system degraded the Muslim 
community from the Millet-i Hakime (the supreme community) to a religious community with a 
limited political role, the Muslim religious authorities faced a more severe crisis of authority than 
their Orthodox counterparts. Notably, the principle of proportionality became intensely criticized 
as soon as it was introduced by the British in the early 1880s. According to the Muslim elite, 
proportional representation in the Legislative Council was fundamentally unjust and favoured the 
Greek Orthodox community.34 The Muslims counter-proposed the adoption of equal 
representation, that is, the composition of the island’s councils and the public service by an equal 
number of Muslim and Christian members. 
The undermining of the religious authorities’ established position also led to common 
initiatives undertaken by both Christian and Muslim religious officials in the defence of their 
interests. As mentioned, the British administration did not abolish the Ottoman district councils 
and the Central Administrative Council. The responsibilities of these councils, however, were 
greatly reduced, while the majority of the Central Council’s responsibilities – legislative, 
executive and judicial – were instead transferred to the Legislative and Executive Councils. In 
1881, the Christian and Muslim members of the Central Council protested the absence of formal 
jurisdiction, while three years later the Bishop of Kition asked for the reinstitution of the district 
councils’ responsibilities, stressing that both the Mufti and the bishops, being the spiritual heads 
of the island’s communities, should be permanent members.35   
The main institution through which the Orthodox Church would attempt to secure its 
traditional power was the Legislative Council itself. The division between the Muslim and the 
Christian communities, which had become institutionalized and politicized in the selection of 
                                                 
33 Bryant, 2004, p. 16. 
34 Philios Zannetos, Ιστορία της Νήσου Κύπρου από της αγγλικής κατοχής μέχρι σήμερον [History of the island of 
Cyprus from British occupation until today] (Larnaca: Typois “Filokalias”, 1911), 318, 320, memorandum by the 
Muslim authorities, April 1882.       
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council members, was key to the Church’s attempt to claim authority over the Greek-Cypriot 
community within the new political context. Because the colonial state refused to safeguard its 
political and economic authority, the Church was forced to rethink its relationship with its 
congregation. The formalization of dividing the population into ethno-religious groups facilitated 
the prelates in emerging as the de facto leadership of the Greek-Cypriot community. The Church 
was the only well-organized local institution of the Ottoman period, and the Christian (and 
Muslim) clergy had a traditional dominant presence in politics. At the same time, despite British 
innovations, the Greek-Cypriot population remained economically dependent on the Church, 
which retained its status as the biggest landowner on the island. Considering the impact that 
religion had on people’s everyday life,36 as well as the fact that the poll was not secret until 
1906,37 it is no surprise that the prelates were easily elected to the Christian seats of the 
Legislative Council from the very first elections.38   
Most importantly, the Church developed a nationalist discourse, appropriating the main 
political discourse of the bourgeoisie of the late nineteenth century. Throughout colonial rule, the 
Church strove to emerge as the national authority of the Greek-Cypriot community, and came 
increasingly to regard the union of Cyprus with Greece as its main aspiration. In fact, the 
survival of the Church came to be intrinsically connected to that of a Hellenic identity on the 
island, reminiscent of the role of the Catholic faith in the revival of a Gaelic identity in 
nineteenth-century Ireland.39  
Similarly to Christian prelates, members of the ulema (Muslim religious scholars and 
notables) were also elected to the Legislative Council. Moreover, the official legal status of 
Cyprus as an Ottoman territory until 1914 secured a second role for the Muslim religious elite. 
The 1878 Cyprus Convention provided not only that the Muslim community would partially 
                                                 
36 During the Ottoman period, the Church was the main authority regulating local rivalries, the production and 
distribution of commodities and the artistic and cultural expression of the Christian population. Michail, 2004, p. 
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37 The secret ballot was introduced for the 1906 elections for the Legislative Council. See The Cyprus Gazette, 18 
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retain its privileged access to positions in the administration, but also that the economic and 
institutional role of the Evkaf would represent a further means of intervention for the Ottoman 
Government. According to the Annex of the 1878 Convention, the Sharia Courts would continue 
to exist and would assume sole jurisdiction over religious matters concerning the Muslim 
population of the island. Furthermore, the administration of the Evkaf was vested in one delegate 
appointed by the Ottoman Government and one appointed by the British. 
Thus, while the political and administrative power of the Muslim religious authorities 
was reduced, their role was at the same time institutionally recognized by the British. This was 
the key for them to claim their power over the Muslim population of the island. This objective 
was equally necessary for the British, as long as the Turkish-Cypriot traditional elite remained 
under their control. This alignment of interests is observable already from the beginning of 
British rule on the island and more evident from the early twentieth century onward. Overall, the 
broad adoption of the Ottoman administrative system by the British and the institutionalization 
of communalism allowed for the maintenance of the religious elites’ power and allowed for the 
preservation of the existing social equilibrium, both between the general population and the 
elites, as well as between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots.    
 
1.3 The Advance of Greek-Cypriot Nationalism 
The secularization of political power encouraged certain laymen within the communal 
administration to challenge the absolute supremacy of the Church. In particular, they raised the 
question of the management of the Church’s revenue, contributing to the intensification of 
conflict within the Church between a faction that recognized the Church’ obligation to concede 
political power to the laymen and another that insisted on maintaining the traditional hegemony 
of the clergy.40 The conflict did not occur between a secular-minded laity and the clergy, but 
within the Church itself. The clergy became increasingly divided between the older, more 
conciliatory prelates and a new, intransigent faction that strongly advocated for enosis. The first 
group owed its leading role to the traditional, confessional organization of society, and did not 
                                                 




oppose the incorporation of Cyprus into the British Empire. The second group supported the 
annexation of the island into the Greek nation-state, and argued that Greek-Cypriot deputies in 
the Legislative Council should press forward such a demand. This faction was significantly 
reinforced during the first decade of the twentieth century, when Athens-educated Cypriots, both 
laymen and clerics, began to return to the island and gradually formed a new generation of 
politicians and community leaders.41 This new nationalist intelligentsia was particularly active in 
the field of education. Literate villagers and priests who had been undertaking teaching roles 
were eventually displaced by graduates of the University of Athens and secondary schools on the 
island. Notably, between 1898 and 1936, all schoolmasters of the Pan-Cypriot Gymnasium came 
from Greece, while teachers educated in Greece constituted about a third of the total teaching 
staff on the island. In addition, the Greek Ministry of Education determined the curriculum and 
books to be used by the island’s schools.42 Despite its ardent nationalist ideology and its initial 
anti-clerical policy, this faction, being unable to overturn the confessional organization of 
society, attempted rather to promote its nationalist politics through the Church. The conflict was 
thus expressed within the Church, whose discourse became more politicized and militant.  
As the political claims of the new, intransigent faction became popular within the 
Church, the conflict against the older, conciliatory elements was restricted to that institution. In 
this context, the participation of the prelates in the elections was a major factor in the 
politicization of their discourse. At the same time, due to the rivalry with the laymen, they 
appropriated part of the latter’s discourse and thus articulated a more militant political agenda. 
Moreover, the lay element participated in the elections for ecclesiastical offices, thus forcing the 
clerical candidates to adopt parts of the lay agenda and to build alliances with members of the lay 
elites.43 By the turn of the twentieth century, the pursuit of enosis had become a significant 
component of the political discourse of the Greek-Cypriot elites. In particular, the old, 
conciliatory elements adopted the claim of enosis and came to see the Church as the unique 
national authority of the Greek-Cypriots, which should maintain good relations with the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul. The new, intransigent party, despite its initial opposition to 
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the participation of the prelates in the elections for the Legislative Council, as well as its position 
in favour of the participation of laymen in the management of Church revenues, cooperated with 
the Bishop of Kition after his election at the Council in 1883, and gradually recognized the 
Church as a national authority.44     
The conflict between the modernist and the traditionalist factions, which rallied behind 
the Bishops of Kition and Kyrenia, respectively, peaked around 1900 when the Archiepiscopal 
See fell vacant after the death of Archbishop Sophronios.45 The archiepiscopal question evolved 
into a multi-level conflict that brought the nationalist bourgeoisie of Larnaca against the 
conservative traditional landowning elite of Nicosia.46 For the faction that supported the 
Bishopric of Kition in the election, the main criterion of patriotism was loyalty to the Greek 
nation and the Greek nation state. As for their opponents, represented by the Archbishopric, the 
Bishopric of Kyrenia and the monasteries, they viewed patriotism as loyalty to the religious faith 
and belief in the primacy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The archiepiscopal question culminated 
therefore in a confrontation between a nationalist party that recognized the Greek state as the 
national centre of Hellenism and a traditionalist party that placed the national centre in the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate and was willing to collaborate with the colonial state, while claiming a 
modern representative system of government. Furthermore, the confrontation between these two 
factions soon expanded into issues that concerned the functioning of Church administration. The 
intransigent nationalists repeatedly called for transparent and democratic management of the 
Church’s property and revenue by incorporating the participation of the laity. The issue was 
resolved in 1910, after the intervention of the colonial government and the Patriarchate of 
Alexandria. The new, intransigent faction prevailed, and the Church gradually adopted a set of 
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nationalist policies. From that year onwards, the demand for enosis was constantly put forward 
by the Church. These nationalist politics and discourse, however, would not become explicitly 
anti-British and anti-colonial until the second half of the 1920s.   
Until at least the end of the First World War, Greek-Cypriot nationalists only timidly put 
forth their claims; the enosis movement remained largely incidental until the mid-1920s. As a 
rule, Greek-Cypriot political leaders submitted petitions and memoranda and despatched 
telegrams to the local and metropolitan British authorities. They also sent delegations, often 
headed by the Archbishop, to London to promote the cause of enosis, appealing to British 
generosity. The policy of petitions, despite the slightly more militant character it acquired in 
periods of economic hardship, such as in 1887, or during Greek-Turkish crises, such as in 1897-
98 and 1912-13, had a negligible impact on the Colonial Office. In most cases, the British 
reminded the Greek-Cypriots that the island remained an Ottoman territory, and that Britain 
therefore had no right to cede Cyprus to any other state, as this would constitute a violation of 
the 1878 Cyprus Convention. After Britain annexed the island in November 1914, the British 
stressed the need to protect the interests of the Turkish-Cypriot community, an argument that 
would be reemployed in the 1950s. Overall, the British Government did not contest the 
nationalist claims of the Greek-Cypriots until the 1920s, a policy that reached its apogee in 
October 1915, when Britain offered Cyprus to Greece. 
 As a Colonial Office official stated in June 1895, the calls for enosis should be ignored, 
given that there was no attempt to translate them into action or to breach the peace in the colony 
in any way.47 In the same spirit, when High Commissioner Smith suggested that enosist agitation 
be made illegal, the Colonial Office responded by appointing the more tolerant King-Harman as 
his successor. In December 1904, a few weeks after assuming office, the new High 
Commissioner observed that the enosist calls were the natural consequence of the Greek-
Cypriots’ national instincts and could not be considered hostile propaganda against the British 
administration.48 An even more sympathetic approach was employed by the Under-Secretary of 
State, Winston Churchill, who, upon his visit to Cyprus in 1907, stated:  
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44 
 
I think it only natural that the Cypriot people, who are of Greek descent, should 
regards their incorporation with what may be called their mother-country as an 
ideal to be earnestly, devoutly, and fervently cherished.49 
British attitudes would, however, change after the end of the First World War, and 
especially after Cyprus became officially a Crown Colony in 1925. As the Assistant Under-
Secretary noted, referring to a protest by Archbishop Cyril against the constitutional changes 
brought about with the transformation of the island into a Crown Colony,   
[N]ow that Cyprus is definitely a British colony it seems to me that this rubbish 
about an enslaved people with national aspirations for transfer to Greece is very 
near sedition.50  
In the following period, the colonial state would constantly intervene in both Greek- and 
Turkish-Cypriot communal affairs, as will be discussed in following chapters.    
The appeal of nationalism among Greek-Cypriots, as well as their opposition to British 
rule, gradually intensified after the end of the war. The first move of the Greek-Cypriot 
leadership that was openly hostile to the colonial regime can actually be traced to the early 
1910s. Soon after the resolution of the archiepiscopal question, the outbreak of war between the 
Ottoman Empire and Italy in September 1911 placed the maintenance of the status quo in the 
Eastern Mediterranean into peril, and forced the intransigent faction to adopt a more militant 
stance. In April 1912, all the Greek-Cypriot members of the Legislative Council resigned, 
demanding more political liberties, the abolition of the Tribute and enosis.51 The crisis provoked 
by the resignations had a severe impact on communal relations, causing the most extensive 
disturbances on the island since 1878. Outbreaks of violence that occurred in several places at 
the same time resulted in five fatalities, while 17 persons were seriously injured. The 
Commission of Inquiry that was formed afterwards, composed by a British, a Turkish-Cypriot 
and a Greek-Cypriot, was unable to agree as to responsibility, though concern was expressed 
about the reliability of the police,  mainly composed of Turkish-Cypriots, in controlling riots.52      
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 The outbreak of the First World War and the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war 
against Britain in November 1914 made the British authorities fear a possible threat on the 
island. Nevertheless, the Turkish-Cypriot elite assured the government early on of its loyalty to 
Britain, while the Greek-Cypriot leadership avoided a militant stance such as the one taken in 
1912. In fact, the biggest political split on the island was within the Greek-Cypriot community 
itself, which, especially after 1916, was increasingly divided between Venizelist and royalist 
camps, echoing the respective and much more acute polarization in Greece.53      
  Following the end of the war, a Greek-Cypriot delegation, headed by the Archbishop, 
proceeded to London in January 1919 to submit a petition for enosis to the government and the 
parliament.54 Despite the international post-war rhetoric on the right to self-determination and 
some initial encouragement by the Prime Minister Lloyd George, the delegation eventually 
proved unsuccessful. This initiative, however, constituted a turning point in the Greek-Cypriot 
leadership. Two years later, the Political Organization of Cyprus was created, presided over by 
the Archbishop and headed by a National Council. The purpose of the organization was to 
promote effectively the nationalist claims of the Greek-Cypriot leadership.55 In 1922, the Greek-
Cypriot elites, divided between those demanding immediate enosis and those who considered 
self-government as an intermediate stage, decided to boycott the elections for the Legislative 
Council, in protest against the government’s intransigence on enosis.56 Although the boycott 
movement failed, as seven Greek-Cypriots ran for the elections and were elected, the initiative 
made the intentions of the National Council clear. In the following years, enosist actions 
increased, as will be discussed in the next chapter, deepening the politicization of the Greek-
Cypriot community.  
 In the same period, following the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, a 
political trend of Kemalist nationalism and modernism was becoming ever more apparent within 
the Turkish-Cypriot community, posing a serious threat to the traditionalist pro-government 
Turkish-Cypriot elite. This trend was particularly evident in the Turkish-Cypriot press, but also 
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in official bodies, most significantly the Legislative Council. After a long period of almost 
absolute loyalty to the British, the cooperation of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership with the 
government could no longer be taken for granted. Most importantly, cooperation among the 
Turkish-Cypriot members of the Legislative Council with their Greek-Cypriot counterparts 
against the colonial government was becoming increasingly frequent at the end of the 1920s, and 
especially after the prevalence of the modernists in the 1930 elections, peaking before the 1931 
revolt. Furthermore, the second half of the 1920s witnessed the emergence of a new political 
force that rejected nationalist politics and claimed to represent the interests of the lower classes 
of the island. The Communist Party of Cyprus, officially founded in 1926, became particularly 
active in the formation of trade unions and the mobilization of the Cypriot working class.   
These political developments and the rising social discontent in the late 1920s and early 
1930s, owing mainly to the economic hardship of the population, led to one of the most 
significant political crises in the island’s history. The 1931 October revolt would come as a 
surprise to both the colonial authorities and the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot political forces, 
given the fragmentation of Cyprus’ political landscape and the relative calmness existing on the 
island in the previous decade – compared to the much more acute unrest happening around the 
Eastern Mediterranean in the same period.    
 In April 1931, the Legislative Council rejected the proposed Customs, Excise and 
Revenue Bill, thanks to the shared opposition of Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot deputies.57 In 
September of the same year, the government passed the Law through an Order in Council.58 In 
the following days, the outcry raised in the Greek-Cypriot community forced the Greek-Cypriot 
deputies to oppose government policy more vigorously. On 17 October, the Bishop of Kition, a 
member of the Legislative Council and a moderate nationalist among the Greek-Cypriot 
community, resigned from the body. He subsequently proclaimed enosis, declared civil 
disobedience and called the Greek-Cypriots to give everything for the realization of union, even 
their lives. On 21 October, their hand forced by the bishop’s move, all Greek-Cypriot Council 
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members resigned and proceeded to the Nicosia Commercial Club to address the gathered 
crowd.59       
  After the councillors finished their speeches, some 5000 Greek-Cypriots marched 
towards the Government House, carrying sticks, torches, banners and Greek flags. Shouting 
slogans in favour of enosis and the end of British rule, they eventually set the building on fire.60 
Soon afterwards, riots broke out across the island, in both urban and rural areas. On the 
following day, summoned by church bells, a crowd in Limassol armed with sticks and tins of 
petrol set the District Commissioner’s house on fire. On 24 October, 300 persons led by the 
Bishop of Kyrenia raided government offices in the town and replaced the British flag with a 
Greek one. On the same day, supporters of the Communist Party attacked the Famagusta police 
station. Violence spread to the rural areas, with instances including stone-throwing at British 
troops, the burning of customs buildings and government offices, the destruction of forest 
stations and plantations, raids on police stations, lootings of salt stores (the product being a 
government monopoly), the despoiling of a ration lorry and the robbing of a tax collector. In 
total, there were instances of violence reported in every major town in Cyprus as well as 209 of 
the island’s 598 Greek-Cypriot or mixed villages.   
The revolt was quite easily suppressed by the British within a week. Upon the Governor’s 
request, the British Mediterranean fleet despatched two cruisers and two destroyers carrying 
platoons of royal marines to supplement the small contingent of Royal Welsh Fusiliers posted in 
Cyprus. Additional units were transported by air from Egypt. The local police set up and armed a 
voluntary force of a further 40 men, mostly British officials residing on the island. Within a few 
days, many Greek-Cypriot politicians and communists were arrested and law and order was 
restored throughout the island. In total, seven Greek-Cypriot civilians were killed during the 
revolt, 68 persons were wounded (29 civilians and 39 soldiers and policemen), 400 were 
arrested, ten were deported for life (mainly elite politicians and clergymen), and 3359 were 
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brought to court, leading to 2606 convictions for penalties ranging from simple fines to prison 
sentences of up to five years. Although the revolt had been an exclusively Greek-Cypriot affair, a 
Reparation Impost Law levied indiscriminately fines on towns and villages considered as 
collectively responsible for seditious actions, for a total amount of £34,315.  
 Immediately after the suppression of the revolt, the colonial authorities imposed an 
authoritarian regime on the colony, resembling in part the British administrative policy in Malta 
during the 1920s and 1930s.61 First to be abolished was the Legislative Council, while the 
Governor was vested with full powers. The Executive Council was maintained, its membership 
reformed to consist of the Governor, four official members – the Colonial Secretary, the 
Commissioner of Nicosia, the Attorney General and the Treasurer – and three non-official 
members, nominated by the Governor. In the following period, a series of laws were passed, 
which, among others, abolished all electoral procedures and representative institutions, imposed 
censorship on the press, forbade assemblies of more than five persons, outlawed the Communist 
Party and generally suppressed all political activity on the island.62 In 1933, an Advisory Council 
was established in place of the Legislative Council. All of its members, like the district and 
municipal councils, were appointed by the Governor. The authoritarian regime would be partially 
lifted only during the years of World War II.  
 
Conclusion 
Cyprus was occupied by Britain in 1878 to secure the empire’s interests in the sea route to India, 
but the strategic importance of the island decreased significantly four years later, when the 
British occupied Egypt. Given the island’s limited value until the end of the First World War, the 
British authorities did not interfere much with local political activity, as long as public order was 
not disturbed. Even the enosist claims of the Greek-Cypriot elite were tolerated by the British, as 
long as it was phrased as an aspiration for the future. At the same time, the adoption of Ottoman 
administrative structures allowed for the maintenance of the authority of the traditional 
confessional elites. Conversely, the secularization of the political power, the introduction of 
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representative institutions and the expansion of the press facilitated the emergence of new 
political actors, initially within the Greek-Cypriot community. The end of the war brought about 
a significant increase in the island’s strategic importance. The British authorities started to 
interfere actively in Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot communal affairs, especially after the island 
was officially declared a Crown Colony. In the same period, Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders 
would promote nationalist policies, as will be analysed in chapters 2 and 3. The confrontation 
between the government and part of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaderships over the control 
of communal affairs gathered speed and culminated in late 1931. In October, with a background 
of acute economic hardship and growing popular discontent, a Greek-Cypriot revolt broke out 
throughout the island, bringing to the fore a variety of grievances, all under the slogan of enosis.  
 The October revolt, which constituted ‘the most humiliating blow sustained by the British 
in any of their Crown Colonies’ during the interwar period, was followed by the imposition of 
authoritarian rule on the island.63 Many of the repressive measures were eventually lifted during 
the early 1940s, yet the suspension of constitutional government in Cyprus was, uniquely in 
British colonial policy, never reversed before the end of colonial rule. Granting a semi-liberal 
constitution to the colony would only briefly be considered by the British after the end of the 
Second World War. Despite the initially positive reaction from the Turkish-Cypriot leadership 
and the Left, the initiative did not materialize, mainly due to the intransigence of the Greek-
Cypriot nationalist leadership. As will be analysed in the following chapters, despite the 
government’s attempts to suppress political activity on the island, Cypriot society was 
pervasively politicized during the 1930s and 1940s, demonstrating the failure of the British to 
make Cyprus ‘a real colony’.
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Chapter 2: Confessional vs. Secular Politics and the Consolidation of Greek-
Cypriot Nationalism 
  
This chapter explores the development of Greek-Cypriot politics from the second half of the 
1920s until the end of the 1940s, focusing on the gradual consolidation of nationalism within the 
community and examining closely two principal points of contention, both involving the 
Orthodox Church. Following the 1931 revolt, the colonial authorities sought to repress the 
political activities of the Church, the main advocate of enosis, and counter the appeal of 
nationalism among the Greek-Cypriot population. At the same time, the politics of the nationalist 
elites, among which the Church was the most powerful, was directly challenged by the secular 
political space of the Left. Nevertheless, nationalist politics gradually prevailed within the 
community by both confrontations reinforcing the Church. On the one hand, the Church 
managed to enhance its political authority, claiming to represent the national interests of the 
Greek-Cypriot population against the colonial government. On the other hand, the main party of 
the Left, AKEL, was eventually forced to fully adopt the enosist discourse and recognize the 
Church as the national leadership of the community. In 1950, the Left would support the Church 
in organizing a plebiscite on enosis, which resulted in an overwhelming vote in favour of the 
union of Cyprus with Greece.  
As this chapter focuses on the consolidation of nationalism within the Greek-Cypriot 
community, the politics of the Communist Party and AKEL are here examined mostly in their 
relation to the nationalist politics of the Greek-Cypriot elites. The role of the parties of the Left 
and the labour movement in the politicization of Cypriot society as a whole and their 
confrontation with the government are explored in chapter 4.   
 
2.1 Political Dynamics and the 1931 Crisis  
During the 1920s and the early 1930s, significant developments within and outside Cyprus led to 
the gradual redefinition of Cypriot politics. Within a context of economic recession, the 
emergence of new dynamics in the Cypriot political landscape reshaped intra-communal and 
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inter-communal politics, and created the grounds for the expression of anti-colonial politics. By 
1931, the existing political order had become intensely destabilized, and the consensual 
administration of the colony had become unmanageable for the British. At the end of the year, 
the outbreak of the October revolt crystallized the political dynamics of the previous period, thus 
constituting a turning point in the evolution of Greek-Cypriot politics and the relations between 
that community and the colonial authorities.  
 
The Politics of the Elites 
Following the end of the First World War, and especially after May 1925, when Cyprus was 
officially declared a Crown Colony, the British began to intervene more actively in Greek- and 
Turkish-Cypriot communal affairs. In the case of the Greek-Cypriot community, this became 
particularly evident in the domain of education. In 1923, a law on Christian educational affairs 
included provisions stipulating that teachers would be appointed directly by the Governor, on the 
recommendation of the Christian board of education.1 The law was amended further in 1929, so 
as to severely limit the autonomy of communal education. According to the amended law, the 
three Christian members of the Legislative Council lost their ex-officio positions on the board, 
and the six remaining members, which had been previously elected by the district committees, 
would then be appointed by the Governor himself. The board would be furthermore deprived of 
the ability to appoint, transfer, promote or dismiss elementary school teachers, who would be 
placed under the direct supervision of the Department of Education, which from then on would 
be responsible for all educational affairs.2 Government intervention in the communal privileges 
of the community, both in education and other domains that had been autonomously managed – 
especially the appointment of village authorities – caused part of the Greek-Cypriot elites and the 
press to promote nationalist politics and demand for enosis more intensely, in response to British 
attempts to ‘de-Hellenize’ Greek-Cypriot youth.  
At the same time, another segment of the elites chose to adopt a more moderate stance on 
enosist politics. Their position was reinforced by significant political developments outside the 
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island during the second half of the 1920s. The outcome of the 1919-22 Greco-Turkish war, 
marked by the Asia Minor Disaster and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, put a 
tragic end to Greek irredentism (the Megali Idea) as a coherent national project. These events 
challenged the realism of enosis and put the intransigent nationalist discourse temporarily into 
question. In this context, following 1922, one can observe the emergence of two rival groups: the 
intransigent and moderate unionists. Both groups regarded the union of Cyprus with Greece as 
their goal, but each promoted a different set of policies. The first group considered enosis to be 
an absolute, immediate goal. They pushed for non-cooperation with the British authorities, and 
advocated for the refusal to pay taxes and the resignation of the Greek-Cypriot deputies from the 
Legislative Council. The second group placed enosis within a more pragmatic political approach, 
which aimed at social and economic reforms for the improvement of living conditions and the 
expansion of communal autonomy. This group began to argue explicitly for autonomy or self-
government within the British Empire, along the lines of a deal recently achieved by Malta.3   
Just as the conflict between a conciliatory and an intransigent camp at the beginning of 
the century ended with the resolution of the archiepiscopal question in 1910, the rivalry between 
the moderates and the intransigents was again debated within the Church. The moderate 
unionists rallied around Nicodemos, the Bishop of Kition, while the intransigent unionists rallied 
around Makarios, the Bishop of Kyrenia, and the Abbot of the Kykko Monastery. Archbishop 
Cyril (1916-1933) did not interfere much in politics, despite his tacit support of the intransigents’ 
camp. Cyril had generally cultivated good relations with the British and at least until the mid-
1920s urged the Greek-Cypriot population to act as loyal subjects and cooperate fully with the 
government.4 In October 1925, the confrontation between the two camps spilled into the 
elections for the Legislative Council. The election results demonstrated the clear prevalence of 
the moderates, to the satisfaction of the government. The British could expect that the new 
deputies would cooperate with the colonial government, and promote the claim of self-
government rather than enosis.5 Nevertheless, Britain did not formulate an offer that would 
enhance the position of the moderate camp (such an offer would have to wait until the mid-
1940s), thus contributing to the gradual dominance of the intransigent nationalists. In the 
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following elections that took place in 1930, the success of the intransigents signalled the 
beginning of a period of strong confrontation between the two camps, and between the Greek-
Cypriot political leadership and the government over the control of communal affairs.      
The main principles of the moderate unionists group were codified in two articles by the 
Bishop of Kition,  published in the newspaper Nea Isotis (New Equality) under the title ‘Mea 
Culpa’ on 3 and 10 October 1931. The Bishop’s main preoccupation was to defend the moderate 
push for reforms by cooperating with the British.6 In January 1930, the intransigent unionists had 
formed the National Organization of Cyprus to advance their position within the Greek-Cypriot 
community. The Bishop of Kyrenia toured the countryside, visiting numerous villages and 
delivering speeches, usually after Church services, that clearly expressed the intransigent 
discourse and political aims.7 On 30 September 1930, at the village church of Kalopanayiotis in 
Nicosia, the Bishop stated:   
We should not ask England to grant us Autonomy or Self-government but Union 
and only Union which is [sic] the only means of our becoming prosperous... [Τ]he 
English, like Satan, are depriving us of our liberty... [W]e shall send the English 
away not with guns or cannons but by the help of God… Cyprus will only prosper 
when united with Greece.8   
A few days later at the church of Kaminaria in Limassol, the Bishop made clear that, in order to 
achieve enosis, the population and all political forces needed to stay united, act with discipline 
and be prepared for great sacrifices.9 In his speeches, the Bishop, using harsh language against 
the British, emphasized the question of communal autonomy:  
We have small snakes which bite us every day without wounding us. These 
snakes are the English, who bite us every day and suck our blood.10   
[The Governor] deprived us of the rights that we had enjoyed under the barbarous 
Turks. It was proved that he is more rude and barbarous still than the Turks. The 
Turks gave us rights in managing our education, Mukhtars [chairmen of village 
councils] and Rural Constables but the famous imperialist deprived us of all 
these.11  
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In the same period, significant political developments within the Turkish-Cypriot 
community, increasingly apparent during the second half of the 1920s, reinforced the feasibility 
of anti-colonial politics. As will be analyzed in the next chapter, the 1930 elections for the 
Legislative Council – the last to be held on the island – demonstrated the growing appeal of a 
Kemalist nationalist and modernist political force which challenged the traditionalist, pro-British 
leadership of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Until the 1931 revolt, the increasing cooperation 
among Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot deputies in the Legislative Council threatened the very 
operation of the body, on which the British had depended for administering the colony 
consensually.  
 
Politicization from Below 
While the rivalries at the elite level were rising, a new political force emerged during the second 
half of the 1920s that would seek to redefine Cypriot politics at the grassroots level. The 
Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK), officially founded in 1926, put forward a social and political 
programme calling for the overturning of the politico-economic power of the Greek- and 
Turkish-Cypriot elites. The party promoted class politics, rejected nationalism and denounced 
the demand for enosis. Thanks to its activity in organizing labour associations and its decisive 
role in the first phase of the nascent labour movement, the KKK had emerged as a significant 
political force by the end of the 1920s.   
Although the party addressed both communities and rejected the established power 
structure on the island as a whole, its main front within local politics was against the Greek-
Cypriot leadership, while its appeal to the Turkish-Cypriots remained limited. The most 
significant opposition to the party came from the Greek-Cypriot nationalist bourgeoisie and the 
Church. From the early days of the KKK’s existence, these groups denounced its positions and 
activities, supported repressive measures enacted by the government and, in many cases, 
launched or supported attacks against the members of the party.  
Articles against communism appeared in Greek-Cypriot newspapers even before the 
foundation of the KKK. In early 1925, Eleftheria [Freedom], the most popular newspaper among 
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the Greek-Cypriot community, denounced communism and the toleration that, according to the 
newspaper, the movement received from the government.12 Alitheia [Truth] welcomed the 
government’s deportation of Nicos Yiavopoulos, a leading figure of the party, from the island. 
According to the Greek Consul Alexis Kyrou, the colonial authorities deported Yiavopoulos at 
the instigation of Greek-Cypriot deputies.13 In the same year, newspaper sellers in Limassol were 
beaten on the orders of the mayor for selling the party newspaper Neos Anthropos [New Man], 
while signs bearing party insignia were destroyed outside its offices.14 The effort to limit the 
influence of the party also appeared at the institutional level. In July 1925, three contractors 
founded an association in Limassol for Greek-Cypriot construction workers, in the hope of 
reducing the appeal of the KKK-controlled Εργατικό Κέντρο Λεμεσού [Limassol Labour Centre] 
among the workers. In 1931, the founding of the Πανεργατική Ένωση [Pan-labour Association] 
aimed to attract members and supporters from the leftist Labour Centre of Famagusta.15 
According to testimonies of leading cadres of the period, the actions of right-wingers against the 
KKK included attacks against labour associations, dismissals of party supporters and even 
murder attempts.16  
The confrontation peaked in the late 1920s, leading to frequent clashes, provoked mainly 
by anti-communist elements.17 In 1928, Eleftheria urged the government to ‘purge’ the working 
class from ‘communist manipulation’.18 In March 1931, on the anniversary of the outbreak of the 
War of Greek Independence, party members attempted to distribute flyers in Nicosia and 
Limassol. Clashes broke out in both towns, leading to arrests, trials and convictions of many 
communists.19 A party supporter was stabbed in Nicosia, while a few months later extensive 
clashes in Larnaca led to the breaking-up of a KKK rally, attacks on party members and the 
                                                 
12 Eleftheria, ‘The manginess of communism’, 7 January 1925; ‘Communism’, 28 January 1925. 
13 Alitheia, ‘Questions’, 10 August 1925; Diplomatic and Historical Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs [hereafter IAYE], Folder A/22/III, Consul of Greece Alexis Kyrou to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 
June 1931. 
14 Neos Anthropos, ‘Swashbuckling’, 1 March 1925.  
15 CSA, SA1/607/1931, Communistic activities. Police reports etc., Famagusta Commandant of Police’s report, 27 
August 1931. 
16 Andreas Fantis, Το κυπριακό συνδικαλιστικό κίνημα στα χρόνια της Αγγλοκρατίας (1878-1960) [The Cypriot trade 
union movement in the years of English Rule (1878-1960)] (Nicosia: 2005), vol. 1, 76-77. 
17 NA, FCO 141/2455, Acting Governor to Secretary of State Lord Passfield, 21 August 1931. 
18 Eleftheria, ‘The labour question’, 4 July 1928. 
19 Eleftheria, ‘And an incident of the communists’, 28 March 1931; ‘Trials of communists’, 1 April 1931; Grekos, 
1994, p. 7. 
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destruction of the offices of the Larnaca Labour Centre.20 In a meeting after the events attended 
by the Commissioner of Larnaca, Greek-Cypriot politicians and the mayor, the latter demanded 
measures for the displacement of communism from the town.21 In the same period, the Chief 
Commandant of Police and the Acting Governor observed that an ‘energetic anti-communist 
propaganda’ had been set in motion by the Church, members of the Legislative Council and 
nationalist politicians.22  
During this period, the Church started playing an active role against the KKK. In 1931, 
the Holy Synod decided that bishops should warn communists that, if they did not comply with 
the principles of the Church, punishments would be imposed on them, to the point of 
excommunication.23 At a conference of representatives of Nicosia associations held at th 
archbishopric for the purpose of ‘fighting communism’, shopkeepers, factory owners, craftsmen, 
contractors and teachers were urged to try to bring communists back to the Orthodox Church. 
Unrepentant communists should be excluded from employment. A circular issued after the 
conference further urged ecclesiastical associations, school committees and municipal authorities 
to always prefer contractors ‘pure from communist contaminant’ and to demand that contractors 
prefer non-communist workers. Furthermore, parents were urged to denounce communist 
teachers to the Education Office and the Archbishop, and to take their children from school until 
the removal of communist teachers. Lastly, addressing all Greek-Cypriots, the circular stressed 
that communist-affiliated labour centres should not be visited, ‘not even out of simple 
curiosity’.24   
In mid-1931, the Holy Synod excommunicated the poet and KKK member Tefkros 
Anthias, while many clerics published articles against communism and the party in local 
                                                 
20 Eleftheria, ‘The communists provoke and attack’, 1 August 1931; ‘Unprecedented popular uprising. Communists 
chased and injured’, 19 August 1931.  
21 Eleftheria, ‘Due to the comrades’, 26 August 1931. 
22 NA, FCO 141/2455, Chief Commandant of Police to the Colonial Secretary, 10 August 1931. 
23 Eleftheria, ‘Holy Synod proceedings. Communism’, 6 May 1931. 
24 CSA, SA1/607/1931, resolution of the conference, ‘Communism in Cyprus. Measures for fighting it’, 22 August 
1931. In the same spirit, a proclamation addressed to the Greek-Cypriot population in the same period stressed: ‘The 
communist worm which threatens to undermine the ideals of Religion, Fatherland, Society, Family and all the other 
high ideals with which the Greek race lives and dies, compels us to unite and face the revolutionary activities of the 




newspapers and the journal of the Church, Apostolos Varnavas [The Apostle Barnabus].25 
Nationalist politicians further suggested that the government prepare a list of all Greek-Cypriot 
communist schoolmasters, and requested that the local committees in their place of appointment 
refuse to accept them for the following school year and close the schools in protest. At a meeting 
of the Orthodox Christian Board of Education in the same year, it was recommended that the 
definition of ‘misconduct’ under the corresponding article of the 1929 Elementary Education 
Law should be expanded so as to include the affiliation of school teachers with communism.26  
 The KKK’s positions and activity brought it into sharp political contrast with all other 
political forces. The differentiation from both nationalists and pro-government Greek-Cypriot 
politicians allowed the party to acquire a distinct position in the political spectrum. At the same 
time, its insistence on ideological purity partially accounted for the KKK’s failure to appeal 
successfully to broader strata, such as the peasantry. As the culture of nationalism became 
increasingly dominant within religious Cypriot society, the KKK’s philosophical atheism and its 
rejection of enosis alienated a portion of workers and peasants, otherwise sympathetic to the 
party’s class militancy. In this context, the KKK started developing a position for a united front, 
based on trade union mobilization that would be inclusive of those lower-class groups that did 
not fully share the party’s ideology.  
In its first congress in 1926, the KKK called for the collaboration between the party and 
non-communists on the basis of an anti-imperialist front. The party was to hold a pan-Cypriot 
convention of both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, which would work towards the achievement of 
self-government.27 The congress put forward a set of demands, upon which collaboration should 
                                                 
25 Eleftheria, ‘Excommunication of an atheist teacher’, 2 May 1931. See also ‘The offenders. Education and 
communism’, 25 April 1931; ‘Communism and equality’, 10 June 1931; ‘Communism and religion’, 4 August 
1931; ‘Communism and property’, 5 August 1931; ‘Communism and motherland’, 26 August 1931. Apostolos 
Varnavas, ‘Identification of methods and principles’, 23 (1931), 361-362; ‘How women are regarded by communists 
or bolshevists’, 29 (1931), 534-536; ‘The bankruptcy of bolshevism’, 34 (1931), 617-620. 
26 CSA, SA1/1078/1931, Director of Education to the Colonial Secretary, 18 August 1931; NA, FCO 141/2455, 
Acting Governor to Secretary of State Lord Passfield, 21 August 1931. According to the Director of Education, 
there were 12 schoolmasters registered as communists in 1931 and 12 more suspected of communist sympathies.  
27 Πολιτικές Αποφάσεις και Ψηφίσματα Συνεδρίων του Κομμουνιστικού Κόμματος Κύπρου (ΚΚΚ) και του 
Ανορθωτικού Κόμματος Εργαζόμενου Λαού (ΑΚΕΛ) [Political Decisions and Congress Resolutions of the KKK and 
AKEL] (Nicosia: 2014), 23-40. 
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be based, while stressing that the party should not lose its independence within the front.28 A 
year later, the 1927 Extraordinary Congress of the KKK called for the unity of nationalists and 
communists on a ‘united front against imperialism’ for the liberation of Cyprus.29   
The necessity for a common anti-imperialist front aiming at the independence or 
autonomy of Cyprus was stressed in many articles in the party newspaper. The KKK hoped that 
the demand for independence would bring about collaboration among different political forces 
and parties, irrespective of their overall political programmes. As early as 1925 an article in Neos 
Anthropos that discussed the tactics of communist parties in colonial territories argued that the 
development of capitalism in the colonies tended to create anti-colonial movements of a petit-
bourgeois character. These movements could, however, be seen as potential allies with 
communist parties, as they jointly opposed Western imperialism.30 A 1927 article invited all 
political forces to a ‘common front against the British’ at both the leadership and the grassroots 
level. A year later, Neos Anthropos called for an even broader front, including bourgeois 
deputies, petit-bourgeois politicians and nationalists, with a view to form a common programme 
with common claims.31   
Throughout the second half of the 1920s, the party put forward the demand for 
independence, hoping that this would allow the inclusion of the Turkish-Cypriots in the common 
front. This position was part of the official resolution of the party’s First Congress, and was 
inscribed in the party statutes. Independence was considered the only solution that would liberate 
workers and peasants from the double yoke of British capital and the Greek bourgeoisie.32 The 
rejection of enosis was publicly expressed on many occasions.33 A 1925 article in Neos 
Anthropos stated:  
                                                 
28 The claims put forward by the Congress included universal suffrage for men and women over 18 years of age, 
formation of a representative legislative body with duties of Parliament, formation of a government accountable to 
the Parliament and military evacuation of the island and assignment of its guarding to local militia.  
29 Yiannos Katsourides, ‘Το Κομματικό Σύστημα στην Κύπρο 1878-1931: Συγκρότηση και Ιδιομορφίες [The Party 
System in Cyprus 1878-1931: Formation and peculiarities]’ (University of Nicosia D.Phil Thesis, 2009), 394.         
30 Neos Anthropos, ‘Enosis or autonomy’, 26 October 1925. 
31 Katsourides, 2009, p. 395.  
32 The First Congress of the KKK stressed that the economic and political liberation of Cyprus would only come 
with the establishment of a labour-peasant Republic which would join the Balkan Labour-peasant Federation. 
33 The party’s manifesto on the Pan-Hellenic Games of 1925 ended with the slogans ‘Down with Enosis’ and ‘Long 
live the Independence of Cyprus’. Neos Anthropos, ‘Manifesto of the KKK for the Pan-Hellenic’, 25 April 1925. 
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No dear patriotic sirs! We do not want union with mother Greece.. The people 
have awakened and know all too well that the Union of Cyprus means greater 
slavery, bitter life, lawless injustice… [The] people are not so stupid to become 
even more oppressed under Greek despotism... Union means economic death.34 
A year later the newspaper asserted: 
The proper solution to the Cyprus question will be only achieved through a 
labour-peasant front of Greeks and Turks...  [H]owever small the Turkish 
minority may be, it cannot remain uninvolved in our struggle for greater political 
liberties. Such a struggle cannot even be conceived without the active 
involvement of the Turkish element.35 
In November 1928, the Second Pan-Cypriot Congress called again for a common front 
against the British, whose ultimate goal was the end of colonial rule on the island.36 Again, the 
party stressed that such a front could not be based on the politics of enosis, as this hindered the 
cooperation of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. Nonetheless, cooperation with the supporters of 
enosis was considered possible. These first moves towards the convergence with its rivals - the 
Church and the Greek-Cypriot nationalist elite - revealed a growing political dilemma within the 
party. The question of enosis would become central in the late 1930s and early 1940s, and would 
lead to the gradual transformation of the party. That process became especially visible after the 
foundation of AKEL in 1941, which replaced the KKK a few years later. By the 1940s, the 
debate had shifted from a front against colonial rule to the so-called ‘national question’. 
Accordingly, the strategy for creating a united front gradually became less about finding 
common political grounds with other political forces, and more about adopting an almost 
unconditional enosist policy, often to the point of succumbing to the party’s rivals and adopting 
their political positions.  
At the end of the 1920s, as the KKK continued to gain influence, the polemic from the 
Greek-Cypriot elite and repressive measures from the colonial government intensified. The 
Greek-Cypriot leadership was concerned about both the party’s role in mobilizing the lower 
strata of the population, and its positions and activity that related to the national question. In 
1929, Eleftheria started a campaign against the party’s position for autonomy and self-
                                                 
34 Neos Anthropos, ‘No we do not want it’, 1 March 1925.  
35 Cited in Pan-Cypriot Labour Federation, Ιστορία ΠΣΕ-ΠΕΟ 1941-1991 [History of the PSE-PEO 1941-1991] 
(Nicosia: PEO publications, 1991), p. 23.  
36 Political Decisions, Second Congress of the KKK, pp. 41-49. 
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government, stressing the imperative of enosis. The newspaper, the mouthpiece of the 
intransigent nationalists, also criticized the positions of the moderate nationalists in the 
Legislative Council and noted the declining interest in enosis among the peasantry.37 In the same 
period, the intransigent nationalists made some initial steps towards the formation of a radical 
nationalist group. The Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωσις κύπρου [National Radical Union of Cyprus 
– EREK], which operated in secret after 1929 and made its official appearance in October 1931, 
declared that it would fight for the union of Cyprus with Greece but also against communism.   
The polemic against communism was in fact a main point of agreement between the 
intransigent and the moderate nationalists. In mid-1931, the Bishop of Kition toured the 
countryside and after preaching the gospel, he warned attendees against communism. On one 
occasion, after holding mass, he publicly accused two KKK supporters of propaganda against the 
Christian religion, and said that he would report the case to the Holy Synod.38 As indicated by 
the results of the 1930 elections for the Legislative Council, however, in which the party 
participated for the first time, it had managed to become a distinct and constantly growing 
political force. Although the KKK failed to elect any candidate, its island-wide appearance and 
the percentage it gained - around 16% - had a major impact on public opinion.39 The major 
breakthrough, however, came a few months later, in 1931, when Christodoulos Galatopoulos, 
supported by the party, prevailed in a by-election in the district of Paphos.   
In the context of its growing confrontation with the nationalists, the KKK held a Pan-
Cypriot conference in July 1931. The conference addressed the growing social unrest on the 
island, in which party members were actively involved. Some of the participants, many of whom 
were younger members, proposed that the party adopt a less confrontational stance towards the 
nationalists, on the grounds of the latter’s increasingly critical attitude towards the British.40 
Some participants even suggested that the party should abandon the line of independence and 
                                                 
37 Panayiotou, 1999, pp. 231-232. 
38 CSA, SA1/607/1931, Limassol Commandant of Police’s report to the Chief Commandant, 3 August 1931. 
39 See Protopapas, 2012, pp. 285-306.   
40 Minas Perdios, Δοκίμιο Ιστορίας Κ.Κ.Κ.–Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. [Essay on the History of K.K.K.-A.K.E.L.] (Nicosia: AKEL 
Central Committee, 1968), 73, 86, 91; Grekos, 1994, p. 7. 
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fight for enosis. Both suggestions were rejected by the Conference; a few months later, in 
October 1931, the questions discussed at the conference were raised in the streets.41   
 
The October Revolt 
In the early 1930s, the developments in Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot politics and the growing 
social discontent became increasingly reflected in the political positions of the deputies from 
both communities in the Legislative Council. Most importantly, in April 1931, Necati Bey, the 
newly-elected Kemalist deputy, broke the traditional common front between the British and the 
Turkish-Cypriot deputies, and voted together with his Greek-Cypriot counterparts, against the 
government’s budgetary estimates for the following year. As the resolution did not carry the 
necessary number of votes, Governor Storrs eventually used an Order in Council to pass the 
respective law through the opposition of the Legislative Council five months later, thus adding to 
popular resentment.  
 In this context, the Greek-Cypriot deputies were forced to adopt a more vigorous anti-
government policy, in line with their voters’ indignation towards the colonial authorities’ harsh 
financial and administrative policy. The moderate unionist deputies were the first to take up a 
militant stance in the autumn of 1931. The Bishop of Kition had been informed that EREK, the 
intransigent unionists’ group, would be transformed into a political organization on 18 October. 
EREK would personally denounce the stance of the bishop, as well as all the moderate deputies,   
and call for their resignations from the Legislative Council. On 17 October, the Bishop resigned 
and addressed the population with a proclamation of his own, urging for disobedience against 
British tyranny. Four days later, all Greek-Cypriot deputies resigned and gave public speeches at 
the Nicosia Commercial Club, triggering a series of riots that began in Nicosia and soon 
expanded across the island.   
The revolt constituted a culmination of the previous period’s mobilizations, and at the 
same time represented a significant transformation of the means of demonstrations. Most 
importantly, the riots, which lasted one week and especially affected all urban centres on the 
island, directly targeted the colonial authorities. This confrontational attitude signalled the 
                                                 
41 The Conference also decided to move the party’s headquarters from Limassol to Nicosia.  
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breakdown of the politics of consensus, and pointed to the emergence of a new, active political 
player: the lower classes of Cypriot society. The change in the tactics of popular mobilization 
can be attributed to a great extent to the discourse and practices introduced in to Cypriot politics 
by the KKK during the second half of the 1920s and early 1930s. As will be analyzed in Chapter 
4, the party had become the driving force behind labour mobilizations and the formation of 
labour centres and trade unions across the island. By 1931, under the growing guidance of the 
KKK, the newly formed trade unions had articulated a cohesive political programme, and had 
spearheaded the first phase of what would become a bi-communal labour movement. Organized 
labour used militant action – mainly strikes and public demonstrations – to put forward the 
claims of the emerging working class. At the same time, the party openly confronted the Greek-
Cypriot elites and called for the end of colonial rule. As new forms of organization and 
mobilization were developed, popular discontent became ever more openly expressed. The 
outbreak of the anti-colonial October revolt, starting from the capital of Nicosia, expressed to a 
great extent the growing social and political turmoil.   
The immediate causes of the revolt and the standoff in the Legislative Council were 
political. The acute economic hardship of the island’s population, seen as deriving principally 
from heavy taxation, the indebtedness of a large portion of the population to the money-lenders 
and the global depression had forced many deputies to oppose government policy, in an attempt  
to maintain their credibility with their voters. As discussed in Chapter 1, the revolt included 
large-scale protests and attacks on government buildings, revealing the population’s outrage 
against government’s economic and fiscal policy. Accordingly, the decision of the moderate 
nationalist Greek-Cypriot deputies to follow the example of the Bishop of Kition by resigning 
from their positions and demanding enosis can be seen as an attempt to gain the trust of the 
electorate. To present the community with an immaterial goal, and promote enosis as the solution 
to the island's economic woes, was seen as a way to outmanoeuvre the intransigent nationalists, 
in the hope of securing the leadership over the Greek-Cypriot community. The resignations and 
the uprising that followed had the effect of temporarily negating the tensions between the 
intransigent and the moderate camps, thus securing the Church’s political initiative and 
reinforcing enosist politics. A key component in the Greek-Cypriot version of nationalism, as 
advocated primarily by the Church (the biggest landowner on the island), was the determination 
of the affluent classes to secure their economic power and prevent reforms that would threaten it, 
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such as the introduction of a fair tax system. In that respect, the demand for the union with 
Greece held a very practical significance for both elite groups. The appropriation of the revolt by 
the Church allowed for its emergence as the political organization that could express the 
demands of the population, and claim a leading role in the evolution of Greek-Cypriot politics. 
Enosis was a demand that both incorporated socioeconomic considerations and the aspirations of 
an anti-colonial struggle.     
In this context, the KKK initially denounced the riots.42 According to Ploutis Servas, 
General Secretary of the KKK from 1936 to 1945, the party had not participated in the revolt and 
had denounced it strongly as ‘a manifestation of the Church and the haut-bourgeois’.43 That view 
is supported by Fifis Ioannou, General Secretary of AKEL from 1945 until 1949. According to 
Ioannou, Charalambos Vatis, a prominent party cadre, from the first days of the riots denounced 
the whole movement for being nationalist and directed by the Greek-Cypriot bourgeoisie.44 This 
decision of the leadership, however, was met with reservations from party members. Ioannes 
Mavros, a party veteran, testified that at a meeting held in the early stages of the revolt, he had 
argued that the party should participate in the movement and had received a negative response 
from Vatis.45  
Nevertheless, on 22 or 23 October, a meeting of the Central Committee decided that the 
party should indeed change tactics and collaborate with the nationalists, so that they would not 
monopolize the popular uprising. In a meeting at the Archbishopric, a delegation of the KKK 
offered to collaborate with the Church against colonialism, even though it retained its 
disagreements with the nationalists on the aims of the uprising and the character of the planned 
demonstrations. Furthermore, Vatis denounced enosis and countered that the aim of the revolt 
should instead be a workers' republic. Vatis warned against the use of the Greek flag, as it 
alienated the Turkish-Cypriots. Eventually, the KKK published its own communiqué on 23 
October, and Vatis addressed a rally outside the Archbishopric, pledging that the party would 
                                                 
42 According to Grekos, who bases his research on statements and accounts of veteran KKK and AKEL party 
members, some of the party’s supporters and members participated in the revolt at the very beginning, at least in 
Nicosia. See Grekos, 1994, pp. 11-15.   
43 Ploutis Servas, Κυπριακό, Ευθύνες [The Cyprus Question, Responsibilities] (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 1980), 117. 
44 Grekos, 1994, p. 13, article of Fifis Ioannou in Apogeymatini [Evening Standard], 26 March 1976. 
45 Grekos, 1994, p. 29. 
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struggle against colonialism and for the release of those arrested.46 The communiqué emphasized 
the need for a common front of nationalists and communists against British imperialism, and 
called for party members to lead the struggle for the withdrawal of Britain from the island. It also 
stressed that the differences between the programmatic aims of nationalists and of communists 
should not constitute an obstacle for the formation of a joint front, and that such differences 
would be resolved after Britain’s withdrawal. Furthermore, the text criticized party organizations 
for the neutral position they had held during the early stages of the uprising and invited the 
nationalist workers to co-organize a common front.    
 The change of party line and the decision to join the uprising was dictated by the danger 
of isolation, as long as the party abstained from popular militant acts of protest. In the following 
years, the KKK’s attempts to converge with the nationalist leadership on the national question 
and its gradual endorsement of the dominant ideology of nationalism would become increasingly 
visible. A year after the revolt, leading figures of the party, such as Vatis and Costas Skeleas 
(then General Secretary), were denounced by the Communist International and were 
subsequently deposed, without taking up any other positions within the party hierarchy. The 
party’s initial stance on the 1931 revolt would attract criticism for years to come. In 1951, a 
resolution issued by the Central Committee of AKEL at its seventh congress stated:      
The party responded to the popular outbreak of 1931 with a wrong line and 
became isolated from the broad masses. At the time, the party did not manage to 
take advantage of the maturation of popular discontent and the development of an 
anti-imperialist sentiment of national liberation among the people.47  
Although the KKK maintained its anti-nationalist position until the beginning of the 1940s, it 
seems that the events before and during October 1931 had led to a debate on the national 
question. The very decision of the KKK to collaborate with the nationalist Greek-Cypriot 
leadership during the revolt can be seen as the beginning of a shift in the party’s position on the 
national question. That shift was completed in the early 1940s, with the formal adoption of the 
demand for enosis.   
                                                 
46 NA, CO 67/240/15, Riots in Cyprus: Deportations, Nicosia Commandant of Police’s report to the Chief 
Commandant, 25 October 1931; Governor’s despatches to Secretary of State Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, 20 
November and 2 December 1931; Grekos, 1994, pp. 12-14. 
47 Contemporary Social History Archives [hereafter as ASKI], F-20/21/47, Towards the Seventh Congress of AKEL, 
AKEL’s report ‘A brief review of our party’s organizational policy until the Sixth Congress (1949)’, 1949. 
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 At the same time, the presence of a KKK delegation at the meeting at the Archbishopric 
demonstrated that the party was considered a political force that had to be taken into 
consideration. It also revealed the confusion that characterized the Greek-Cypriot elites. Despite 
their active role in the unfolding events, these elites were caught by surprise as much as the KKK 
leadership and the colonial government by the magnitude and the spontaneity of the uprising.48 
Only a few days after the attempts for a common front between nationalists and communists 
against the colonial authorities, the Greek-Cypriot leadership backtracked and attempted to 
distance itself from the revolt. On 2 November, Archbishop Cyril requested a meeting with the 
Governor and later in the month he issued a circular and a despatch addressed to Storrs, 
apologizing for the revolt and expressing his regret for the arson attack on Government House.49  
 
2.2 The Archiepiscopal Question 
In the wake of the revolt, the British imposed an authoritarian regime on the colony. They 
suspended all elections, repealed the semi-liberal institutional framework of the previous period, 
and imposed a series of repressive measures against the Church and the Left.  Their goal was to 
eliminate communal autonomy and suppress all political activities. For the government, the 
revolt provided an ideal opportunity to take action against all its political opponents, even those 
with little or no participation in the riots and their outbreak. Most significantly, communist 
activity was completely repressed, and steps were taken to control the influence of the emerging 
modernist Turkish-Cypriot leadership, as will be analyzed in Chapters 4 and 3, respectively. In 
these circumstances, a significant portion of the Greek-Cypriot elite decided to cooperate with 
the government, with a view to protecting its interests. The very idea of abolishing the elections 
was actually suggested by P. Cacoyiannis, who had served as deputy of the Legislative 
Council.50 This stance was well received by the British, who appointed leading figures of the 
                                                 
48 In his official report on the revolt, Governor Storrs stated: ‘There is no evidence to show that the outbreak was 
premeditated or prearranged. Any such theory would be sufficiently contradicted by the haphazard nature of the 
deplorable events’. Parliamentary Papers, 1932, Command 4045, vol. 6, p. 31, Storrs to Secretary of State Sir Philip 
Cunliffe-Lister, 11 February 1932. 
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Greek-Cypriot elite to public posts. As Governor Stubbs reported in 1933, ‘we need to breed 
such a class that will be willing to cooperate with us’.51 Nevertheless, a small part of the elite, 
rallying gradually around the acting Archbishop Leontios, who had succeeded Cyril after his 
death in 1933, continued to oppose the regime. Under the leadership of Leontios, Greek-Cypriot 
nationalism would be reinforced, although the prospect of enosis was receding and the future fate 
of the island was becoming ever more unpredictable, not least in the context of the growing 
destabilization in the Middle East and, from 1936 onwards, the growing tensions in the 
Mediterranean.52   
Following the October revolt the British deported two of the three bishops of the island – 
the bishops of Kyrenia and Kition, as well as eight other prominent Greek-Cypriots. After Cyril’s 
death, Leontios, the Bishop of Paphos and only remaining bishop on the island, assumed the 
position of Locum Tenens of the vacant Archiepiscopal See. The absence of the two Bishops 
from Cyprus constituted an obstacle for the canonical election of a permanent successor to Cyril. 
According to the charter of the Church of Cyprus, holding a Holy Synod required the attendance 
of all three Bishops.53 The colonial government refused to allow the exiles to return, and with the 
Locum Tenens’ and the exiles’ decision to postpone the elections until they could be held 
according to canon law, a deadlock was created. The archiepiscopal question would soon evolve 
into a multi-faceted political confrontation between the Church and the government, as well as 
between different factions within the Church itself. This confrontation was not resolved until 
1947.      
Immediately after Leontios assumed duties as Locum Tenens, the exiled Bishops made 
clear their positions regarding the archiepiscopal elections in their correspondence to him. While 
both rejected the possibility of a settlement before their return to Cyprus, the despatches 
indicated the different concerns of each of the old rivals, giving a clear image of the political 
confrontation that would follow. Nicodemos, the Bishop of Kition, was aware that he was being 
retrospectively regarded as the leader of the October revolt and attempted to pre-empt an 
                                                                                                                                                             
reform of the constitution, Arthur Dawe’s memorandum, 3 April 1929; NA, CO 67/256/7, Municipal Corporations 
(Amendment) Law, 1934, Governor Palmer to the Assistant Under-Secretary of State, 2 January 1934. 
51 NA, CO 67/251/3, Political situation, Governor Edward Stubbs to Secretary of State Cunliffe-Lister, 4 June 1933. 
52 See Larry Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez; Britain’s Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-1939 (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975).  
53 See Charter of the Most Holy Church of Cyprus (1914), article 2.  
67 
 
intervention by the Ecumenical and the other Patriarchates during his absence from the island, 
which could cost him his future election. He therefore highlighted the danger of dissent within 
the Church, and stressed that any intervention from the other Orthodox Churches would be 
uncanonical, due to the Church of Cyprus’ autocephaly, and would render any result void.54 In 
this event, the prolongation of the deadlock and the growing popular discontent soon forced him 
to change his position, as the Bishop wanted to appear willing to sacrifice his own candidacy in 
favour of a quick settlement. 
Meanwhile, the Bishop of Kyrenia desired a settlement without the immediate 
participation of the Locum Tenens. Such an outcome would only serve to reinforce Leontios' 
prestige at the expense of the exiled bishops, leading to his own election. For that reason, the 
Bishop of Kyrenia stressed that the Locum Tenens could not, acting unilaterally and on his own 
initiative, postpone the elections without such a decision by the Holy Synod. For Leontios, the 
exile of the two leading bishops presented him with a great opportunity. A lengthy postponement 
of the elections would only provide him time to gradually consolidate his position within the 
Church and among the congregation, and convert his temporary status into a permanent 
arrangement. He had no real vested interest in persuading the government to let his rivals return 
to the island.  
From the very beginning, the archiepiscopal question aroused the interest of all 
concerned parties, both inside and outside Cyprus. It attracted the attention of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate, the colonial authorities, the secular Greek-Cypriot elite and parts of the Greek-
Cypriot population. According to a report that reached the colonial authorities in June 1935, the 
Ecumenical Patriarch had decided to send the Bishop of Trebizond on a mission to convene with 
the Patriarchs of Jerusalem and Alexandria, and then to proceed to Cyprus. This was seen as a 
sign that the Patriarchate was willing to mediate a solution to the archiepiscopal question in 
Cyprus. As the Bishop’s visit did not ultimately happen, Acting Governor Battershill suspected – 
in contrast with the explanation provided by the report – that the Bishop had been informed that 
his intervention was not welcome.55    
                                                 
54 Apostolos Varnavas, 1 (1934), pp. 11-13. 
55 NA, CO 67/262/18, Archiepiscopal Question. Possibility of a Settlement, Acting Governor to Secretary of State 
Malcolm MacDonald, 16 August 1935.  
68 
 
The colonial authorities viewed the archiepiscopal question as a clearly political matter, 
and as a key barometer of Greek-Cypriot tendencies. From its beginning, all aspects of the 
question, including the attitude of the clergy and the secular elite as well as the reaction of the 
population, held the absolute attention of the colonial officials.56 Most importantly, the 
government was preoccupied with preventing any of the three bishops from being elected to the 
vacant See. Only a few days after Archbishop’ Cyril’s death, Governor Stubbs telegraphed the 
Colonial Office  reporting his intention to intervene in the elections by introducing legislation 
that  would bar the exiled bishops from the election.57 The government’s overall goal was to 
restrict the political power of the Church and eliminate its ethnarchic role. As Governor Palmer 
stated,  
[I]t must be clearly understood – (a) That the deported Bishops will not be 
allowed to return to Cyprus under any circumstances. (b) That though election is 
perfectly free, Government will not again recognize an Archbishop as Ethnarch or 
as having any right to interfere in secular or political affairs, but solely as spiritual 
head of his own Orthodox Christian Communion in Cyprus. (c) … In regard to 
the Archiepiscopal problem … it is of immediate importance both to Cyprus and 
to the Orthodox Church as an institution that the Church should abandon the 
political role it has pursued so long in Cyprus.58  
 
For the majority of the secular elite, the archiepiscopal question was strongly related to 
the question of the administration of Church property. The vacancy of the Archiepiscopal See 
and of the two Bishoprics was considered an important factor in the continued mismanagement 
of Church property and the squandering of its wealth. At the same time, the archiepiscopal 
question was seen as an ideal opportunity for asking the legislative intervention of the 
government so as to transfer control over the wealth of the Church to lay members. In 1933 and 
1934, ecclesiastical committees, village commissions, the mayor of Nicosia and a number of 
priests submitted petitions to the government, many of them identical.  The signees represented 
164 towns and villages across the island and 140,000 Greek-Cypriots – out of a total Greek-
                                                 
56 There are numerous reports by all ranks of the administration regarding the actions and attitude of the Church, the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Orthodox Churches, the secular elite and the Greek-Cypriot population. See NA, 
CO 67/262/18. 
57 NA, CO 67/252/13, Vacancy for the Archbishop of Cyprus, Governor’s telegram, 20 November 1933. 
58 NA, CO 67/262/18, Governor Palmer to Secretary of State Malcolm MacDonald, 18 July 1935. 
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Cypriot population amounting to 276,500, according to the 1931 census.59 The petitions called 
for the government’s legislative intervention for the solution of the archiepiscopal question and 
the administration of ecclesiastical property. Notably, the monastery of Ayios Panteleimon was 
also in favour of such an enactment. Many of the petitions, mostly for the election of Church 
committees, were also addressed to the clergy.60     
The petitioners emphasized the corruption in the management of the Church property and 
revenue, and stressed that this would be terminated only when Church economics would be 
subjected to lay oversight. In particular, they stressed that Church property and revenue were 
being constantly embezzled, squandered and misappropriated by the Church committees charged 
with their management. The members of these committees were accused of treating Church 
property as ‘a family fief’, which they used for their own interests.61 The petitions reflected the 
indignation of the rural laity and a significant part of the rural clergy and demanded that at least 
the surpluses of the Church’s property and revenue should be dedicated for meeting the needs of 
the lower clergy and the population. In the same spirit, the newspaper Paphos reported in 1934 
that ‘thousands of pounds were given by the members of the Church committees to their friends, 
family or groomsmen’, instead of being used for providing landless farmers with property, 
philanthropy and the support of education.62 The petition movement encountered strenuous 
opposition from the higher clergy, whose interests were threatened by the petitioners’ demands, 
and the government refused to intervene.  
The confrontation between the laity and the higher clergy can be clearly illustrated by a 
petition addressed to the Governor in late 1934. The petitioners asked for the immediate 
introduction of a law that would drastically put Church property – emphatically described in the 
text as belonging to the people – under state control, and terminate the corruption inherent in its 
administration. The petition also emphasized that such legislation would not intervene in 
dogmatic or religious questions, but would only deal with the financial administration of the 
                                                 
59 CSA, SA1/759/1934/1, 1) Archiepiscopal Question. 2) Ecclesiastical Property Administration Question. Petitions 
on-. 
60 Two-thirds of these Church committees were composed of clerics appointed by the bishops, and one third of 
laymen indirectly elected by the male population. Given that the ‘property-less’ and the indebted were precluded 
from being elected, most of the lay members on the committees were local notables.  
61 The Church’s revenue derived mainly from the lands it leased to farmers, commercial activities, the licenses for 
marriages and divorces and the fees collected by the Church Courts.  
62 Rappas, 2008, p. 265. 
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‘biggest popular property’, which was being squandering and would eventually be exhausted, 
unless the government intervened. It is particularly interesting that any reference to religious 
matters is absent from the petition. In contrast with all the other petitions, there is no reference to 
the archiepiscopal question, namely the vacancy of the Archiepiscopal See, nor to the Bishoprics 
of Kition and Kyrenia. The petitioners addressed the government, seen as a powerful ally, and 
aimed solely at restricting the economic and political power of the Church. The archiepiscopal 
question, while a matter of indifference in itself to the secular elites, in fact presented them with 
an ideal opportunity to mobilize the population against the Church in a moment of crisis. The 
movement went to great lengths to appeal to the rural laity and, to a certain extent, also to the 
rural clergy.63 As a significant part of the peasantry were tenants of the Church and the 
monasteries, and because the majority of the rural clergy were living in miserable conditions and 
they were frequently paid in arrears, these groups saw in the movement an opportunity to secure 
fixed and adequate remuneration. The petitioners included in their proposals the foundation of an 
Agricultural Bank which would issue loans on easy terms, thus alleviating the burden of debt for 
the rural population. The government did not take action before 1937, when the Churches and 
Monasteries (Investigation and Audit) Law was enacted. That, however, proved the high point of 
the movement. Its activity would gradually weaken, while the tactics utilized by the Church 
during the archiepiscopal question, as well as its overall strategy throughout the 1930s and 
1940s, would allow the Church to grow even stronger.   
From its very beginning, the archiepiscopal question attracted the attention of the press, 
which noted the rivalries within the Church. The debate would thus occupy a central space in the 
public sphere. Some influential newspapers, including the conservative Phoni tis Kyprou [Voice 
of Cyprus] and Neos Kypriakos Phylax [The New Cypriot Guardian], both published in Nicosia, 
supported the stand of the exiled Bishops and the Locum Tenens. Meanwhile, a larger number of 
papers, including Paphos and the Limassol-based Chronos [Time], adopted an increasingly 
critical tone as the election dragged on. Chronos stressed that the solution to the question should 
not depend on the ‘personal whims of the two exiled Bishops’ who insisted on their position ‘out 
of stubbornness, caprice or individual interest’.64 Throughout the spring and summer of 1936, 
Eleftheria systematically promoted the Bishop of Kition’s gradual shift in favour for a quick 
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64 Rappas, ibid. 
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settlement of the question.65 The Bishop had reportedly made contacts with the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate and the Greek Government, favouring an election under the aegis of the Church of 
Alexandria or Jerusalem.66 From early on, the old rivalry between the Bishops of Kition and 
Kyrenia had resurfaced, with the issue of the archiepiscopal election as the point of conflict. In 
June 1936, on the occasion of King George V’s birthday, the Bishop of Kition openly denounced 
the decision of the Locum Tenens (supported by the Bishop of Kyrenia) to forbid any 
commemorative ceremonies in honour of the King. Later in the year, the Bishop of Kition 
publicly supported the early election of a prelate to fill the vacant See, while the Bishop of 
Kyrenia and the Locum Tenens were in favour of postponing the election, both thinking that an 
election at a later date would favour their own claim.67 Their procrastination compelled the 
Bishop of Kition to share his concerns over the two others’ indifference in resolving the 
archiepiscopal question, and he accused Leontios of deliberately delaying the settlement.68    
By 1937, newspapers in Cyprus, such as Paphos, and in Greece, such as Patris 
[Fatherland], deplored the formation of two parties. One group supported an immediate 
resolution in order to protect the ‘madly squandered’ property of the Church and provide the 
Church and the community with a leader.69 Their rivals advocated the prolongation of the current 
situation until elections could be carried out under the proper conditions. Any other settlement 
would signify a recognition of the right of the colonial government to interfere with ecclesiastical 
matters on the island, as well as an indirect acceptance of the right to depose any Bishop, either 
by outright dismissal or by compelling him to give up his See and leave Cyprus.  
 
Government Intervention 
In the years following the October revolt, the measures taken by the government against the 
Church in part resembled the notorious Penal Laws of Ireland that had been repealed a decade 
earlier. These measures would constitute central points of confrontation between the two 
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institutions.70 A few weeks after the revolt, the government enacted the Bells (Regulation) Law. 
As the ringing of bells had been used during the revolt for assembling Greek-Cypriot 
demonstrators, and generally for the celebration of Greek national anniversaries, the main 
provision of the law stipulated that permits would be required to ring bells.71 The reaction of the 
Church was immediate. Archbishop Cyril gave strict instructions to the church committees and 
village priests to refuse to apply for permits and to stop the ringing of all Church bells on the 
island in protest. The Archbishop threatened the clergy with immediate dismissal if they ignored 
his order.72  
Most importantly, the enactment of legislation on the archiepiscopal election was 
thoroughly contemplated by both the Cyprus government and the Colonial Office after late 1935. 
Being concerned about the possibility of a quick election of an ‘unacceptable person’ to the 
position of archbishop, the Governor wanted to have legislation ready to prevent such a 
development.73 In particular, Palmer suggested that the government determine which candidates 
would be eligible, and exclude those that have been ‘deported from the Island in consequence of 
seditious activities’. Palmer also wished that candidates should be British subjects, and would 
abstain from secular affairs if elected. In other words, he wanted to exclude the two exiled 
Bishops and in fact any Greek, pro-enosis candidate, and to ensure that the new Archbishop 
would not have any political role or participation in secular affairs, such as education.74 Overall, 
the Governor sought to force the Church to abandon its claims to ethnarchy. To justify such a 
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degree of state intervention in a question lying outside the scope of the administration’s 
jurisdiction, he invoked the ‘1908 precedent’, when, in face of the 1900-1910 archiepiscopal 
question, the government had intervened through ad hoc legislation in order to determine the 
procedure for the election of an archbishop.75 The grounds of this justification were met with 
scepticism from the Colonial Office, which described the proposed intervention as autocratic, 
and noted that, in contrast to 1908, the Church of Cyprus now had a constitutional charter, the 
Katastatikon, which had been brought into effect in 1914.76  
To complicate matters for the British, the Chiefs of Staff were at the time deliberating 
over a plan to convert Cyprus into a major military base. Though such considerations proved 
short-lived, they necessitated firm action to suppress the Church’s political activities.77 Hence, a 
grand design to reform the Church of Cyprus was conceived. The plan aimed to bring Church 
under state control, and addressed all pending issues: the archiepiscopal election, the 
administration of the Church property and the question of episcopal appointments. The reform 
was ultimately abandoned, because of the ‘risk of revivifying an institution … “bound hand and 
foot to the chariot of Hellenism and political intrigue”’.78   
The Cyprus government then favoured the introduction of a set of laws, each of which 
dealt with a specific feature of the Church of Cyprus. First came the law on the election of the 
Bishops and the Archbishop – called the ‘Berat’ Law – according to which elections should be 
dependent upon formal ratification by the governor to be considered valid.79 Second, with a view 
to deal with the question of ethnarchy, another law was proposed, with the aim to revise the ex-
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officio rights of the archbishop, so as to separate the Church from secular and political affairs.80 
The proposed law also required that the archbishop should be Cypriot. A third law would impose 
a governmental audit of the properties and finances of the Church, which had been allegedly 
used to support the claim for enosis.81 Finally, the British considered amending the 1933 
Elementary Education Law so as to recognize the de facto situation of the previous years that 
saw the mayors act as chairmen of the education committees in place of the exiled bishops. The 
aim here was to prevent the Church from regaining its former dominant position in the 
administration of educational affairs.82 Overall, the proposed legislation signified an articulate 
attempt to bring the Church under the control of the colonial state and force it out of politics.   
For the Secretary of State, the amendment of the 1933 Education Law was imperative. 
Both the Church and the colonial authorities considered education to be the major factor for the 
promotion of the national sentiments of Greek-Cypriots. Memories of Ireland, where the 
influence of the Catholic Church over matters of education eventually led to the Fenian 
movement, only strengthened the arguments for a dynamic intervention. As early as 1929, the 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State stressed: 
We shall never have peace in Cyprus, and … the situation is bound to grow 
progressively worse, so long as Education is under the control of people who use 
their power openly for political ends. It will be a case of Ireland over again. What 
can we expect of a generation which has been inoculated from early childhood 
with the “Union with Greece” virus? If matters … go unchecked, we shall reach a 
point – as we did in Ireland - when we shall have no practical alternative but to 
yield to the demand.83 
Indeed, government attempts to introduce a British atmosphere in education were based on a 
comparative study of the curricula developed for teachers in Northern Ireland, Palestine and 
Ceylon.84 Ultimately, the 1937 Elementary Education Law, the first of those discussed to be 
passed by the government, altered the composition of the Board of Education and town 
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committees for Orthodox-Christian schools, removing the Archbishop of Cyprus, the Bishop and 
the Mayor of each town from the seats which they had hitherto held ex officio.85  
  Meanwhile, after the summer of 1937, the Bishop of Kyrenia had changed his attitude 
concerning the archiepiscopal election, probably due to an intervention by the Greek Orthodox 
Church, and had agreed to the appointment of representatives to mediate between himself and 
the Bishop of Kition.86 Reports that the Locum Tenens travelled to Athens, Alexandria and 
Jerusalem, and that the Bishop of Trebizond – representative of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 
Athens – had been appointed as the representative of the Bishop of Kyrenia alerted the colonial 
authorities.87 In August 1937, the Locum Tenens, probably under pressure by his associates and 
the Consul of Greece, convened a Synod of the three Cypriot Bishops in Jerusalem. They had 
two objectives: to reach an agreement over the representatives of the exiles, and to make a 
decision regarding the candidacy of Germanos, the Archbishop of Thyateira, who was serving as 
the legate of the Ecumenical Patriarch to the archbishopric of the Church of England. The Synod 
never convened, because the Bishop of Kition refused to participate, and the Bishop of Kyrenia 
failed to arrive in Jerusalem, Nonetheless, it constituted a first attempt to resolve the 
archiepiscopal election. A few weeks after the death of the Bishop of Kition in September 1937, 
the government passed the Churches and Monasteries (Investigation and Audit) Law. The 
government then received reports that the Bishop of Trebizond had emerged as a compromise 
candidate between all competing sides, and that he and the bishop of Sinai planned to come to 
the island with the purpose of convening an electoral Synod.88 It was then that the government 
promulgated the two remaining laws: the Church of Cyprus (Archbishop’s Disqualifications) 
Law, which excluded the three Cypriot Bishops and any non-Cypriot from becoming 
candidates;89 and the Church of Cyprus (Governor’s Approval of Archbishop), or ‘Berat’ Law.90    
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Religious and Political Discourses and Church Solidarity 
For the Church of Cyprus, the archiepiscopal question primarily represented a political matter, as 
it encapsulated a power struggle within Church circles, and a confrontation with the government 
and parts of the secular Greek-Cypriot elite. Nonetheless, the Church formulated a theological 
rationale as well. The Church would deploy this rationale throughout the confrontation with the 
colonial authorities. At this level, it would find a powerful ally, whose intervention would prove 
challenging for the government: the Anglican Church.   
Just a few days after Archbishop Cyril’s death, the Locum Tenens wrote to the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and head of the Anglican Church, Cosmo Lang (1928-1942), 
reminding him of his leading role in the attempts at improving the relationship between the 
Orthodox and Anglican Churches, and appealing for his intervention in favour of the return of 
the Bishops of Kyrenia and Kition.91 In 1931, after the deportation of the bishops, Lang had 
expressed his disapproval of their activities and his doubts on whether he should advocate their 
return. In December 1933, however, he stressed to Secretary of State Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister 
that similar appeals had been addressed to him by the Patriarch of Alexandria, the Ecumenical 
Patriarch and the Archbishop of Thyateira.92 The Church of England did not consider the British 
government responsible for the election deadlock, placing the blame on the intransigence of the 
exiled bishops and the Locum Tenens. Lang was now calling, however, for a compromise 
solution, to the effect that the Bishops should be allowed to return, on the condition that they 
would not be candidates, that they would abstain from any political activities during the election 
and that they would leave the island immediately afterwards.93   
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The Archbishop of Thyateira, the Patriarch of Alexandria and the Ecumenical Patriarch 
were personally known to Lang, the first two having participated in the Seventh Lambeth 
Conference of Anglican Bishops in 1930. Meletios, the Patriarch of Alexandria, had been the 
leader of the Eastern Orthodox delegation sent to the Conference. Meletios had also participated 
in the Sixth Lambeth Conference, held ten years earlier, which decided on the formation of a 
permanent Eastern Churches Committee within the Anglican Church. Under his tenure, the Holy 
Synod of Constantinople had officially acknowledged the validity of the Anglican Orders, its 
example followed by the Patriarchate of Jerusalem and the Church of Cyprus, then under Cyril.94 
Meletios had also been the representative of the Patriarch of Jerusalem in Cyprus, was elected 
Bishop of Kition in 1910, and had participated actively in the formulation of the 1914 charter of 
the Cyprus Church. His representative to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Germanos, Archbishop 
of Thyateira, had been deeply involved in the Ecumenical movement of the Anglican Church, 
leading to a close relationship with Canon John Douglas, General Secretary of the Anglican 
Church’s Council on Foreign Relations. Thanks to these personal connections and a mutual 
theological consensus, the Anglican Church was the only Western Church with which the 
Orthodox Church discussed earnestly the possibility of a reunion, creating a substantial concord 
between Anglican and Greek-Orthodox clergies.95    
The reaction of the Governor to the Church of Cyprus’s appeal to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury is indicative of the impact the latter would have on the government’s position 
throughout the archiepiscopal question. As Governor Stubbs stressed, any intervention of the 
Archbishop of Canterbury would be embarrassing to the Cyprus Government, and would delay 
the resolution of the question.96 Similarly, the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Cosmo Parkinson 
emphasized the authority of the Archbishop, and made clear that the Colonial Office would take 
the views of the Anglican Church under serious consideration.97 Interestingly, in contrast to the 
Anglican authorities in Britain, the Anglican Church in Cyprus decided from early on to align 
itself fully with the government, stressing that ‘the situation is so complicated and so wrapped 
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with politics that it is considered inadvisable … to have any official dealings with the responsible 
Orthodox authorities’.98       
A few weeks after the passing of the 1937 laws, the Locum Tenens sent a memorandum 
to Governor Palmer, Secretary of State William Ormsby-Gore and the press asking for the repeal 
of the laws regulating the archiepiscopal election.99 It is remarkable that the Locum Tenens did 
not discuss, let alone ask for, the repeal of the Churches and Monasteries (Investigation and 
Audit) Law and the Education Law, which had been passed during exactly the same period. 
Neither did he request that any other law that concerned the Church be repealed. The Locum 
Tenens seems to have considered the use of a theological discourse advantageous for his line of 
argument, and the invocation of canon law was frequently employed in his text. Thus, a criticism 
of the provisions of laws that dealt exclusively with secular matters was left for a more 
appropriate moment in the future. Given that the Archbishop of Canterbury had expressed his 
favour towards the Investigation and Audit Bill two months earlier, the laws addressing the 
archiepiscopal election were seen by the Locum Tenens as the weak spot in the colonial 
government's legal case.100   
The central argument of the Locum Tenens was that the government’s intervention 
violated ‘perennial [προαιώνια] rights, the perennial [αιωνόβιον] status quo [καθεστώς] and the 
most ancient [παλαίφατο] autonomy’ of the Church of Cyprus. In particular, he argued that the 
Archbishop’s Disqualifications Law violated the sacred canons of the Orthodox Christian faith, 
the true spirit of Christianity, the rights of the Church (the only competent authority to define any 
qualifications of the clergy) and canons instituted by the Apostles and Ecumenical Synods and 
the Charter of the Church of Cyprus. Most importantly, the Governor’s approval of the 
Archbishop Law violated the ‘divine inspiration’ of the electors, who made their decision ‘by the 
right of God [ελέω Θεού], by the grace of Christ [χάριτι Χριστού] and in the presence of the 
Holy Spirit [εν Πνεύματι Αγίω]’.  
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Ultimately, the matter of the invocation of the Holy Spirit became a point of contestation 
for all clerics involved. The Bishop of Trebizond stressed that the election was a religious act, 
the selection and the enthronement of the candidate immediately following the invocation of the 
Holy Spirit. According to Church tradition, the two acts were parts of the same and indivisible 
process, between which no temporal authority had the right to intervene.101 The same rationale 
was employed by Archbishop Germanos and the Archbishop of Canterbury, who also requested 
that the Secretary of State prevail upon the Governor to modify his position. Moreover, the 
Anglican Archbishop argued that the interests of the government would be sufficiently 
safeguarded if provision was made that the Governor would receive a list of candidates before 
the election and strike out the persons to whom he had valid objections.102 He also expressed his 
concerns about the Archbishop’s Disqualification Law, reaffirmed his consent to the exclusion of 
the two deported bishops and the Locum Tenens from the process and stressed the importance of 
an immediate resolution to the archiepiscopal election. The anticipated pro-Synod of all the 
Orthodox Churches would debate the normalization of relations between the Anglican and 
Orthodox Churches, and Lang did not want Cyprus to feature in that discussion.103 Overall, 
religious solidarity resulted in a divergence between the agendas of these two institutions, the 
Anglican Church and the colonial administration. The dissociation between the colonial and the 
Church authorities illustrated the inherent tensions between a secular, autocratic discourse, made 
manifest through Common Law, and a sacred rationale, based on Church canon and ecclesiastic 
traditions.   
The secular Greek-Cypriot elite adopted a less confrontational attitude towards the 
colonial government; it remained critical of the legislative initiatives, but did not denounce them 
on the whole.104 In November 1937, the newspaper Embros [Forward] stated that the 
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government had cause to block the candidacy of individuals whose claim to spiritual leadership 
was not accompanied by the attitude of loyal citizenship. The newspaper urged both sides to 
compromise, and further warned the Governor that the ever-tightening legislative measures 
risked alienating Greek-Cypriots from the government.105 Similarly, members of the Advisory 
Council stressed their consent to the exclusion of the Cypriot Bishops from the election, but 
expressed doubts on limiting the candidacies to Cypriot natives.106 The attitude of the secular 
elite echoed its ongoing antagonism towards the Church regarding the management of its 
finances and property. In this context, support for the government’s legislative intervention was 
dictated by the need to restrict the Church’s economic and political power. The passing of the 
Churches and Monasteries (Investigation and Audit) Law constituted a major success for the 
secular elite, which saw that the demands it put forward from the beginning of colonial rule and 
more recently during 1933-34 now lay within their grasp.  
The varying reactions of Orthodox prelates to the 1937 legislation are indicative of the 
political significance of the archiepiscopal question, which remained unresolved. The activity of 
the Patriarch of Alexandria is a case in point. In 1937, when the colonial authorities introduced 
their new legislative measures, the Patriarch had reacted with hostile indifference. A year later, 
he changed his position, motivated by his personal aspirations, and asked for a British stipend to 
pledge his services at the disposal of the British Government.107 In October 1939, in opposition 
to the established position of the Church of Cyprus, the Church of Greece and most other 
Orthodox Churches, the Patriarch stated that the laws were not anti-canonical, and argued that 
the government was obliged to enforce them because, by contrast with the allegations of the 
Bishop of Kyrenia, it was the only responsible solution for defining the preconditions for the 
archiepiscopal election.108   
In this context of shifting alliances and intrigue, the Anglican Church, a powerful 
institution with great and direct influence on colonial authorities, emerged as the most valuable 
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ally of the Church of Cyprus. From a very early stage, the intervention of the Anglican Church – 
26 of whose bishops sat in the House of Lords – had cast doubt upon the Colonial Office 
concerning the way the government of Cyprus had managed the entire question. In April 1938, 
Secretary of State Ormsby-Gore noted:   
It is all most unsatisfactory... I feel that … [the governor] ignores … the fact that 
we have a Bench of Bishops in the House of Lords and is determined to 
embarrass the secretary of state. I feel I have no option but to pass these drafts and 
hope that the governor will not go on ignoring my views. It is most 
unsatisfactory.109  
Although the Archbishop of Canterbury did not harbour the same aversion to the 1937 laws held 
by the Church of Cyprus, he exerted pressure on the Secretary of State to compromise with the 
Church, repeal the Berat law, and replace it with a provision for a list of candidates to be 
approved by the Governor before the election. The British proposal, however, was rejected by 
the Locum Tenens.110 Nonetheless, the Colonial Office was forced to delay the enactment of the 
laws on the archiepiscopal election for almost a year.111 Most importantly, a set of laws drafted 
in early 1939, which would place further restrictions on the autonomy of Church by forcing an 
archiepiscopal election, were never adopted. In the following years, the Church of England 
continued its policy of involvement in the matter, to the dismay of the colonial authorities. The 
Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem, George Francis Graham-Brown, visited Cyprus some months 
later in mid-1939, and met with the Locum Tenens, to the Cyprus Government’s and the 
Colonial Office’s irritation. In spring 1940, the Bishops of Gloucester and Gibraltar called on the 
British Ambassador in Athens, pleading that any future legislation respect the charter of the 
Church of Cyprus.112 The intervention of the Anglican Church would prove even more effective 
after the end of the Second World War. In 1946, the laws would be repealed in line with the 
colonial government’s new considerations on Cypriot politics.   
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2.3 Colonial Legality vs. Ethnarchy 
The confrontation between the Church and the colonial authorities culminated in 1939, when the 
government brought charges against the Locum Tenens, leading to his conviction. As early as 
1932, Leontios, then Bishop of Paphos, had been convicted for sedition by the Limassol Assize 
Court, because of his public criticism of those who had testified against Greek-Cypriots in the 
aftermath of the 1931 revolt.113 In April 1938, the Locum Tenens was again prosecuted for 
delivering seditious speeches, and was found guilty of seeking to disturb the tranquillity of the 
colony. He was placed under police supervision for one year, ordered to reside in the municipal 
limits of Paphos, and forbidden to leave the district without written authority of the police, under 
the 1935 Prevention of Crime Law.114 Exactly a year later, in April 1939, based on information 
given by an informant, a party of 14 policemen raided the Archbishopric looking for guns and 
seditious documents.115 This raid, which took place on Orthodox Easter Monday, as well as the 
fact that the priests were body-searched and the sacristy opened, caused an outcry. The Locum 
Tenens protested to the Governor that the search at the Archbishopric was not only a violation of 
the immunity of the Church (thus, an impious act), but also contrary to the promise given by the 
first British High Commissioner back in 1878 that the government would respect the rights of the 
Church.116 The Locum Tenens forwarded his complaints to the Secretary of State, and sent letters 
to the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Patriarchs of Jerusalem, Alexandria, Antioch, Romania and 
Serbia, the Archbishop of Athens, the heads of the Autocephalous Churches of Georgia, Albania 
and Poland and, of course, the Archbishop of Canterbury.117 The raid on the Archbishopric was 
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intensely criticized by the Colonial Office, as it brought only negligible results, while eliciting 
severe criticism from the Anglican Archbishop and considerable local reaction.118   
A few weeks later in May 1939, the Locum Tenens was summoned to the District Court 
of Limassol for what was to turn into a three-day trial (15-17 May) that would again lead to his 
conviction.119 Leontios’ alleged subversive activity from mid-1938 to mid-1939 led to 
accusations of disturbance of the peace in the colony, and actions against British sovereignty 
over the island. Leontios was further accused of corrupting the minds of schoolboys, claiming to 
represent the Cypriot people and delivering sermons and speeches of political nature – that is, 
claiming ethnarchy.120 What is of particular interest is that these accusations did not take the 
form of charges against the Locum Tenens, but constituted grounds for determining the ‘general 
circumstances’ of the case, and for proving his ‘known character’ and the ‘likelihood of 
disturbing the public tranquillity’ to the Court.121 The 1935 Prevention of Crime Law, under 
which Leontios was convicted, allowed the police to summon and then arrest an individual 
deemed likely to breach the peace, without the obligation to prove that they were guilty of any 
particular act that showed such an intent.122 As the president of the Court, Justice Thomas 
Wilkinson, noted at the opening of the trial, ‘there could be no strict evidence that a person is 
likely to do something. What is likely to happen must be a matter of opinion’.123 On the final day 
of the trial, explaining his argumentation for making an order, he stated:   
I do not have to decide, and I do not decide, whether the Respondent has 
committed any offence. The [Prevention of Crime] Law … is not penal, … it is … 
preventive: what I have to decide is whether or not an Order is to be made – and 
one of the considerations I have to bear in mind is, the likelihood … of any 
disturbance of the public tranquillity – NOT whether any such disturbance has 
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taken place. I have to look to what may happen in the future than make any ruling 
as to what has happened in the past.124         
 
Before stressing some important features of the trial, an analysis of the 1935 Prevention 
of Crime Law, in the context of the legal and institutional system of Cyprus and the British 
colonial empire in general, is necessary.     
The official argumentation behind the enactment of the law was the need to reduce 
crimes against property in the countryside – notably the theft of animals and crops, which the 
police, the district administration and the rural constabulary were unable to control.125 In 
September 1934, a member of the Advisory Council sent a letter to the Colonial Secretary, 
blaming the increase in crime to the fact that police had stopped arresting suspects.126 A few days 
later, the mukhtars and azas (members of village councils) of 36 villages in the district of 
Larnaca petitioned the government, requesting that those convicted of theft should be flogged 
and imprisoned, and that landless vagabonds known to the authorities be pre-emptively arrested. 
The introduction of a law for the Prevention of Crime along these demands was discussed at a 
meeting of the Advisory Council the following month. The Council warmly supported such 
measures. Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Larnaca and the Governor suggested the amendment 
of the Penal Code so that cases of animal stealing and robbery were punishable by flogging, in 
addition to imprisonment.127  
Although the official rationale for the enactment of the Prevention of Crime Law was the 
need to prevent criminal actions, it appears that the repression of political activity was equally 
important in the final decision of the government. The Commissioner of Larnaca, the first 
official to propose the enactment of the law, argued that it would allow the government to 
control subversive activity and restrict the freedom of movement of suspect individuals. In fact, 
the law was introduced because the emergency Defence Regulations that had been enacted after 
the 1931 revolt to prevent political agitation would have to be eventually repealed. The debate 
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that accompanied the amendment of the law in 1951, as well as the relevant discussions for the 
introduction of the new Peace and Order (Preservation) Law, make clear that the goal of the 
authorities was to repress ‘the expression of political opinions’ by criminalizing ‘utterances, 
publications or conduct … likely to disturb public tranquillity or … prejudicial to good 
government’.128 The law seems to have been modelled on the Palestine Prevention of Crime 
Ordinance of 1933, which had amended a 1929 Ordinance for the Prevention of Crime, and 
shared a similar objective with the Cypriot legislation.129 The most controversial provision of the 
Palestine Law was the barring of the public and representatives of the Press from judicial 
proceedings under the Ordinance, which indicated that the expected trials would not deal solely 
with ordinary civil crime.130 The repressive character of the law was made clearly manifest in the 
trial of the Locum Tenens, four years after its enactment.           
According to the provisions of the Cyprus 1935 Prevention of Crime Law, a 
commissioner or a president of a district court could act against an individual, upon information 
that they were likely to disturb the peace.  The accused was required to prove that their intentions 
were peaceful, or the judge could order that the person post bond or be restrained within the 
limits of a district, town or village. Moreover, the law stated that the prosecution was not 
required to prove that a person committed any particular act in court, or even intent of purpose. 
A case could be made simply based on circumstantial evidence or even the ‘known character’ of 
the accused.   
On a first level, the law introduced the criminalization of intent. As stated in sections 2 
and 5(4b), it was not the criminal act itself that was prosecuted, but the likelihood of its being 
committed. Although similar provisions had been introduced into the United Kingdom’s legal 
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system as early as 1871, and its logic had been partially maintained in the 1908 Prevention of 
Crime Act, the political dimensions of their application in Cyprus institutionalized the 
suppression of freedom of expression, especially in relation to nationalist and anti-colonial 
positions.131 On a second level, the provisions concerning the evidence that would determine the 
guilt or innocence of the accused were clearly arbitrary. The ‘circumstances of the case’ and the 
‘known character’ of the accused were seen as sufficient for a person’s conviction, and were at 
the absolute discretion of the Court. Although similar provision had been present in the 1824 
Vagrancy Act, the 1871 Prevention of Crimes Act, and the 1908 Prevention of Crime Act, in 
Cyprus, the law also provided the Governor and commissioners with the ability to exercise 
judicial powers. And taking into consideration the pro-rogation of the Legislative Council after 
the 1931 revolt and the permanent ability of the government to legislate with Orders in Council, 
the law represented the final blow for the separation of powers on the island.  
This feature made the law all the more advantageous in the eyes of the government and 
the Colonial Office. Similar legislation had existed in other colonies and dependencies, such as 
Palestine, Kenya, Ireland and the Channel Islands.132 As Governor Palmer stated,   
[T]he Law … has been enacted as an exceptional measure in terrorem 
maleficorum and for the preservation of the security of the law-abiding citizen. 
By associating members of the Administration and judicial officers in a common 
procedure for its application, it serves to impress upon the public mind the fact, 
sometimes liable to be obscured, that Administration and Judiciary are both 
equally and alike functions of the same Government and inspired by a single 
purpose to maintain the ‘King’s Peace’.133 
Such an utilitarian approach to the legal system was seen as natural by all ranks of the colonial 
administration. Commenting on the law, district commissioners and colonial office officials 
admitted that its restricting provisions were oppressive and illiberal. Yet, as Arthur Dawe, a 
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senior official in London, stressed, such legislation might be reasonably applied in Cyprus, given 
that it had worked well in Palestine.134 He further stated:         
[O]bjections to this type of legislation from the standpoint of British legal 
principles are obvious. But principles which will work here will not equally work 
in the special conditions of Cyprus… [W]e must let the Governor have his way. 
He is evidently quite conscious of the unusual nature of the provisions... But he is 
satisfied that no less drastic powers are necessary.135   
 
As had been expected, the Prevention of Crime Law was welcomed not only by the 
village authorities, who had called for its introduction, but also by part of the rural population, 
which, in contrast to the townsfolk, suffered from petty crimes on a constant basis. From the 
Shepherds’ Licensing Law to the Goats (Amendment) Law, and from the Juvenile Offenders 
Law to the Prevention of Crime Law, the colonial authorities introduced a series of legislative 
initiatives in 1935 against rural crime. Along with the reorganization of the police and the 
intensification of patrols in the countryside, the number of minor offences in rural areas dropped 
during the first half of 1936. Mukhtars, azas and rural constables expressed their satisfaction 
with the deterrent effect of the law, as well as its ability to decrease the cases of animal-stealing, 
housebreaking and burglary. This led the Governor to note with satisfaction that the law was not 
perceived as arbitrary and extra-judicial by the rural population.136  
In 1939, the trial of the Locum Tenens would test the effectiveness of the law in handling 
political questions. Most importantly, the trial illustrated the significant role of the Church in 
Cypriot politics, with Leontios personifying the conflict against the colonial authorities. His 
defence consisted of ten advocates from all across Cyprus, all of them important individuals 
within the Greek-Cypriot community and prominent in the struggle against the colonial 
government.137 The team included Criton Tornaritis, Alekos Zenon, Lefkios Zenon  and Pheidias 
Kyriakides from Limassol; Vias Markides from Nicosia; Christodoulos Galatopoulos and Sotiris 
Markides  from Paphos; George Vassiliades from Larnaca; Andreas Gavrielides  from 
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Famagusta; and Savvas Christis from Kyrenia. In other words, the defence represented different 
generations and cut across political divisions within the Greek-Cypriot community. Some, like 
Gavrielides and Lefkios Zenon, both members of EREK, were ardent nationalists. Alekos Zenon 
and Sotiris Markides had fought in the Balkan Wars as volunteers with the Greek army, while 
Kyriakides had been one of the leaders of the demonstration that attacked the government house 
in 1931. Others were affiliated to the Left, such as Kyriakides and Vassiliades, who would 
become founding members of AKEL in April 1941, and Galatopoulos, who had been elected 
deputy at the legislative council with communist support and was later imprisoned for his role in 
the revolt.  
It is of particular interest that the defence team did not attempt to persuade the Court that 
the various speeches and sermons of the Locum Tenens – which constituted the main body of 
evidence offered by the prosecution – were innocuous and unthreatening. No attempt was made 
to reject the accusations, apart from that of promoting anti-British feelings. Throughout the 
cross-examination of the witnesses and in their addresses to the Court, the advocates focused on 
the historically Greek character of Cyprus and on Leontios’ ethnarchic role. According to the 
defence, these points made the actions and discourse of the Locum Tenens natural, if not 
imperative. Even during cross-examination, the advocates attempted to highlight the links with 
Greek culture that the witnesses enjoyed. The defence argued that the dedication of Leontios to 
his ethnarchic duties, that is, the promotion of Greek culture and Orthodox faith, was not 
incompatible with loyalty to the British. It seems that the growing tensions in Europe and 
especially in the Eastern Mediterranean had caused concerns among Greek-Cypriots that a 
potential departure of Britain from the island could only pave the way for the occupation of 
Cyprus from a different foreign power.      
In his own statement, the Locum Tenens defined himself as the ethnarch of the Greek-
Cypriot community, the defender of its holy and national traditions and the promoter of Greek 
education [παιδεία].138 Like his defence team, Leontios professed his loyalty to Great Britain, 
and, at the same time, his readiness to sacrifice himself for the sake of his congregation. At the 
                                                 
138 NA, FCO 141/2590, Locum Tenens’ speech, 17 May 1939. The Greek term ‘παιδεία’ designates a system of 
broad cultural education, or a process providing systematic knowledge for the overall improvement of someone’s 
intellectual level. ‘Eκπαίδευση’ (education), on the other hand, designates a systematic process of transmitting 
knowledge and skills on a more narrow, or specific basis.      
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same time, he invoked his spiritual role, refusing to take the oath and speak from the dock, while 
he employed a number of Biblical extracts in his address. His whole presentation seems to have 
been carefully prepared. When Leontios arrived at court on the first day of the trial, he was 
accompanied by 200 clerics and a clique of supporters.139 During the course of Leontios’ address 
to the court, many in the audience - and at least four of the advocates - wept. Men, women and 
children gathered every day in the vicinity of the courthouse, and as the proceedings lengthened 
the crowds became larger. According to the report of the Deputy Commissioner of Police:   
On every appearance of the Bishop and his attendant priests in the streets long 
cheering and … clapping was heard... One school in the vicinity of the Bishopric 
… broke out of class and rushed on to the street to applaud the Bishop on his way 
to Court. The Bishop responded to the applause on all occasions by waving his 
hand and blessing the people... Occasionally cries of “Zito Enosis” [Long Live 
Enosis] … were heard in the crowd. Large crowds gathered outside the Limassol 
Metropolis after the Bishop had returned there following the decision of the Court 
… and remained there until his departure at Paphos.140       
The trial had offered Leontios a great opportunity to restore the prestige of the Church, 
which had been greatly diminished by the archiepiscopal question and the issue of Church 
property. As such, the objective of the Locum Tenens and his defence team was not to secure 
acquittal, but to attach a political significance to the trial that would confirm the claim of the 
Church to ethnarchy. Indeed, the trial highlighted the political unity of the Greek-Cypriot 
community, under an emerging leader who could convincingly appear as the defender of its 
national interests. The Locum Tenens’ persecution would, it was hoped, come to be inscribed as 
a symbolic sacrifice for the good of his congregation. In this sense, the trial developed into an 
absolute success for Leontios and a failure for the government. The British had only managed to 
restrict his physical movement within the municipal limits of Paphos, at the cost of enhancing his 
prestige. They would repeat the same mistake in 1956, with the exile of Archbishop Makarios 
III.     
 Most importantly, all sides involved in the trial (the colonial authorities, the Church, the 
secular Greek-Cypriot elite) regarded the process as a challenge to the political role of the 
Church. Because the accusations revolved around the political and secular, or ethnarchic, 
dimension of Leontios’ activities, the British implicitly recognized the Church itself as a partially 
                                                 
139 NA, CO 67/297/7, Limassol and Paphos Deputy Commissioner to the Commissioner, 18 May 1939. 
140 NA, CO 67/297/7, Deputy Commissioner of Police to the Commissioner of Police, 18 May 1939.   
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secular institution. The accusations, as well as the argumentation provided by the public 
prosecution and the Court, did not address the religious and spiritual authority of the accused. 
The British had seized an opportunity to further curtail the secular activity of the Church, after 
the successful measures against religious participation in the Greek-Cypriot board of education 
and its local branches.  The Court was mainly preoccupied with the content of Church discourse, 
not the presence of such activity – after all, the Muslim religious elite had also traditionally 
enjoyed a longstanding secular role, which the government sought to reinforce. Conversely, the 
trial offered the Church an opportunity to secure its prominent political position on the island. 
The confrontation between the Church and the government urged all Greek-Cypriot political 
forces to support the Locum Tenens, creating a consensus among the previously competing 
factions. That new understanding was made manifest in the composition of the defence team and 
the extensive coverage of the trial in most newspapers of the island, including those controlled 
by the secular elite and the left-wing Anexartitos (The Independent). In the following years, 
Leontios would successfully expand on his position as a prominent anti-government political 
figure and leader of the Greek-Cypriot community.      
 
2.4 Towards the Nationalization of Greek-Cypriot Politics  
The relations between the Church and the government did not improve after the departure of 
Governor Palmer and the appointment of William Battershill in July 1939. Leontios, who had not 
been invited to the welcoming ceremony for the new Governor, welcomed Battershill with a 
protest letter. The Bishop demanded the fulfilment of Greek-Cypriot community’s ‘national 
desires’, which included  the repeal of the 1937 Church laws, the return of the exiled Bishop of 
Kyrenia and the restoration of Greek-Cypriot education to its original status.141 With the 
beginning of the Second World War, the Locum Tenens’ attitude towards the British hardened 
further. Leontios refused to allow prayers for an Allied victory, noting that a German victory was 
probable, while, in early November, he declared that the King, not being an Orthodox believer, 
                                                 
141 Heraclidou, 2011, p. 100.   
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should not be mentioned in the prayers of Orthodox churches.142 Moreover, he refused to 
countenance the collection of charity donations for the British Red Cross in the churches, while 
he permitted such contributions to the Greek Red Cross.     
The entry of Greece into the war on 28 October 1940, however, led to a rapprochement 
between Leontios and the British. The Bishop stated that all differences between himself and the 
government were over and that ‘the world is nothing without Britain and Greece’.143 On 29 
October, Leontios gave a public speech in Larnaca, inviting the audience to forget past 
misunderstandings, and finishing by proclaiming ‘Long live the King of England, the British 
nation, our allies Turkey and Greece’.144 On another occasion, the Bishop draped himself in the 
British and the Greek flags and proclaimed, in the old pun, that ‘the English are angels’.145 In the 
same period, he called for the enrolment of Cypriots in the Greek army, and led popular pro-
Greek demonstrations, which were held in all major towns and were tolerated by the British 
despite the 1930s repressive legislation.146 As the government feared, Greece’s entry in the war 
had galvanized pro-Greek, and thus pro-enosis, feelings on the island, as indicated also by the 
remarkable contribution of Greek-Cypriots to the Greek War Fund.147 Overall, the Locum 
Tenens continued to stress his ethnarchic role and the desires of Greek-Cypriots for enosis both 
in public and in his correspondence with colonial officials.148 Leontios' campaign only slowed 
down after the occupation of Greece by the German army dealt a blow to the prospects of enosis.     
While the confrontation between the Church and the government had reached a 
stalemate, the appearance of a new party would gradually bring about major transformations in 
the Greek-Cypriot political landscape. In the early 1940s, the KKK moved to form a new, legal 
left-wing party that would demand labour and civil rights and the end of colonial rule on the 
                                                 
142 NA, CO 67/313/8, Archiepiscopal question, memorandum on Cyprus Archbishopric, 28 March 1941; NA, CO 
67/308/9, Reports on the political situation, Governor William Battershill to Secretary of State Malcolm 
MacDonald, 29 December 1939. 
143 Yiangou, 2012, p.44. 
144 Ibid., p. 50. 
145 NA, CO 67/313/8, memorandum on Cyprus Archbishopric, 28 March 1941. 
146 In the first days after the announcement, around 1200 men registered for enrolment in the Greek army and 200 
women volunteered for the Greek Red Cross. The volunteer movement was opposed by the colonial government, 
which was embarrassed at the failure of the recruitment drive for the British forces, and eventually halted by 
Leontios. Apostolos Varnavas, Locum Tenens’ circular ‘On fundraising for the national struggle in memoriam of 
Ioannis Metaxas’, 31 January 1941; Yiangou, 2012, pp. 47-50. 
147 By mid-1941, the amount raised for the Fund had reached the sum of £100,000. NA, CO 67/308/10, Reports on 
the political situation, Governor to Secretary of State Lord Lloyd, 8 July 1940; Yiangou, 2012, p. 44. 
148 See NA, CO 67/313/11, Method of dealing with messages of greeting from the Locum Tenens. 
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island. The foundation of the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) in April 1941 
signified the formation of a broad secular political space, posing a threat to the traditional 
political establishment. Being particularly active in trade union organizing, the new party played 
a key role in supporting large-scale labour mobilizations throughout the 1940s. AKEL’s political 
agenda was met with wide popular support, as indicated by its success in the municipal elections 
of the period, and the party soon emerged as the most significant opponent of the nationalist 
Greek-Cypriot elite. Four years after its foundation, the party had come to be seen as the most 
powerful adversary of the colonial government as well, which sought to restrict its activities and 
stem its appeal.   
A few days after the party’s foundation, the Locum Tenens established a six-member 
Λαϊκό Συμβούλιο [Popular Council], composed of nationalist figures from all districts of the 
island.149 As early as April 1942, Governor Woolley suggested the deportation of Ploutis Servas, 
the General Secretary of AKEL, while a year later, following the Left’s success in the 1943 
municipal elections, right-wing politicians moved to the foundation of the Κυπριακόν Εθνικόν 
Κόμμα [Cypriot National Party – KEK].150 The KEK sought both to impede the expansion of 
leftist influence and to form an anti-communist and nationalist pole within Greek-Cypriot 
politics that would advance the cause of enosis within the framework of Anglo-Hellenic 
friendship and through peaceful means.151 Themistocles Dervis, mayor of Nicosia and the first 
General Secretary of KEK, had been closely cooperating with the colonial government for over a 
decade. In 1935, Dervis had been awarded the title of Officer of the British Empire, and, three 
years later, he suggested that the elections should not be restored on the island.152 In this context, 
and as right-wing nationalist politics continued to be dominated by the Church, the appeal of the 
new party remained limited. Its very appearance, however, signified the great concern of the 
Greek-Cypriot elite about the growing influence of AKEL, considered as an ‘internal enemy’.153    
                                                 
149 Eleftheria, ‘Popular Council of the Church of Cyprus’, 4 June 1941.   
150 A few months later, Servas was searched and arrested for allegedly carrying a revolver and revolutionary 
documents. He was eventually released, while all documents found on him were seized. NA, CO 67/314/14, 
Governor Charles Woolley to Secretary of State Viscount Cranborne, 2 April 1942; Anexartitos, ‘Police search of 
the General Secretary of AKEL’, 12 November 1942; NA, CO 67/314/15, Servas’ memorandum to Secretary of 
State Oliver Stanley, 23 December 1942.   
151 NA, FCO 141/2819, KEK (Cyprus National Party); basic paper, 22 June 1949; Eleftheria, ‘The foundation of a 
Cypriot national party was decided’, 7 June 1943. 
152 Katsiaounis, 2000, pp. 43 and 47. 
153 Eleftheria, ‘Yesterday’s meeting in Nicosia for the formation of a Pan-Cypriot party’, 5 June 1943.  
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The politics of AKEL and the Greek-Cypriot elite intersected on a major issue, that is the 
national question. In fact, as much as the foundation of AKEL marked the emergence of a 
political dynamic which challenged the confessional and conservative character of Greek-
Cypriot politics, it also signified the nationalization of the discourse and politics of the Left. 
From its very first steps, the new party adopted the dominant nationalist and enosist discourse, 
which had been hitherto monopolized by the Church and the nationalist politicians. AKEL would 
also recognize the head of the Church as the ethnarch, or the natural leader of the Greek-Cypriot 
community and the national-liberation struggle.  
In March 1942, AKEL announced that it would organize celebrations on the anniversary 
of the outbreak of the Greek War of independence (25 March 1821) across the island and the 
date was adopted by the party as an official annual celebration.154 Only a decade earlier, on 25 
March 1931, KKK members had taken down the Greek flag from the high school of Limassol 
and replaced it with a red flag.155 Now the new party wanted to prove its allegiance to the 
national cause and gave extensive publicity to the celebrations. At the same time, the party 
severely criticized the Church, which had announced in February that the anniversary would not 
be celebrated due to the occupation of Greece.156 Eventually, the Locum Tenens was forced to 
issue an elucidation stating that celebrations should not be affected by the previous 
announcement.157 This move triggered a dispute between the Church and some of its allies, with 
the right-wing Nicosia clubs announcing that they would not participate in any celebrations.158 
One week before the anniversary, the Archimandrite of Kyrenia attacked AKEL’s plan, stressing 
that the party was in essence anti-national, having therefore no right at all to be involved in the 
anniversary celebrations.159 Eventually, the party celebrated the anniversary as planned, while 
services were held in churches. The Locum Tenens conducted the main liturgy in the church of 
Phaneromeni, in Nicosia, and prayed for the restitution of the Greek nation.160 Overall, the 
dispute revealed the formation of two opposing camps within the Greek-Cypriot community, 
both of which attempted to assume the leadership of the national-liberation struggle.  
                                                 
154 Anexartitos, ‘The celebration of the March 25th in the countryside’, 10 March 1942.  
155 NA, CO 67/239/14, Political situation, Governor Storrs to Secretary of State Lord Passfield, 4 June 1931. 
156 Neos Kypriakos Phylax, ‘Greek Church of Cyprus: celebration of the March 25th’, 14 February 1942; Anexartitos, 
‘The celebration of the anniversary of national rebirth’, 25 March 1942.  
157 Neos Kypriakos Phylax, ‘The celebration of the March 25th’, 26 February 1942. 
158 Eleftheria, ‘The national anniversary’, 16 March 1942. 
159 Neos Kypriakos Phylax, ‘Our national celebration and the party’s aims’, 18 March 1942. 
160 Yiangou, 2012, p. 75. 
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Due to lack of evidence, it remains unclear how and when the shift of the KKK position 
on the national question started. It seems possible, however, that the shift began during the 
second half of the 1930s, and specifically after the official election of Ploutis Servas as General 
Secretary of the KKK at the Third Party Congress in 1936.161 The new Secretary introduced two 
main innovations in party policy. Servas stressed the importance of trade union organizing, and 
insisted that the party should avoid appearing overly hostile to the Church and the nationalist 
discourse on enosis. Although the impact of Servas' opinion on the KKK’s national politics is not 
certain, the position of AKEL, for which he also served as its first Secretary, indicates that a turn 
in the KKK’s policy must had started some years before the foundation of AKEL.     
 In February 1942, Servas submitted an extensive memorandum to the Governor, in which 
he offered the cooperation of the party with the government for the better administration of the 
island and the protection of the working class.162 Servas criticized the record of the colonial 
authorities since 1878, and suggested a series of reforms that mainly concerned the establishment 
of representative institutions and the economic relief of the inhabitants, primarily the working 
class. Strikingly, the introductory paragraph of the memorandum stated that the party wished to 
cooperate with the government ‘in the interests of the community’, among others. Servas' text 
constituted a radical break with KKK and AKEL precedent, not only because of his conciliatory 
stance towards the authorities, but also for making no reference to the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. Even more significantly, the memorandum conceptualized the national issue in a 
line of arguments identical to that of the Church:   
Cyprus, inhabited principally by Greeks for the last 3000 years, was provisionally 
occupied ... in 1878 by the British, in order ... to meet strategic requirements in 
the interests of Imperial Turkey... The Greeks in Cyprus hoped that at the end of 
the emergency the island would be handed over to Greece on historical and 
national grounds... In 1915 and 1916, Great Britain offered Cyprus with its 
270,000 Greek inhabitants to Greece if the latter joined the Allies..; the Greek 
government at the time preferred neutrality over Cyprus, but in 1917 when ... 
Greece did join the Allies ... the Cypriot Greeks prayed and hoped for national 
union...  
                                                 
161 No evidence exists of the Third and Fourth Congresses of the KKK, held secretly in 1936 in Varoshi, Famagusta, 
and in 1940 in Derineia, Famagusta, respectively.  
162 NA, CO 67/314/14, Servas’ memorandum to Governor Charles Woolley, 25 February 1942.  
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Furthermore, the memorandum criticized the government’s policy on education and asked for the 
lifting of the legislation on the archiepiscopal election.  
In May 1942, AKEL addressed a memorandum to the Governor asking that the Atlantic 
Charter’s provisions on self-determination be implemented in Cyprus. The memorandum 
stressed that this should be applied in the context of a recent statement of Greece’s Prime 
Minister, who had spoken of enosis. The memorandum was published in the party newspaper 
Anexartitos, under the title ‘enlistment under the condition of securing the union of Cyprus with 
mother Greece’, together with a similar memorandum by the Locum Tenens, who also advocated 
for enosis in exchange for the mobilization of Greek-Cypriots in the war effort.163 A month later, 
AKEL called the government to recognize the national status of the Greek-Cypriot schools, 
stressing that they should promote the national spirit of the community.164 At the end of the year, 
the General Secretary of the party submitted a memorandum to Secretary of State Oliver Stanley 
that repeated the questions raised by the memorandum earlier sent to the Governor, though 
emphasizing government measures against AKEL’s activities. Again, the text criticized, among 
other issues, government measures against the Church, it demanded the teaching of Greek 
history in schools, and protested against the government’s refusal to allow posting pictures of 
Greek revolutionary heroes on school walls.165  
 All the memoranda and documents submitted garnered no reaction from the Cyprus 
Government.166 AKEL itself, however, gave these documents great publicity and supplied copies 
to organizations and politicians in Britain.167 In January 1943, the Second Congress of the party 
declared that ‘our only claim [is] the national claim’ and demanded the national restoration of the 
island.168 The party’s newspaper reported extensively on the new position of AKEL on the 
national question. Meanwhile, many articles pointed to the party’s attempts to come to an 
understanding with the Church.169 The effort seemed to have met initial success, as the Locum 
Tenens responded positively to the party’s request for his help in re-establishing political life on 
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the island. Crucially, Leontios remained neutral in the municipal elections in March 1943, which 
proved a first test for the appeal of AKEL and its policies.170   
 The party contested the elections in most towns and municipalities with candidates who 
were either party members or allies participating in a united front or a people’s alliance. Most 
notably, the party supported the candidacy of Ioannis Clerides, the legal advisor of the 
Archbishopric and associate of the Locum Tenens, for mayor of Nicosia. The discourse 
employed by the opposing camps during the pre-election period signified the polarization of 
Greek-Cypriot politics between Left and Right and at the same time demonstrated the 
crystallization of the Left’s nationalist politics and the diffusion of its discourse among the lower 
classes and even among AKEL’s opponents.   
The political platform of the right-wing candidates was mainly based, as expected, on the 
national question. The growing engagement of the working class with labour questions during 
the previous period and the militancy of AKEL, however, forced right-wing politicians to present 
a labour welfare programme. Thus the programme of the Εθνικός Συνδυασμός [National 
Combination] of Nicosia included, among other pledges, a reduction of taxation on workers and 
of the cost of living index.171 The right-wing candidates also called for the repeal of the 
authoritarian legislation imposed after the 1931 revolt and supported the political independence 
of municipalities from the government.172   
The candidates supported by the Left emphasized labour issues as well as the national 
question, while denouncing the candidates of the Right who had been appointed to official 
positions by the colonial authorities during the previous decade and had cooperated with the 
government.173 A few days before the elections, Servas, who was himself a candidate in 
Limassol, repeatedly stressed that enosis constituted the national goal of communists in Cyprus:   
                                                 
170 Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Book 15, ‘General Secretary of A.K.E.L. to 
Locum Tenens Leontios’, 16 June 1942; and ‘Locum Tenens Leontios to General Secretary of A.K.E.L.’, 18 June 
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hitherto appointed mayor of Nicosia, who ran for mayor as the leader of Nicosia’s National Combination. See 
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[A]re we ... a Cypriot nation? Can such a thing exist? ... [W]e do not have our 
own Cypriot language ... and everybody knows that we speak Greek... We also 
share a common religion with the Greeks ..., we also have the same historical 
traditions... There is no other civilization in Cyprus than the Greek one ... and 
there is no doubt that for Cyprus national restoration would mean union with 
Greece.174  
The elections proved a great success for AKEL. The candidates supported by the party in 
Limassol and Famagusta were elected mayors, while candidates supported by AKEL received 
49.9% of the votes in towns across the island, in comparison to the 54.4% of the right-wing 
candidates.175 On the eve of its success, the party embarked on a new nationalist campaign, 
calling for the collaboration among all political forces in the Greek-Cypriot community on 
claiming to advance the cause of enosis.   
 
2.5 Attempts at the Formation of a Common National Front 
Following the municipal elections, which demonstrated that the nationalist political discourse 
developed by AKEL had popular appeal, the party intensified its direct demands for enosis and 
called for the formation of a Εθνικό Συμβούλιο [National Council].176 The council was supposed 
to bring together all Greek-Cypriot organizations under the presidency of the Locum Tenens 
with the single goal of promoting enosis. The initiative was rejected by the right-wing politicians 
and organizations, but not by Leontios, who received it positively. Leontios' frequent support for 
AKEL caused a strong reaction among conservative politicians, such as Dervis, and the inner 
circle of the Bishopric of Kyrenia. A few weeks after the elections, right-wing politicians 
criticized Leontios for meeting with the newly elected municipal council of Famagusta and 
praising the national activities of its members.177 Similarly, a visit to the Archbishopric by a 
delegation of AKEL-affiliated cultural clubs from Morfou met with disapproval.178 A series of 
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articles in Neos Kypriakos Phylax criticized the Locum Tenens’ overall attitude towards the 
party, and called upon him to abstain from inviting the Left to join the National Council, or any 
other institution that would claim to represent the community.179 All the same, the Locum 
Tenens attempted to arrange a meeting with delegates from all Greek-Cypriot parties, including 
AKEL, the KEK, the Pan-Cypriot Farmers’ Union (PEK), as well as members of the press, all 
elected mayors of the island, and some prominent political figures of the Greek-Cypriot 
community. The meeting aimed at discussing the formation of such a council, but proved 
unsuccessful as only the Left responded positively.180 The KEK and all other right-wing 
organizations demanded the exclusion of AKEL as a condition for their participation.181   
At the same time, AKEL invited its members and supporters to enlist in the British army 
to support the Allies in liberating Greece, so that enosis could be claimed after the war. 11 
members of the party’s Central Committee were the first to enlist in the Cyprus regiment.182 The 
appeal quickly proved highly successful, with about 700 members of the party enlisting within a 
few days of its publication. Notably, the volunteers were blessed by the Locum Tenens; that act 
resonated with the enlistments for the Balkan wars in 1912, which loomed large in Greek-
Cypriot memory.183   
In April 1944, AKEL held its Third Congress, which focused on the war effort, peasant 
and labour issues, civil rights and the national question.184 The Congress resolutions suggested a 
series of reforms for the protection of the peasant and working classes, and called for the national 
restoration of Cyprus, in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. The Congress also addressed a 
systematic presentation of the party's priorities and positions to the Governor. The text asked for 
freedom to organize national and anti-fascist events and for the abolition of all antidemocratic 
articles of legislation, emphasizing the laws related to the archiepiscopal question. The text also 
stressed that the community had the right to be prepared for national restoration immediately 
after the liberation of Greece, and demanded the democratic administration of all political, 
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economic and educational affairs on the island and within the Greek-Cypriot community by 
elected representatives. Last, the resolution suggested a series of measures for the protection of 
the peasant and working classes, asked for the release from prison of all trade union members 
incarcerated in the previous period, and called for the improvement of prisoners’ living 
conditions.  
  The resolution reflected the anti-colonial discourse which the party had been articulating 
since its foundation, and codified the national and socio-political claims of the Left. Party policy, 
now tinged with nationalism, considered enosis as the ultimate goal of the Greek-Cypriot 
community. Nevertheless, AKEL also put forward a social programme based on civil rights and 
the demand for a democratic administration. This duality of the party’s anti-colonial discourse 
would be, with some variations, constantly stressed until the end of colonial rule. Overall, AKEL 
felt it had to prove its national credentials before it could play the role in Greek-Cypriot politics 
to which it aspired. To that end, AKEL pursued an understanding with the Church, now seen by 
the party as the natural leadership of the community. The moderate attitude of Leontios favoured 
this policy. In late 1943, the party and its affiliated organizations sent a despatch to the 
Governor, asking specifically for the abolition of the laws which impeded the archiepiscopal 
elections.185 The move was warmly received by the Locum Tenens, who sent a despatch to 
AKEL, praising its repeated efforts towards the resolution of the question:  
We have been following the representations of AKEL and the organizations of the 
working People … in favour of the canonical solution of the said question and 
[we] express the gratification of the church … for the orthodoxy of these popular 
protests... Please convey our gratitude to the Central Committee of AKEL and to 
… the honourable Mr. Ploutis Servas.186   
The rapprochement between the Church and AKEL continued in the following years, until late 
1947, when Leontios died and the Bishop of Kyrenia was elected Archbishop.  
 In mid-1944, the Locum Tenens attempted once more to form a National Council, which 
would embrace all political parties. This short-lived initiative was also bound to fail. The KEK 
not only considered AKEL a treacherous political force, but was critical of the attitude of 
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Leontios, who refused to denounce AKEL for its support of Greek communists.187 In August of 
the same year, the occasion of the visit of the Under-Secretary of State, Sir Cosmo Parkinson, 
made coordination among Greek-Cypriot political forces more imperative than before. Leontios 
again invited all parties to submit a common memorandum demanding enosis immediately after 
the war.188 AKEL responded positively, though its participation was again an obstacle for the 
Right, whose anti-communist crusade was openly backed by the Bishopric of Kyrenia.189  
 On his arrival in Cyprus, Parkinson received a series of telegrams from various Greek-
Cypriot organizations, mainly requesting union with Greece.190 AKEL and the KEK, which 
issued separate proclamations demanding enosis, requested an interview with the Under-
Secretary along with representatives of other Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot 
organizations.191 On 16 August, the government issued a communiqué prohibiting 
demonstrations, while Dervis and Servas, after being warned, promised that their parties would 
comply with the order.192 That same night, however, AKEL cadres, including Servas, 
participated in a demonstration in support of enosis, leading to their arrest.193  
 A few days later, AKEL announced that it would organize peaceful demonstrations to 
express the national feeling of the Greek-Cypriot community.194 Following the announcement, 
the government suspended the circulation of the trade union newspaper Anorthosis for reporting 
on the processions, brought police reinforcements to Nicosia and placed Indian soldiers along the 
main roads of Cyprus’ towns.195 Moreover, the Under-Secretary informed the General Secretary 
of the party that he would not grant him an interview if the demonstrations took place.196 A few 
days before the planned demonstrations, the KEK denounced AKEL’s policy and stressed the 
necessity of protecting Anglo-Greek friendship for securing a favourable settlement of the 
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national question after the war.197 Eventually, AKEL refused to accept the Under-Secretary’s 
invitation, unless the suspension of Anorthosis was lifted, and Parkinson met only with 
representatives from the KEK, who gave him a memorandum that emphasized British 
philhellene and liberal tradition.198   
 Despite the tension between the Left and the Right, the imminent liberation of Greece 
and the participation of the Greek Left in a national unity government paved the way to a 
collaboration between the two Greek-Cypriot factions. In September 1944, AKEL called for the 
formation of a common Greek-Cypriot political organization that would collect funds for the 
reconstruction of Greece.199 The suggestion was positively received by part of the right-wing 
press, which urged the Locum Tenens to launch an initiative to that purpose.200 With the KEK’s 
pledge to support such a move, Leontios organized a meeting of representatives of all political 
parties, organizations and newspapers at the Archbishopric, which led to the formation of a pan-
Cypriot Committee to work on that purpose.201   
 Strikingly, the KEK called a few days later for the formation of a National Council, and 
joined the Locum Tenens in inviting the parties of the island to overcome their political 
differences in order to form a political organization that could advance the cause of enosis.202 
AKEL and the KEK indeed agreed to collaborate under the leadership of the Locum Tenens, and 
an agreement was finally reached in November 1944, after a period of negotiations between all 
parties and organizations.203 The right-wing organizations’ doubts regarding AKEL’s enosist 
politics was the main obstacle to an agreement. The issue was eventually resolved thanks to 
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reassurances by Leontios.204 The conciliation, however, would prove short-lived. As the Greek 
national unity government collapsed in early December, violence broke out in the streets of 
Athens.205 The cooperation between the Greek-Cypriots followed swiftly. In January 1945, the 
seven-member Γραφείο Εθναρχίας [Ethnarchy Office] was founded, composed of nationalist 
figures from all over the island appointed by Leontios.206 The foundation of the body was 
followed by the formation of the Εθναρχικό Συμβούλιο [Ethnarchic Council], whose 
membership expanded to include 21 lay and clerical members from across the island. Most 
council members were right-wing figures, but it also included moderate politicians such as 
Clerides.207 In the same period, right-wing politicians started a campaign to expel left-wing 
teachers from schools. A notable victim of the campaign was the mayor of Famagusta Adam 
Adamantos, who was prohibited from teaching in the high school.208   
After a period of open calls to all Greek-Cypriot parties and to the Locum Tenens to 
continue to collaborate in the campaign for enosis, AKEL eventually managed to hold a Εθνική 
Σύσκεψη [National Conference] in Limassol in June 1945. The conference was attended by 
centrist and moderate right-wing politicians.209 So as to prove its dedication to the national cause, 
the party leadership submitted an extensive declaration to the Conference, stressing AKEL’s 
devotion to enosis and denouncing the politics of the KKK on the national question. The 
Conference led to the formation of the Ένωση Λεμεσού Εθνικής Συνεργασίας [Limassol 
Association of National Collaboration – ELES], which called on the Locum Tenens to form a 
representative National Council to replace the Ethnarchic Council.210 Despite Leontios’ attempts, 
the proposal was rejected by the majority of the Council, which wanted to prevent the Left from 
participating.  
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In August 1945, the Fourth Congress of AKEL called for the formation of a 
Εθνικοαπελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο [National – Liberation Front].211 The dual anti-colonial 
discourse employed at the previous Congress was maintained, with the party calling for enosis – 
characterized as ‘national destiny’ and seen as a precondition for the definite solution of any 
political and economic problems of the island – and for a democratic administration based on 
civil rights.212 The Congress also elected Fifis Ioannou as General Secretary; under his 
leadership, the party amplified the calls for enosis and for the formation of a national-liberation 
front. Moreover, AKEL declared that the national-liberation struggle should be totally peaceful. 
AKEL envisaged that victory would come through pressure exerted on Britain by the British and 
international public, by the Greek people and government, and by international organizations.213 
The party further made clear that the front should operate under the leadership of the Locum 
Tenens. This concession to the leadership of the anti-colonial struggle of the Church came due to 
the realization that the moderate Leontios was the only personality that could overcome the 
Right's refusal to collaborate with AKEL, and unite all Greek-Cypriot political factions in a 
common front against the British.    
Although the attempts to form a common front failed, AKEL’s tactics were soon to prove 
successful. In May 1946, the party and its allies, which had campaigned on a platform of national 
unity, triumphed in the municipal elections. Candidates supported by the party prevailed in four 
out of six municipalities of the island (Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Nicosia), as well as in 
many rural communities, securing a total of 56.3% of the vote.214 The Right maintained power 
only in the smaller municipalities of Kyrenia and Paphos. Most significantly, Dervis, mayor of 
Nicosia and General Secretary of the KEK, lost to the moderate Clerides, who had again 
received the support of AKEL. Despite the scope of its great victory, however, AKEL did not 
attempt to function exclusively outside the space of the Church, but rather to expand further its 
organizational structures. The immediate goal of the party was to transform its electoral alliances 
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into a broad pan-Cypriot national-liberation organization under the leadership of the Church.215 
Soon after the elections, the newly elected municipal councils called again for the enlargement of 
the Ethnarchic Council so as to include the elected mayors of the Left.216 Nevertheless, despite 
the renewed attempts of the Locum Tenens any such moves were destined to fail, given the 
resistance of the right-wing politicians and the conservative leadership of the Church, which 
constituted the majority of the Ethnarchic Council, to the participation of the Left.217 By contrast, 
the success of AKEL triggered the reaction of many right-wing politicians and clerics, who, 
although they did not previously support the Locum Tenens, now rallied around the emerging 
ethnarch.      
 
2.6 The Consolidation of Ethnarchic Enosist Politics 
The success of the Left in the municipal elections alarmed both the Greek-Cypriot elite and the 
colonial government, while further developments within and outside Cyprus during the same 
period led to the reshaping of Greek-Cypriot politics.   
First, the decision of the government to repeal the laws regarding the archiepiscopal 
election allowed for the long awaited resolution of the problem, creating new conditions for the 
relations between the Church and the Left, as well as between the two and the government. The 
first cracks in the position of the colonial authorities on the question had actually been 
observable since August 1940. The Secretary of State, Lord Lloyd, had met with the Archbishop 
of Canterbury, and they agreed that the Archbishop would conduct an unofficial consultation 
with the Ecumenical Patriarchate through Archbishop Germanos, with a view to devising a way 
out of the impasse. In the following months, Lord Lloyd agreed to a plan outlined by Germanos 
that would repeal the laws so that the patriarchate could send bishops to Cyprus and form a 
Synod. In exchange, the bishops would confirm that no candidate would be elected without the 
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Governor’s approval.218 Although Governor Woolley also adopted a position in favour of the 
repeal of the laws, the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Patriarch of Jerusalem were opposed to a 
joint intervention and were disposed to await developments after the war.219 The laws were 
finally repealed in October 1946, to a great extent due to the colonial authorities’ determination 
to strengthen the position of the Church as a counterbalance to the growing appeal of the Left, 
made manifest in that year’s municipal elections.220 The British attributed the expansion of 
AKEL’s appeal to the diminishing of the influence of the Church, and they considered Leontios 
‘little more than a puppet in the hands of politicians’.221 The party itself had emerged since early 
1945 as the island’s single-most important political actor, and was described by Governor 
Woolley as the government’s greatest threat.222   
 The candidates for the Archiepiscopal See were the Archbishop of Sinai Porfyrios and 
the Locum Tenens. Porfyrios was supported by the Bishopric of Kyrenia, the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate, the Archbishopric of Athens and the KEK.223 The Locum Tenens was supported by 
the abbots of the monasteries of Chrisoroyiatissa, Machaira and Stavrovouni, AKEL and several 
leftist and centrist politicians. At the elections in May 1947, 900 out of 1000 elected special 
representatives supported the Locum Tenens, and he was enthroned at the Archiepiscopal See in 
June of the same year.224 Having waited so long for his enthronement, he died a month later and 
was succeeded by Makarios, the Bishop of Kyrenia, who had been allowed back from exile in 
December 1946.   
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The final resolution of the archiepiscopal question and the election of Makarios II had a 
twofold significance for Cypriot politics. On one hand, the government’s accession to the 
Church’s demands and the ascendancy of Leontios to the Archiepiscopal See, after having been 
opposed by the British for over a decade, were a sign that the Church had prevailed in its 
confrontation with the colonial authorities. On the other hand, the very election of Makarios 
marked a definite rupture of the relations between the Church and the Left. Less than a year after 
his election the Holy Synod issued a circular against communism, while the journals affiliated to 
the Church frequently published anti-communist articles.225 The fragile rapprochement between 
the Church and the Left, evident ever since the foundation of AKEL, had relied almost 
exclusively on the moderate policy of Leontios. The new Archbishop constantly attacked AKEL, 
while, in late 1940, the newspaper Efimeris (Newspaper), edited by the Secretary of the 
Bishopric of Kyrenia Polykarpos Ioannides, had openly called for the proscription of the party.226 
In fact, the government’s decision to allow the return of Makarios was also taken under the 
consideration that he could be a strong ally against AKEL. The fact that the Bishop was an 
ardent anti-communist and had made serious attempts to prevent AKEL’s effort to form a united 
front promoting enosis had led Governor Woolley to consider his presence on the island as 
politically advantageous.227  
The policy of Leontios, during whose term as Locum Tenens (1933-1947) the Church 
developed an understanding with the Left, was in fact as undesirable for the Greek-Cypriot elite 
as it was for the colonial authorities. Before and after his term, anticommunism was a constant 
feature of the prelacy’s discourse and policy, drawing the Church closer to the government and 
providing ground for common action on many occasions. As an official of the Colonial Office 
put it in 1939, ‘it is prejudicial … to the British Empire too that the Christian religion, even in 
the form in which it is nominally imparted by the Cypriot branch of the Orthodox Church, should 
be allowed to die out’, as ‘the alternative … tends towards proletarian Communism’.228 In the 
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same spirit, a 1941 memorandum on the Cyprus Archbishopric proposed that, after the war, the 
Church should become a strong ally of the government in its struggle against communism.229   
Indeed, the confrontation between the Church and the Left would soon peak, justifying 
the government’s conciliatory attitude towards the former. At the end of 1945, with resistance 
against colonialism on the rise across the globe, and in the face of the growing political pressure 
exercised by the anti-colonial movement on the island, the newly-elected Labour government in 
Britain hinted at the possibility of granting a constitution in Cyprus, after consulting with 
representatives of the local population. In July 1947, the Governor announced plans for the 
introduction of a constitution, and declared his intention to form a Consultative Assembly 
composed by representatives from both communities to assist the government in that task.230 The 
formation of the Assembly would stand as a critical point for the confrontation between the 
politics of AKEL and that of the Church.   
AKEL and its affiliate, the Παγκύπρια Εργατική Ομοσπονδία [Pan-Cypriot Labour 
Federation – PEO], were the only groups from the Greek-Cypriot community to participate in the 
Assembly, in contrast to the Church and the KEK, which denounced any negotiation with the 
government. Most importantly, AKEL participated in the Assembly having modified its position 
on the national question. Its new slogan was now ‘self-government – enosis’, which caused the 
strong reaction of its rivals, who accused the party of betraying the national cause. In December 
1947, the Bishopric of Kyrenia, under Bishop Makarios in his capacity as Locum Tenens, issued 
an announcement, making clear its position against the politics of AKEL:  
His Reverence the Locum Tenens stressed that Cyprus … will remain steadfast to 
its national demand and will never lower the flag of Enosis... In view of the 
pathetic attitude of the few communists who separated from the national body and 
ask for autonomy, His Reverence the Locum Tenens said that the national 
struggle of the Island will be inevitably fought on two fronts from now on. 
Namely, the people have to withstand both England and its allies, the 
autonomists.231  
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The change in the line of AKEL and its participation to the Assembly should be attributed to a 
great extent to the party’s continuous attempts to take over the political initiative on the national 
question from the Church and the Greek-Cypriot elite, and lead the national-liberation struggle 
itself. A moderate success in the Assembly and an advantageous temporary solution for the 
Cyprus issue could realistically render the Left the winner of the confrontation. In December 
1947, two months after the Fifth Congress of AKEL, the party moved to found the Εθνικός 
Απελευθερωτικός Συνασπισμός [Alliance for the National Liberation – EAS], aiming at 
escalating the mobilizations for self-government – enosis. The organization included leftist 
politicians as well as middle class centrist allies, such as Clerides, who was the head of the 
alliance.  
A few months later, in May 1948, AKEL decided to withdraw from the Assembly, faced 
with the government’s refusal to grant self-government and under intense criticism from its 
opponents. In July of the same year, the Holy Synod decided on the enlargement of the 
Ethnarchic Council, but again excluded AKEL. The party’s participation in the Consultative 
Assembly gave the Church the opportunity to reinforce its position as the ethnarchic leadership 
of the Greek-Cypriot community and achieve its principal goal: to monopolize the slogan of 
enosis. The strengthening of the Church’s stance became immediately apparent. In October of 
the same year, a few weeks after the archbishop had issued a circular against communism, the 
Holy Synod amended the charter of the Church, aiming at excluding communists and fellow 
travellers from the process of ecclesiastical elections.232   
Six months later, in view of the upcoming municipal elections, the Ethnarchy Office 
denounced anyone collaborating with communists, characterizing it as equal to national 
treason.233 The danger that AKEL represented to the confessional politics of the Church 
necessitated an alliance among all anti-communist political actors. The position of the Church 
had been seriously reinforced after the election of Archbishop Makarios, and his subsequent re-
organization of church administration, leading many right-wing politicians and other bourgeois 
figures to rally around behind Makarios. The new Archbishop constantly urged the lay elite to 
distance itself from the government, and criticized those prominent Greek-Cypriots who had 
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attended the ceremonial parade and social reception organized at the Government House on the 
occasion of King George VI’s birthday.234       
Meanwhile, political developments in Greece following the end of the Second World 
War had a direct impact on Greek-Cypriot politics. The repercussions of the Greek Civil War 
(1946-1949) exacerbated the conflict between AKEL and the Greek-Cypriot nationalist elite.235 
Throughout the war, AKEL remained in open communication with the Communist Party of 
Greece, while it also organized fundraising campaigns in support of the Democratic Army of 
Greece (DSE). Furthermore, in 1946, members of the Greek extreme right-wing organization X 
(Xhi) arrived in Cyprus, to form a sister organization on the island.236 That first group of Xhi was 
particularly active during the 1947 archiepiscopal elections, while, two years later, the National 
Peasant Party of Xhites [members of X] of Cyprus was founded.237   
 In the same year, the inauguration of the Truman Doctrine, which replaced Britain’s role 
in supplying military and economic aid to the Greek Government with the United States, enabled 
Athens to adopt a much more active policy on the question of enosis, as had been constantly 
requested by the Greek-Cypriot nationalist elite. In late 1947, a statement of the Greek Prime 
Minister in support of enosis reinforced the position of the Church, which again accused the Left 
of treason for its participation in the Consultative Assembly.238  
The confrontation between the Left and the right-wing, now ethnarchic, political space, 
which was receiving the full support of the colonial government, was vividly expressed in the 
campaign for the 1949 municipal election. In his address to the commissioners of the island in 
February 1949, the Acting Governor stated:   
[A] glancing blow was delivered at the Right. For a long time now we have turned 
a blind eye to the seditious aspect of the advocacy of enosis. We shall continue to 
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do so… We must concentrate upon the communists… The religious influence of 
the Church is … especially important at this time because of its anti-communist 
nature. What I should like to secure would be an implicit truce between 
Government and the Church on the question of enosis…239  
    
A few weeks before the May municipal elections, the American Government urged the Cyprus 
authorities to assist the nationalists in consolidating their position, and to open a strong lead over 
the candidates of the Left. The Americans also suggested that the Church be urged to stress 
openly its support of the nationalist candidates. The American Government promised it would 
exert its influence on that respect on the Archbishop of Greece Damaskinos, friend of 
Archbishop Makarios, and on the Greek and Turkish governments.240   
Indeed, the Left suffered a serious setback in the elections, which marked the end of the 
potential formation of a common front with the Right. As the latter continued to attack AKEL for 
its alleged betrayal of the national struggle, AKEL and its allies received a total 48% of the vote, 
down from the 56% three years earlier.241 The party was forced to admit that its participation in 
the Consultative Assembly and the demand for self-government had proved detrimental to its 
appeal. The negative result also triggered a severe crisis within the party.242 In January 1949, 
following a series of meetings between the leadership of AKEL and the Communist Party of 
Greece, the AKEL Central Committee denounced the support of constitutional reforms and 
participation in the Assembly. It further renounced self-government as an intermediary goal, and 
stressed that the only goal of the party should be enosis.243 Two months later, the Central 
Committee resigned and appointed a Temporary Central Leadership (Καθοδήγηση) to guide the 
party until the Sixth Congress.244 The new line was given extensive coverage in the left-wing 
Press, while the Congress, held in August 1949, repeated its renouncing of support for self-
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243 ASKI, F-20/21/21, Activities Report of the Central Committee of A.K.E.L. September 1947 – May 1949; F-
20/21/19, Announcement of the Temporary Central Leadership of A.K.E.L., 1949; F-20/21/47, ‘A brief review’. 
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government and participation in the Consultative Assembly, and called for the intensification of 
the struggle for enosis.245   
As ethnarchic politics had prevailed within the Greek-Cypriot community, AKEL was 
now forced to readopt the intransigent enosist line. Nevertheless, the party’s national politics 
would remain under the shadow of the Church until the end of colonial rule. In August 1949, on 
the occasion of the arrival of Governor Sir Andrew Wright, the party organized large-scale 
demonstrations across the island and signings of resolutions demanding enosis, and announced 
the holding of a plebiscite on the question of union with Greece.246 The Church managed, 
however, to take back the political initiative, and announced in November its own plebiscite, to 
be organized by the Ethnarchic Council. AKEL, the left-wing mayors and the PEO were not 
consulted in the decision. The party, however, cancelled its own plebiscite, lending its support to 
the one organized by the Church and campaigning for voting in favour of enosis.247 According to 
the decision of the Council, the plebiscite was scheduled for 15 January 1950 and a circular 
would be sent to the government, inviting it to oversee the process. In case of refusal, the 
plebiscite would be organized by the Church. All inhabitants of Cyprus above the age of 18 
would have the right to vote.  
The government naturally refused to conduct the plebiscite and warned that the question 
of union with Greece had been closed, with the consent of the Greek Government. This, 
however, did not prohibit the holding of the plebiscite, resting on the fact that its results would 
lack any official validity.248 The plebiscite, organized by the Church and supported fully by the 
Left, would raise even greater concerns for the colonial authorities, mostly the potential of an 
alliance between the Right and the Left. The Left, however, was becoming increasingly 
subordinated to the politics of the Church, and it would soon fall to the latter to lead a militant 
anti-colonial movement against the British presence on the island. Worried about the radical turn 
that the enosis movement was taking on the island, still considered by the colonial authorities as 
                                                 
245 The Congress also elected Ezekias Papaioannou as General Secretary. See Political Decisions, Sixth Congress of 
AKEL, 27-28 August 1949, pp. 131-145. 
246 Chroniko [Chronicle], ‘The pan-Cypriot enosist plebiscite of 15 January 1950’, vol. 48, p. 6. 
247 Apostolos Varnavas, ‘Ethnarchic Circular on holding of pan-Cypriot Plebiscite’, 8 December 1949, pp. 469-471; 
Chronicle, ibid., p. 8; Anexartitos, ‘For the better organization of the enosist plebiscite’, 21 December 1949; ‘For the 
utilization of our enosist plebiscite’, 16 January 1950; ASKI, F-20/21/24, brochure ‘We claim the union of Cyprus 
with Greece’, distributed all over Cyprus, 30 December 1949. 
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an integral part of the Empire, Governor Wright asked the Colonial Office for further repressive 
powers.249 According to the results of the plebiscite, 95.7% of the Greek-Cypriot population 
voted in favour of enosis.250 The plebiscite quickly became global news, as it was extensively 
covered by the Greek and international press, while copies of the signed ballot papers were 
handed to the president of the Greek parliament and the Secretariat of the United Nations.     
 
Conclusion 
By the end of the 1940s, enosist politics had conclusively prevailed, and enjoyed the support of 
all political forces within the Greek-Cypriot community. The Church of Cyprus had emerged 
both as the most prominent advocate of enosis and the single most powerful political actor on the 
island. Most significantly, the consolidation of Greek nationalism as the dominant political 
discourse among Greek-Cypriots brought about a homogenization of politics as in its essence 
anti-colonial. In other words, the outcome of the period’s multi-faceted conflict of power was to 
a great extent the emergence of a radical form of nationalism that constituted the main point of 
convergence among the competing confessional and secular political forces within the Greek-
Cypriot community. As nationalism came to be a main force behind the politicization of Greek-
Cypriot society during the 1930s and 1940s, the political force that would manage to determine 
its content would also consolidate its position as winner of the conflict. During the next decade, 
Cyprus would witness a militant national liberation struggle, headed by the Church of Cyprus. 
The origins of this seemingly paradoxical development can be traced to the period under 
scrutiny.    
 During this period of British rule, the Church proved itself capable of adapting to the 
emergence of new political forces that challenged its authority. Most significantly, it managed to 
resolve the major confrontations that broke out in the Greek-Cypriot community under its own 
terms and within its own political space, and was to a large degree successful in controlling the 
politicization of the community. Already in the mid-1920s, the rivalry between the intransigent 
                                                 
249 NA, CO 537/6228, Constitution, J. Bennett’s minute, 21 January 1950, Colonial Office. For an in-depth analysis 
of the strategic significance of Cyprus for the British, see Klearchos Kyriakides, ‘British Cold War strategy and the 
struggle to maintain military bases in Cyprus, 1951-60’ (University of Cambridge D.Phil Thesis, 1996).  
250 Protopapas, 2012, p. 490. 
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and the moderate unionists was made manifest as a rivalry between the Bishoprics of Kyrenia 
and Kition. In the beginning of the next decade, the appropriation of the legacy of the 1931 
revolt secured political initiative for the Church, which thus managed to claim the lead role in the 
formation of Greek-Cypriot politics, with enosis emerging as the only form that expressed anti-
colonial feeling. A few years later, the trial of Leontios led the whole Greek-Cypriot elite to 
come to his support, and at the same time to recognize him as leader. Notably, the Church 
dominated right-wing politics, helping to prevent the emergence of an organized, and most 
notably secular, right-wing party. In the late 1940s, the political initiatives and tactical moves of 
Archbishop Makarios II forced the majority of the lay elite, including those who had in the past 
enjoyed close relations with the government, to rally around him.   
Secondly, the Church prevailed in its confrontation with the colonial authorities and 
managed to secure a number of concessions from the government. The Church won the conflict 
over the archiepiscopal question, which lasted from 1933 to 1947. The government was 
eventually forced to concede to all the demands set by the Church, to a great extent thanks to the 
successful mobilization of powerful international religious networks. The very election of the 
Locum Tenens, one of the most prominent anti-government figures during colonial rule, to the 
archiepiscopal throne demonstrated the failure of British policies to accomplish one of the 
government’s main objectives: to control the power of the Church and the appeal of nationalist 
politics to Greek-Cypriots. The Church’s radical enosist politics would set the tone of the anti-
colonial movement on the island until the end of British rule.   
 Finally, by successfully dominating political discourse within the Greek-Cypriot 
community, the Church succeeded in heading off the secular political force that had been 
encroaching on its political space. By the early 1940s, a broad, left-wing political movement had 
been formed, whose politics and discourse were formulated along class lines, and which claimed 
to represent the interests of the Cypriot working class beyond confessional line. Despite the 
significant initial success and growing appeal of the Left, which allowed it to dominate Greek-
Cypriot politics until 1947, AKEL chose not to challenge the nationalist discourse put forward 
by the Church. By the end of the decade, and despite certain variations in its position on the 
national question – most vividly manifested by its participation in the Consultative Assembly – 
the Left eventually adopted completely the enosist politics promoted by the Church. Following 
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the failure of the Assembly experiment, and despite the renewed cooperation between the 
government and the clergy against the party, AKEL would increasingly define its role within the 
political context set by the Church. The party abandoned its attempts to formulate an anti-
colonial discourse different from the politics of enosis, and was eventually forced to recognize 
the Church as the national leadership of the Greek-Cypriot community. In 1950, AKEL’s support 
to the Church in organizing the plebiscite on enosis would illustrate the latter’s emergence as the 
lead political actor in defining the politics of the community against the British authorities, a role 
it would maintain until the end of colonial rule on the island.
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Chapter 3: From Loyalism to Nationalism in Turkish-Cypriot Politics 
 
This chapter explores the shaping of Turkish-Cypriot politics from the second half of the 1920s 
until the late 1940s. In contrast with the Greek-Cypriot community, the traditionalist Turkish-
Cypriot elite remained perfectly loyal to the British up to the second half of the 1950s. It proved 
more vulnerable, however, to a Kemalist nationalist and modernist political force emerging 
within the community after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. By the Second 
World War, the modernists had definitely prevailed within the community, to the alarm of the 
colonial authorities, which strove to control their appeal. The new leadership demanded reforms 
that would modernize the community and expand its autonomy. At the same time, they put 
forward an increasingly militant nationalist discourse that called for the restoration of Cyprus to 
Turkey, in case Britain left the island. In the face of an ever more radical Greek-Cypriot 
nationalism, Turkish-Cypriot nationalist politics were gradually consolidated by the end of the 
1940s.   
 As mentioned in the Introduction, there is a major deficiency of secondary sources on the 
Turkish-Cypriot community, making the interpretation of Cyprus’ colonial history incomplete; 
this chapter therefore seeks to contribute in bridging this significant historiographical gap, and 
suggests a narrative for the political and social history of the community.      
 
3.1 The Politics of the Traditionalist Elite and Early Controversy 
A few days after Cyprus was formally annexed by Britain in November 1914, the Cadi, the 
Mufti, the Turkish delegate of Evkaf and other prominent figures of the Turkish-Cypriot elite 
wrote to Secretary of State Lewis Vernon Harcourt, expressing their satisfaction and promising 
loyalty to His Majesty the King.1 Acting High Commissioner Harry Luke noted that the reactions 
                                                 
1 NA, CO 67/179, Offices: Foreign, despatch to the Secretary of State, Lewis Harcourt, 17 November 1914.  
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of the Turkish-Cypriot notables, after being informed that they had become British citizens rather 
than subjects of the Caliph, was one of ‘dignified resignation’.2   
Since the beginning of British rule on the island, the traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite 
had relied on the government for maintaining its power and control over communal affairs. All 
the more, in a period when the Greek-Cypriot leadership’s calls for enosis seemed to gain some 
traction within British circles, the maintenance of British rule in comparison appeared as a much 
less disadvantageous development. Certainly, the declaration of loyalty to the British had a 
strong element of self-interest, as it meant that the elite could secure its posts on the island; the 
Cadi and the Turkish delegate of the Evkaf had been previously appointed by the Ottoman 
Government. In October of the following year, after Britain formally offered Cyprus to Greece, 
the opinion among Turkish-Cypriots in favour of the maintenance of British rule was 
strengthened.3 In a series of memoranda and petitions to the British authorities, leading figures of 
the community denounced the British offer and the possibility of enosis. A decade later, in May 
1925, when Cyprus was proclaimed a Crown Colony, all three Turkish-Cypriot members of the 
Legislative Council expressed again their full satisfaction.4 
Until the 1920s, the loyalist politics of the traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite remained 
almost completely unchallenged. Appreciating this stance, the government granted considerable 
powers to prominent political figures of the community, upon whom it relied for administering 
the island. During the 1910s and the first half of the 1920s, Irfan Bey was the most significant 
figure of the community; he had been elected to the Legislative Council in 1913 and served until 
his death in 1925. In 1903, Irfan Bey had been appointed by the Ottoman authorities as the 
Turkish Evkaf delegate. Following the annexation of the island, legislation was introduced, 
according to which both Evkaf delegates would be appointed by the High Commissioner. Irfan 
Bey was reappointed to his old position, as well as to the colony’s Executive Council.5 
Throughout his political career, he proved unswervingly loyal to the British administration and, 
together with the other two Muslim members of the Legislative Council, he almost invariably 
                                                 
2 Holland, 1998, p. 11. 
3 A first, informal approach of the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos by British ministers had been made at 
the end of 1912: Georgios Georghallides, Cyprus, British Imperialism and Governor Sir Ronald Storrs (Nicosia: 
Zavallis Press, 1988), 17.  
4 See Nevzat, 2005, pp. 239-241. 
5 The Cyprus Gazette, 1915, ‘Appointments’, p. 9207.  
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collaborated with the British members, to the extent that the King’s Advocate noted, ‘it was only 
by the assistance of the Moslem members that the Government managed to carry on’.6   
 Immediately after Irfan Bey’s death, the British chose Münir Bey as his successor. Münir 
Bey had been in government service since 1906, and had been temporarily appointed judge of a 
district court in 1923.7 Two months after his appointment as the Turkish delegate of Evkaf, he 
was elected to the Legislative Council, filling the seat left vacant by Irfan Bey’s death. In 1926, 
he was also appointed as additional member of the Executive Council.8 Münir Bey held 11 other 
public appointments on the island and was also decorated with the Order of the British Empire. 
As the Acting Governor put it in 1932, ‘He is 100 per cent pro-British, has the mentality of the 
old Turkish Pasha and has absorbed into himself every office he could’.9  
 Nevertheless, the absolute loyalism and overall politics of the traditionalist elite did not 
always remain undisputed, nor were they homogeneous in all their facets. In December 1918, 
protesting against the renewed efforts of the Greek-Cypriot leadership to raise the question of 
enosis at the Paris Peace Conference, leading figures of the community issued a resolution 
demanding the restoration of Cyprus to the Ottoman Empire, if Britain ever abandoned the 
island.10 In early 1920, a few months before the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, the newspaper 
Doğru Yol (The Right Way) decried the expected provisions for an independent Armenia, and 
stressed that the Turks had expected that their own national rights would also be satisfied.11 The 
newspaper further emphasized that the Greeks had caused thousands of persons to die in Smyrna, 
and stated that ‘the destruction of the innocent … Turkish nation was decided in order to please 
the Armenians and Greeks’, the ‘deadly enemy’ of Turkey. A few days later the newspaper 
asserted:  
The Turks who have taken part in the general war with the lofty aspirations of 
preserving their national independence and glory… have demonstrated that they 
are the true heirs of their ancestors’ bravery and valour… The occupation of 
                                                 
6 Nevzat, 2005, p. 216. 
7 NA, CO 67/247/13, Munir Bey. Conversations with Colonial Office Officials, Acting Governor’s report on Munir 
Bey, August 1932. 
8 The Cyprus Gazette, 1925, ‘Appointments’, p. 453; ‘Legislative Council’, p. 481; Ibid., 1926, ‘Executive Council’, 
p. 420. 
9 NA, CO 67/247/13, ibid. 
10 NA, CO 67/189, Despatches, Officer Administering the Government to the Secretary of State, Walter Long, 24 
December 1918. 
11 Nevzat, 2005, p. 250. 
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Smyrna, this tragedy and oppression, will stain the brightest pages of the history 
of the victorious nations until the day of resurrection...12 
In the following period, a rift emerged within Turkish-Cypriot politics between the traditionalist 
elite that aimed for the maintenance of the community as had been modelled in the Ottoman 
period, and in close collaboration with the British, and a party seeking to reform the community 
along national, that is,  Turkish, lines. The conflict could be traced back to the Young Turk 
Revolution of 1908, and would become ever more vividly manifested.13   
In September 1920, Doğru Yol described the Treaty of Sèvres, signed in August, as 
incompatible with the honour of nationalists.14 Under the treaty, the Ottoman Empire recognized 
the annexation of Cyprus by Britain in 1914 and renounced all rights and claims over the island. 
Ottoman privileges included the tribute that had been formerly paid to the sultan, as well as all 
rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Muslim population of the island. Furthermore, the 
treaty provided that Turkish nationals born or resident in Cyprus would lose their Turkish 
citizenship and acquire British citizenship, while it was stated that no power could be exercised 
by any Turkish authority in any territory that had been detached from Turkey.   
 Two years later, in late 1922, Eyoub Bey, member of the Legislative Council since 1913, 
published a series of petitions to publicize the claim for the maintenance of Cyprus’ status quo, 
opposition to enosis and aspirations for union with Turkey. Eyoub Bey claimed to have collected 
signatures from all over the island:  
We the Moslem inhabitants of … Cyprus respectfully and earnestly beg that our 
… national claims … may be taken into consideration in the Peace Conference: 
… We … beg that, in the settlement of the fate of Cyprus…, should the 
restoration of Cyprus to Turkey, which is our national desire…, be impossible for 
any political reason, the Island may be restored to its pre-war status and that 
without the consent of the Turkish Government and of the Moslem people of the 
Island, it may not be handed over to any Government excepting Turkey.15 
 
                                                 
12 Cited in Nevzat, 2005, pp. 261.262, Doğru Yol, 26 March 1920. 
13 For the influence of the Young Turk Revolution on the Turkish-Cypriot community and the political 
developments until the end of the First World War, see Nevzat, 2005, pp. 168-255. 
14 Nevzat, 2005, p. 260. 
15 CSA, SA1/1273/1922, Union of Cyprus with Turkey. Applications by Moslems for-, petitions. 
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The petitions further asked that all pre-war rights of the Muslim community be maintained, and 
that its ‘attachment to the glorious Caliphate from religious, racial, linguistic and educational 
standpoint … continue to remain free from any interference’. The petitions also called for the 
establishment of a Muslim Council, which would be recognized by the government as a legal 
body, to administer the Sharia courts, the Evkaf and the community’s educational affairs. Eyoub 
accompanied his petitions with a memorandum to High Commissioner Sir Malcolm Stevenson 
and the Secretary of State, the Duke of Devonshire. There, he stressed that the community had 
been satisfied with the British administration in regards to the protection of life and property, 
however, ‘the original master of the island’ was the ‘national government of Turkey’, to which it 
should be restored. He also asked for the reform of the social, national and religious institutions 
of the community, and their re-establishment along modern lines.16    
As indicated in the discourse and claims of the petition movement, part of the Turkish-
Cypriot elite attempted to put forward a new conceptualization of the political, social and 
cultural formation of the Turkish-Cypriot community, along Turkish lines. After the foundation 
of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, a new Turkish-Cypriot political elite – soon to be followed by 
a growing part of the community – started referring to the nation as its motherland. The Treaty of 
Lausanne clearly demonstrated that Cyprus lay outside the political space of the Turkish nation, 
and recognized the island’s annexation by Britain. In January 1924, the newspaper Birlik [Unity] 
stated: ‘Unfortunately the Lausanne Treaty, which for Turkey is equivalent to recognition of its 
liberation, has cut off our beautiful island and separated it from the Turkish motherland’.17   
Nevertheless, article 21 of the Treaty provided that Turkish-Cypriots had the right to opt 
for Turkish nationality within two years from the coming into force of the treaty, provided that 
they would leave Cyprus within 12 months after having so chosen. In 1925, the Turkish 
government established a Turkish consulate on the island, the principal task of which was to 
inform Turkish-Cypriots on the opportunities that awaited them in Anatolia.18 By mid-1928, 
about 5000 Turkish-Cypriots had emigrated to Turkey, alarming the British authorities. The 
British dreaded the possibility of a shift in the island’s demographic equilibrium, on which their 
administrative pattern was based to a great extent. Although many Turkish-Cypriots returned to 
                                                 
16 Ibid., Eyoub’s memorandum to the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State, 11 December 1922.  
17 Cited in Nevzat, 2005, pp. 268-269, Birlik, 4 January 1924. 
18 See Georghallides, 1979, pp. 407-420.  
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Cyprus in the following years due to economic difficulties in Anatolia, emigration continued 
until the late 1930s, due to the economic hardship in Cyprus and the continuous encouragement 
by the Turkish consulate and part of the local press.19 Certainly, the emigration movement 
signified the growing attraction of Kemalist Turkey to the Turkish-Cypriot community.   
Kemalism was very differently perceived in Cyprus, however, than in Turkey, as would 
be demonstrated already during the second half of the 1920s. Most importantly, the Turkish-
Cypriot Kemalist intelligentsia, faced with the ever more dynamic demand of the Greek-Cypriots 
for enosis, developed an irredentist discourse, asking for the restoration of Cyprus to Turkey in 
case of any change of its status quo, although the island lay outside the borders defined in 
January 1920 by the National Pact.20 Furthermore, faced with government’s firm cooperation 
with the traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite, Turkish-Cypriot Kemalist nationalists adopted a 
realistic approach to religious institutions. In direct contradiction with the Kemalist principle of 
secularism, they called for the maintenance of the Muftiship, a religious institution par 
excellence, which they sought to keep away from the traditionalist elite’s reach. In the following 
period, the modernists would constantly call for the internal reorganization of the community 
along modern lines. Their demands led to a conflict with the traditionalist pro-British elite, which 
would culminate towards the end of the 1920s and continue until at least the late 1940s. The 
outcome of the conflict would be foreshadowed as early as 1930, with the prevalence of the 
Kemalist modernists in the October elections for the Legislative Council.    
 
 
                                                 
19 The Turkish Consulate was the main means of Turkey’s intervention in Turkish-Cypriot politics, which, however, 
was not particularly active. As it appears, Asaf Bey, the first Turkish Consul, played a role in encouraging the 
Kemalist nationalist trend within the community and, in 1930, he supported the electoral campaign of the 
modernists. NA, CO 67/258/39913, Immigration of Polish Jews to Cyprus, Henniker Heaton to the Turkish Consul, 
30 October 1934; NA, CO 67/281/14, Position of the Moslem community, Governor Palmer to Secretary of State 
Ormsby-Gore, 17 November 1937; NA, CO 67/290/3, Departure from the Colony of Natives of the Colony 
(Regulation) Law, Governor Palmer to Secretary of State macDonald, 24 February 1939. 
20 The National Pact was the total of six resolutions issued during the last session of the Ottoman parliament in 
January 1920. Among others, the resolutions provided that the territories not under occupation at the signing of the 
Armistice of Mudros in October 1918 would form the indivisible homeland of the non-Arab Ottoman Muslims (the 
area to be called Turkey after 1923), and that the future of the occupied Ottoman territories of the former Russian 
provinces of Kars, Arhadan and Batumi and of Western Thrace would be decided by plebiscite. 
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3.2 Government Intervention in Communal Affairs and the Emergence of a New Political 
Dynamics 
The change in the legal status of Cyprus with its official declaration as a Crown Colony in 1925 
signalled a shift in the government’s administrative policy. The change affected both 
communities, but had a greater impact on Turkish-Cypriots. During the second half of the 1920s, 
a series of reforms were introduced concerning the communal affairs of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. The autonomy of the community was restricted and government control over 
communal affairs enhanced. The reaction to the reforms demonstrated the emergence of a new 
political dynamic within the community, which became increasingly apparent towards the end of 
the decade.   
 
The case of the Sharia Courts 
In 1927, within the context of reorganization of the judicial system, the government enacted a 
new Courts of Justice Order, which among other stipulations defined the operational framework 
of the Sharia Courts. The Sharia Courts had been officially recognized in Cyprus under the 1878 
Cyprus Convention. The convention had included a provision that gave to the Sharia Courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over religious matters that concerned the Muslim population of the 
island.21 The provision was also reaffirmed in the 1882 Courts of Justice Order, which further 
provided that the civil courts could summon a Sharia judge to sit as an assessor and to advise the 
Court on questions related to their area of jurisdiction.    
Prior to the British occupation, there were seven Sharia Courts on the island: one for the 
town of Nicosia (under a mullah, or Chief Cadi) and one for each of the districts of Nicosia, 
Larnaca, Limassol, Famagusta, Kyrenia and Paphos.22 In 1883, the British reduced the number of 
courts to four: one for the town of Nicosia; one for the districts of Nicosia and Kyrenia excepting 
the town of Nicosia; one for the districts of Famagusta and Larnaca; and one for the districts of 
Limassol and Paphos.23 The Cadi of Nicosia, whose jurisdiction was limited to the town, retained 
                                                 
21 Annex to the Convention, article 1. 
22 CSA, SA1/615/1926, Sheri Courts. Reorganisation of-, Chief Justice’s memorandum, 22 June 1926. 
23 The Cyprus Gazette, 1883, Law No.4, ‘For regulating the limits of the jurisdiction of Mussulman Religious 
Tribunals in Cyprus’, p. 312. 
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the title of Cadi of Cyprus, or Chief Cadi, apparently due to the fact that, prior to British 
occupation, he was also President of the highest Criminal and Civil Court on the island and of 
the Court of Appeal. The execution of the decisions of the Sharia Courts was regulated by the 
1885 Civil Procedure Law, which did not include provision for appeal. Until Cyprus’ annexation 
by Britain, appeals could be made to the High Religious Court in Istanbul (Sheikh-ul Islamate), 
according to Ottoman Law; after that, the operation of Sharia Courts on the island depended 
upon the 1882 Order alone.24    
Under the 1927 Order, three Sharia Courts and a Sharia Court of Appeal were established 
and began operating in the same year. Newly introduced rules on court procedure replaced all 
previous rules of Sharia Courts.25 Shortly before the passing of the new rules, the Office of the 
Cadi of Cyprus and those of the district cadis were abolished.26 The Sharia judges were thereafter 
to be appointed by the delegates of Evkaf, under the Governor’s approval, as officials of the 
Evkaf department, from which they would also receive their salaries.27 The Governor reserved 
the right to make further rules for all aspects of the regulatory framework of the Courts. He could 
issue an order on the practice and procedure of the Courts as well as the evidence to be admitted, 
the qualification of court representatives, the duties of court officers and the fees charged by the 
court. As the Acting Governor stated, ‘the Sheri Judges will be under the control of the delegates 
of Evkaf but … they will be subject to the Governor’s pleasure in all respects’.28 Three years 
later, the offices of deputy Sharia judge, clerk and messenger were also abolished. The order was 
slightly altered in 1949, when a new law was introduced that provided for the ability to appeal 
against the decisions of Sharia Courts to the Supreme Court.  
 The reorganization of the Sharia Courts introduced some secular concepts into their 
operational framework, but brought them under the Governor’s complete control. The new Rules 
of Court and the reintroduction of the provision for a right to appeal (until 1949, still to a Sharia 
court) established a degree of detachment from the Muslim religious administration of justice. 
Certainly, respective reforms in Turkey in the same period were far more radical in separating 
                                                 
24 CSA, SA1/615/1926, ibid.  
25 CSA, SA1/615/1926, report ‘Sheri Tribunals’, 16 April 1947. 
26 The Cyprus Gazette, 1927, ‘Abolition of Offices’, p. 666. 
27 CSA, SA1/1462/28/1, Mussulman Religious Tribunals. Proposed abolition of-, Attorney General’s minute, 8 
November 1929.  
28 Ibid., Acting Governor to the Secretary of State, 18 December 1929. 
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religion from the justice system. Sharia Courts in Turkey were abolished in 1924, putting an end 
to the legal dualism existing since the mid-nineteenth century. Two years later, Turkey adopted a 
modified version of the 1912 Swiss Civil Code, introducing the large-scale secularization of civil 
law and putting an end to many Islamic practices. By 1930, the entire legal system had been 
completely secularized.29 In Cyprus, as in all British colonies, the introduction of judicial 
reforms was driven by the needs of effective administration and control over communal affairs. 
The colonial authorities in Cyprus felt that they could not achieve these objectives if they 
dissatisfied their allies among the traditional Turkish-Cypriot elite. This elite would be 
disappointed if the government gave in to the demands of the rising Kemalist forces of the 
community, who were asking for the complete abolition of the Sharia Courts. As William 
Battershill, then Colonial Secretary, stated, referring to another case of government intervention 
in Muslim legislation:  
[T]here are serious dangers in any legislation…: (a). If such legislation is 
undertaken … the old schools of Moslems may be exacerbated… (b). Such 
legislation may be looked upon by the new school and by the Turkish 
Government as playing into their hands and might be hailed by them as a victory. 
(c). In any case it would be contrary to the policy of this Government to take 
cognizance of Kemalistic laws as affecting in the slightest degree any Cypriot 
Moslem or Cypriot Moslem institutions or customs.30 
The reception of the new regulatory framework by the Turkish-Cypriot elite and the press 
was not uniform. All three Turkish-Cypriot members of the Legislative Council, in line with 
their overall policy of cooperation with the government, backed the reforms, while Münir Bey 
was closely associated with them, as the reorganization of the courts meant a significant increase 
of his power.31 As the Turkish delegate of Evkaf, Münir Bey could exercise a great extent of 
control over the Sharia judges. The end of the independence of the courts was in fact as 
beneficial for him as it was for the government. It seems the colonial authorities had chosen to 
hand the responsibility for the administration of the Sharia courts to the Evkaf Department 
because they relied on Münir Bey’s absolute loyalty. 
                                                 
29  Şükrü Hanioğlu, Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 158. 
30 CSA, SA1/428/35/1, Moslem marriage and Divorce Bill, minutes, 1 December 1936.   
31 See CSA, SA1/615/1926, memorandum by the Turkish-Cypriot members of the Legislative Council to Governor 




Notably, most Turkish-Cypriot newspapers were also in favour of the reforms. Even 
those associated with or published by the Kemalist intelligentsia supported them, mainly due to 
their tentatively secularizing and modernizing character. Many articles referred directly to 
current events in Turkey, stressing the ties of the Turkish-Cypriot community with the country, 
and extensively discussed the Kemalist reforms of the judicial system, which were presented as a 
model for the Turkish-Cypriots. Shortly before the enactment of the new legislation, the 
newspaper Birlik stated:  
[W]e are by race, culture and religion attached to Turkey. Since Turkey … has 
completely adopted western civilization, these ties and connections … could not 
but naturally make us amenable to principles of civilization in our personal and 
social affairs too… There is no reason why we should … continue to maintain in 
its present state any organization from the middle ages… We shall be unable to 
endorse the maintenance of the Sheri Courts unless they are fundamentally 
reformed and amended.32  
Söz [The Word], the leading Kemalist newspaper on the island, emphatically campaigned for the 
abolition of the Sharia Courts and the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in Cyprus as well:   
We, the Turks of Cyprus, ... are attached, by acquaintance and culture, to 
Turkey…. Consequently when the local Government seeks to obtain the views 
and opinion of the proper persons regarding the Sheri Courts, the latter will point 
out the analogous institutions that have been brought into existence by the Turkish 
Republic, and they will thereby further strengthen our present social ties with the 
mother country… The Sheri Courts should be entirely abolished and a new 
organization such as would adopt the social parts of the [Swiss] Civil Code should 
be set up in their lieu…33      
Similar views were expressed by Mehmet Houloussi, a district judge who also militated for the 
abolition of the Sharia Courts and the transfer of their jurisdiction to modern courts.34 
Nevertheless, the Kemalist intelligentsia generally saw the reforms as a first step towards a 
separation of the secular affairs of the community from religion, part of a process that could 
eventually achieve the modernization of the community along Kemalist lines. The vivacity of the 
                                                 
32 CSA, SA1/615/1926, Birlik, leading article, 12 February 1927.  See also ‘How the Sharia Courts should be 
reformed’, 29 January 1927; ‘In what way should the Sharia Courts be reformed?’, 19 February 1927; Doğru Yol, ‘Is 
there any reason for the existence of the Sharia Courts?’, 25 January 1926; ‘Is there any remedy for the abolition of 
the Sharia Courts?’, 8 February 1926; Söz, ‘We are in difficulty and we invite the attention of the Local 
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33 CSA, SA1/615/1926, Söz, leading article, 19 February 1927. Söz constituted the main locus of expression of early 
Kemalism in Cyprus and occasionally received financial assistance directly from Turkey.  
34 CSA, SA1/1462/28/1, Mehmet Houloussi to Governor Storrs, 25 March 1930. 
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debate in the press and the persistent calls for modernizing reforms caused the reaction of Sharia 
Judge Fuad Bey, who denounced Söz and ruled out any possibility of abolition of the Sharia 
Courts, as demanded by “nationalists” or extremists in Cyprus … wishing to follow in [Kemal 
Pasha’s] footsteps’.35 A week later, Mufti Mehmet Ziyaeddin – whose office was next to be 
abolished – also denounced such publications and called for the Governor to take measures 
against them.36   
The conflict between the traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite and the modernists regarding 
secular reforms continued during the following years. In 1929, the Kemalist advocate Rizat Bey 
stressed that the existing Muslim Inheritance Law did not provide for equal rights between both 
sexes and asked for its abolition.37 By contrast, Fuad Bey defended the inferior legal status 
reserved for women in the Muslim law, and argued in favour of the existing social etiquette. 
After the 1930 elections, which were marked by the success of the Kemalist modernists, the 
reform of the Inheritance and Wills legislation on modern principles was also raised in the 
Legislative Council.38 In 1934, Ahmed Said, who had served in the Legislative Council and had 
been selected Mufti by the Turkish National Congress of Cyprus, stated that the Qur’an and 
hadiths (the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) permitted the enactment of modern family 
legislation in line with changing times. Three months later, the ulema came out in opposition to 
all demands for reform of the legislation dealing with marriage, divorce, inheritance, succession 
and wills and for protection of women’s rights. The ulema favoured instead the maintenance of 
the existing legislative framework.39   
Subsequently, two drafts for a Family Bill and a Wills and Succession Bill were 
submitted to the government by Zekia Bey, member of the Advisory Council. His drafts 
provided for the fundamental reform of religious law and existing Cypriot legislation along 
secular and modern principles. The government, unwilling to intervene in issues of Sacred Law 
without the consent of the ulema, rejected Zekia’s proposals. The Muslim Marriage and Divorce 
                                                 
35 Ibid., Fuad Bey to the Chief Justice, 12 February 1929. Emphasis in the original.  
36 CSA, SA1/615/1926, Mufti to Governor Storrs, 19 February 1927. 
37 CSA, SA1/650/1929, Sheri Law and Mohameddan (Inheritance) Law, Rizat to the Colonial Secretary, 18 
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38 Ibid., memorandum of the Turkish-Cypriot deputies to the Under-Secretary of State, 1930; Zekia Bey to Governor 
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39 CSA, SA1/607/34, The Moslem Family Bill and the Wills and succession Bill, Submission of by Zekia Bey, 
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Registration Bill, issued in 1939, followed the suggestions of an appointed committee that had 
been chaired by the Attorney General and consisted of four Turkish-Cypriot members, all 
belonging to the traditionalist elite.40 Although government officials themselves recognized the 
need to remove some egregiously anachronistic provisions of Muslim law, such as for polygamy, 
the provisions in the bills marked no significant change in the previous legislative framework 
and remained in accordance with Muslim tradition.   
The reform was met with satisfaction by the traditionalist elite and was conversely 
strongly criticized by the modernists, as well as a great part of Turkish-Cypriot youth. Criticisms 
of the law appeared in many Turkish-Cypriot newspapers, such as Vakıt [Time] and Söz, but also 
in the Greek-Cypriot newspaper Embros. The Cypriot press stressed the need for modernization 
and the protection of women’s rights, and called for the adoption of related provisions from the 
Swiss or the Turkish Civil Code.41 In the face of the reaction of Turkish-Cypriot public opinion, 
the government did not enact the Marriage and Divorce Bill, while a new Inheritance Law was 
introduced in the mid-1940s, to the satisfaction of the modernists.42 Finally, in 1950, the 
government adopted their suggestions and passed new family legislation dealing with questions 
of marriage and divorce, which followed almost entirely the legislation in force in Turkey. At 
that point, the colonial authorities regarded the issue as an opportunity to cooperate with the 
modernists, in the face of the intensified attempts of the Greek-Cypriot leadership for union with 
Greece.43       
 
The Case of the Muftiship     
                                                 
40 CSA, SA1/428/35/1, committee’s report, 10 November 1938.  
41 Ibid., despatch by Vedad Dervish, Barrister at Law, to Embros, 28 January 1939; extract from Press Officer’s 
report, 11 February 1939; articles of Zekia Bey in Embros, 17-19 and 22-23 March 1939.  
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43 NA, CO 67/373/6, Law to make provision for marriage and divorce involving the Turkish moslem community of 
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In November 1928, Münir Bey and the British delegate of the Evkaf suggested to the Colonial 
Secretary the abolition of the post of the Mufti of Cyprus.44 As in the case of the Evkaf and the 
Sharia Courts, the Muftiship was an institution that had been maintained after British occupation. 
The Mufti, interpreter of the Qur’an and of the sayings of the Prophet, and responsible for 
issuing fetwas [religious decrees], was elected by the ulema, and his appointment was confirmed 
by the Ottoman authorities.45 After the British occupation, the role of the Mufti, as well as those 
of the Muslim clergy in general, underwent a process of redefinition, gradually acquiring more 
responsibilities than those deriving from simply his religious capacity. His participation in local 
politics became much more direct than merely communicating the political concerns of the 
Muslim community to the Porte.  
 In the opinion of the Evkaf delegates and the government, there were significant reasons 
for abolishing the Mufti’s office. Most significantly, they feared that the modernist Kemalist 
intelligentsia was looking for a personality to guide ‘their unlawful acts’, so they had attempted 
to turn the Mufti into the leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community and to attach to his office role 
similar to that of the head of the Orthodox Church. Against the wishes of the modernists, it was 
further deemed necessary that the Mufti should lose his role in Evkaf matters or any other 
matters of the community - his sole duty should be to issue fetwas. The overall objective of the 
government and Münir Bey was to place all communal institutions, especially the Muftiship, 
which was potentially the most dangerous among them, under the Evkaf Department. In January 
1929, the department was declared a government organ. Münir Bey’s fervent call to place the 
Mufti under the control of his department should not be interpreted as an attempt to merely 
increase his own power. It should be considered an attempt to secure his own authority from an 
opponent who could challenge it, especially if allied with the modernists. The concentration of 
all previously autonomous Muslim posts under the Evkaf department, which became the 
exclusive authority regulating all Turkish-Cypriot affairs, would secure the maintenance of the 
current balance of power within the community.      
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The case of the Muftiship constituted a major point in the conflict between the 
traditionalist elite and the Kemalist modernists during the late 1920s. The issue would continue 
up to the mid-1950s, polarizing the entire community. The very fact that the modernists sought 
to secure this traditional religious institution is particularly significant and indicative of the 
adaptation of Kemalist ideology and principles to the Turkish-Cypriot context. Given that the 
elections for the Legislative Council were determined by the practice of patronage and 
clientalism, and the economic dependency of the population on the traditionalist elite, the 
modernists demanded the participation of the public in the election of the Mufti, pushing for 
more representative politics. In fact, they were attempting to appropriate the role the Mufti had 
been playing outside his religious capacity, namely, to politicize his authority. The Mufti had 
been acting as the spiritual head of the community, and the protector of its autonomy. Notably, 
Ziyaeddin, who remained in office until 1927, and the other muftis of the period were ardent 
anti-Kemalists. The modernists, nevertheless, regarded the autonomy of the Muftiship and all 
other communal institutions from the government as a precondition for gradually bringing them 
under their own control, and therefore prevailing within the community.        
 Less than two months after the Evkaf delegates’ proposal for the abolition of the 
Muftiship, the office was indeed abolished.46 The Mufti’s duties were henceforth carried out by 
the Fetva Emini [Officer of Fetwas], an official attached to the Evkaf Department, whose 
appointment rested with the delegates.47 The first holder of the new office, Hakki Bey, was 
Münir Bey’s brother in law.48 The modernists strongly criticized the government and called for 
the reestablishment of the Muftiship. That demand would be frequently raised during the next 
two decades, as part of their broader conflict with the colonial authorities and the traditionalist 
elite for control over the communal institutions.  
In the elections for the Legislative Council in late 1930, the abolition of the Muftiship 
and the office of the Cadi became one of the main subjects of public debate. The measure was 
strongly criticized by the Kemalist press, the candidates of the modernists and the Kemalist 
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intelligentsia.49 Münir Bey, who was running for the council seat of Nicosia, was personally 
attacked for his collaboration with the government by Necati Bey, the most prominent figure of 
the modernist camp, who was running against him. Necati Bey campaigned on making all 
communal institutions independent from government control. In the wake of Necati Bey's 
victory, he began to raise the issue of the reestablishment of the office of the Mufti and his 
election by popular vote.50 Petitions and memoranda to that purpose were submitted to the 
colonial authorities, and a few months later Necati Bey convened the Turkish National Congress 
of Cyprus. The congress elected Ahmed Said as the new Mufti, an act that was not recognized by 
local authorities.51 In 1933, Said called again for the reestablishment of the office and, in 
response to the Evkaf delegates, he stressed the importance of the Mufti’s duties for the 
community. Said presented the authorities with a full list: to  approve or reject applications of 
persons to become imams [Muslim priests] and hatips [predicators of mosques]; to give 
permission for the performance of rites in mosques; to determine the dates of Ramazan, Bayram, 
and other religious festivities; to prepare bills on family and inheritance legislative questions; to 
supervise the religious preachers; and to act as a permanent member of the Muslim Board of 
Education and as official advisor of the government on religious questions.52  
 Governor Palmer and the colonial authorities refused to address these concerns. After 
Palmer's term had ended in 1939, however, and especially after the modernists won the 1943 
municipal elections, the question was again raised. The modernists, mainly through the Kıbrıs 
Türk Milli Birlik Partisi [Turkish Cypriot National Union Party – KTMBP], which was founded 
in 1944, and the Kemalist press, constantly asked for the reestablishment of the Muftiship and 
the popular election of the Mufti.53 Eventually, under pressure from the new leadership of the 
community, whose cooperation was now vital, the government accepted a compromise solution. 
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In 1950, the Muftiship was re-established, with the new Mufti appointed by the Governor and 
barred from participation in any political activities.54   
Overall, the government had sought to prevent the emergence of the Mufti as national 
leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The British feared that the Mufti would gain a prestige 
and authority analogous to that of the Orthodox Archbishop, who was considered personally 
responsible for the organization of the enosist plebiscite in January of 1950.55 The evolution of 
the Mufti on the ethnarchic model would enhance further nationalist politics within the 
community, and would significantly reinforce the influence of the modernists, who had only 
recently come to a fragile consensus with the government. In a period when Turkish-Cypriot 
nationalism was becoming ever more radical and the calls for Turkey’s intervention were 
intensified, limiting the Mufti to his religious duties was considered imperative. In 1951, after 
receiving reports that the demand for an elected Mufti was universal within the community, the 
government was forced to adopt the demand under pressure from the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. 
The British agreed to the public election of the Mufti, who was still required to abstain from 
politics.56 After a period of heated debate among all the involved parties – the government, the 
modernist leadership, the few leading figures remaining in the traditionalist camp and the 
Turkish government – a new Mufti, supported by the modernists, was finally elected at the end 
of 1953.57      
 
The Administration of the Evkaf 
In late 1928, the government passed the Evkaf (Muslim Religious Property Administration) 
Order in Council, redefining the administrative framework of the evkaf, as had been set by the 
Cyprus Convention of 1878. The convention stipulated that the administration of the evkaf 
would be carried out by a British and a Turkish delegate, appointed by the British and Ottoman 
authorities respectively; after the annexation of Cyprus by Britain, both delegates were to be 
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appointed by the High Commissioner. The evkaf foundations had immense economic 
significance for the Turkish-Cypriot community, as well as for the economy of the island as a 
whole. The Evkaf administered all property that had been appropriated or endowed for charitable 
and religious purposes, including landed and monetary property that belonged to mosques, 
cemeteries, Muslim schools and other religious establishments. The evkaf of Cyprus were 
divided into two main categories: a) the mazbuta evkaf, which included evkaf endowed by the 
sultans, property acquired by the delegates out of mazbuta funds and money formerly sent to 
Istanbul, and Escheats (a special category of mazbuta evkaf), were under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Evkaf during the Ottoman period and were now directly administered by the 
delegates; b) the mulhaka evkaf, which included property that had been endowed for religious or 
charitable purposes, and were administered by the heirs of the donor, who retained the surplus of 
its income after those duties were fulfilled. There was also the small Jelalié Privileged Vakf 
[singular form of Evkaf], dedicated to the benefit of the sect of Mevlevi dervishes.58 Under the 
1928 Order, all mazbuta and mulhaka evkaf funds were to be either directly administered or 
directed and superintended by the delegates; in 1933, they also acquired jurisdiction over the 
Jelalié Privileged Vakf.             
 The most important provision of the order was to turn the Department of the Evkaf into a 
government department. The delegates passed under the direction of the Governor and the Evkaf 
accounts became subject to government audit. Having already imposed its control on two 
fundamental communal institutions, the Sharia Courts and the Muftiship, the government would 
also control the most prosperous foundation of the community. At the same time, by placing 
these communal institutions under the department of the Evkaf, the British turned it into the most 
powerful institution within the Turkish-Cypriot community. Given that the Turkish delegate, 
Münir Bey, was perfectly loyal to the British colonial authorities and that the department was 
now a governmental one, control over communal institutions was almost absolute. The British 
were about to bring the last domain of communal autonomy, education, also under their control.   
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 Reaction to the reform was evident from its very inception.59 Encapsulating all claims 
that would be put forward by the modernist camp over the following decades, the main protest 
raised was against placing the Evkaf Department under government jurisdiction. In March 1927, 
Söz claimed that the Evkaf property belonged to and should be exclusively administered by the 
‘Turkish community’ and emphasized that it should be kept away from politics.60 The very 
participation of the Evkaf Department in politics, however, was seen as absolutely necessary by 
the government. In 1937, Governor Palmer advanced £5,000 to the department as a free from 
interest loan, while a year later he asked the Colonial Office to authorize further financial 
support. Palmer stressed the critical role of the department for the political life of the Turkish-
Cypriot community, and contended that it was the duty of the government to support its 
activities.61 Palmer stressed that the Evkaf Department and its committees were the main 
channels of influence of the traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite within the community, and that 
influence was rapidly declining due to the appeal of the Kemalist nationalists. The Governor 
further highlighted the support that Kemalism and Turkish-Cypriot nationalism received from 
the Turkish consulate on Cyprus, and linked their opposition to the traditionalist elite to anti-
British agitation.62 Assisting the Evkaf against its opponents and strengthening its position within 
the community was thus deemed necessary for the maintenance of order in the colony and 
securing Turkish-Cypriot loyalty to the government. In the Governor’s words, ‘a Government 
Department … can perform as an instrument for the maintenance of the goodwill of Moslems 
towards the British Administration’. Finally, Palmer emphasized that the traditionalist Turkish-
Cypriot cooperation with the colonial administration was being challenged within the 
community, and that Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot nationalists were joining forces in opposition 
to the colonial government.   
 The question of the administration of Evkaf property would be persistently raised by the 
modernists in the following years. The modernists demanded that the administration of the 
property be assigned to a body elected by the community, and that the department detach itself 
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from politics. Notably, the modernists held very similar demands to the secular Greek-Cypriot 
elite, which pushed for its participation in the administration and finances of the Orthodox 
Church on the island. Nevertheless, for almost a decade after 1928, when the order was first 
enacted, the two groups did not coordinate their activities in this regard. Some moves for 
cooperation appeared in 1937, when attempts were made to found bi-communal political 
societies, aiming to coordinate common action against the authoritarian regime imposed after the 
1931 revolt. The government refused to grant permission for the foundation of such societies, yet 
one of the demands that the modernists were planning to promote was the termination of 
government control on the administration of the Evkaf. In the following period the demands for 
secular and popular control would be promoted without any bi-communal coordination, itself a 
telling sign of incipient fracture.        
 
Educational Affairs 
By the end of the 1920s, government intervention in the last autonomous domain of communal 
affairs would complete its control over communal institutions. Regulation over educational 
affairs was mainly imposed by directly subjecting part of the administrative framework to the 
Governor, and by controlling the two Boards of Education. In this, government intervention was 
equally definite for both communities, and resulted in a degree of coordination against the 
colonial authorities. Education was considered the main conduit capable of cultivating pro-
British sentiments in the local population. For the government, this made the de-nationalization 
of education imperative; for the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, it was seen as an arbitrary attempt 
to Anglicize education. The autonomy of education would be claimed by both the Turkish-
Cypriot modernist elite and the Greek-Cypriot leadership until the end of colonial rule.  
In late 1929, the government enacted the new Elementary Education Law. As in the case 
of the Greek-Cypriot community, the law stipulated that the six members who had been elected 
by the district committees would then be appointed by the Governor. The Governor would also 
be responsible for the appointment, promotion and dismissal of teachers, while the Boards of 
Education retained their right to prescribe the curricula and choose the textbooks. Of course, the 
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board, composed as it was by the director of education, the colonial secretary and the delegates 
of the Evkaf, was already under the full control of the government.63     
Government oversight of educational affairs became increasingly evident from the 
beginning of the 1920s. Soon after the introduction of the 1921 Elementary Education Law, the 
colonial administration censored the material used in Muslim schools. Turkish-Cypriots received 
their educational materials from the Ottoman Ministry of Education, and to some extent it 
promoted irredentist feelings. In extracts selected from such textbooks, students were called to 
identify with the Turkish motherland and be prepared to make sacrifices and study the art of 
warfare. The books reported on injustice against the Turks, and specifically mentioned the 
territories that the Turkish nation had lost and needed to regain. In July 1921, the Acting Chief 
Secretary instructed the Chief Inspector of Schools to redact all related passages, inciting the 
reaction of Eyoub Bey.64 From then on, issues concerning educational affairs would be closely 
related to the claim for communal autonomy. As early as 1922, Eyoub Bey had included the 
formation of a Muslim Council to be given charge of education in the lists of demands in his 
petitions. In 1930, the Turkish National Congress of Cyprus, formed after the modernists’ 
success in the 1930 elections, also included the autonomy of the communal education system in 
its demands. A year later, Söz stressed: ‘For us, a national education system is necessary before 
everything. This truth we will seek in the motherland, in the great Turkish spirit. An educational 
system will come from Turkey’.65   
Notably, the government was rather more tolerant in regards to the academic curriculum 
than it was in educational administrative affairs. From 1930 onwards, Turkish-Cypriot education 
was based on the new Turkish curricula, and secular subjects, such as philosophy, sociology, 
psychology and civics, replaced religious indoctrination. The curriculum remained the same even 
after the introduction of more repressive measures on education, in the aftermath of the 1931 
revolt. At the same time, special arrangements with the Turkish government provided for the 
admittance of Turkish-Cypriot secondary school graduates in Turkish universities without any 
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further examination.66 The government focused on banning the importation of teachers and 
books from Turkey - as well as Greece - and intensified censorship on those sections of the 
curricula that promoted nationalist sentiment. To that end, two English-speaking training 
colleges were established between 1935 and 1937, for the training Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot 
teachers.67 Facing similar problems, the modernist Turkish-Cypriot leadership and the Greek-
Cypriot elite provided some mutual support on educational affairs against the government. This 
cooperation was especially evident in the period between the 1930 elections and before the 1931 
revolt, when the two communities were also working together in the Legislative Council. In 
February 1931, Eleftheria stressed that the government had no right to intervene in Turkish-
Cypriot education and that its policy eliminated the last traces of the community’s educational 
autonomy.68 The following day, Söz expressed gratitude for the support of Eleftheria and 
proposed the collaboration between the two communities against government policy.69   
The calls for educational reform would grow after the end of Governor Palmer’s term, 
and especially after the end of the Second World War. In 1946, the modernists asked for the 
representative election of school committees. Even though the director of education himself 
recognized the arbitrary character of the boards of education, the government, eager to defend 
the position in educational affairs of the traditionalist elite, responded to the demand with 
intransigence.70 Two years later, government policy would only be slightly altered, adopting a 
small part of the suggestions that had been submitted by the Committee on Turkish Affairs in 
1948. Secondary school committees would be henceforth composed exclusively by Turkish-
Cypriot members, however, they would be appointed by the government.   
In the same period, the Turkish government came under increasing pressure from the 
pan-Turkic movement in Turkey, which had emerged during the war years, and gradually 
changed its policy regarding the Turkish-Cypriot community. Turkey’s increased interest in the 
community’s educational affairs was expressed directly in requests to appoint teachers, and its 
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economic support for Turkish-Cypriot schools.71 Moreover, Turkish officials with pan-Turkic 
views in the Kemalist bureaucracy sent teachers to the island to encourage anti-enosis 
demonstrations and promote the claim of Cyprus’ union with Turkey.72 By the early 1950s, 
pressure by the Federation of Turkish Cypriot Associations, which had been founded in 1949, 
and an initial change of government policy led to the partial autonomy of the Turkish-Cypriot 
educational system. In that period, the Secretary of the Federation managed to secure funding for 
secondary education from Turkey through the newly founded Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği 
[Cypriot Turkish Cultural Association], while additional funding was also received from other 
Turkish sources.73 Turkey’s participation in Turkish-Cypriot educational affairs, tolerated by the 
government, was maintained and intensified through to the end of colonial rule.74        
 
3.3 Consolidation of Modernist Politics and the Advance of Nationalism 
Towards the end of the 1920s, the Kemalist modernist political trend was becoming ever more 
influential within the Turkish-Cypriot community, to the detriment of the traditionalist elite and 
the influence of the colonial authorities. This trend had been particularly evident in the Turkish-
Cypriot press, but also in state institutions, such as the Legislative Council. In the following 
period, the gradual prevalence of modernist politicians would drastically redefine Turkish-
Cypriot politics, and would carry implications for the government’s overall administrative 
planning.  
After a long period of almost absolute loyalty to the government, the cooperation of the 
Turkish-Cypriot deputies could no longer be taken for granted.  In early 1929, Arthur Dawe, an 
official in the Colonial Office, observed that Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot members of the 
Legislative Council had recently begun to ally themselves in opposition to government measures, 
forcing the government to pass legislation by Orders in Council.75 In April of the same year, the 
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idea of abolishing the constitution and forming an appointed Legislative Council, so as to surpass 
this difficulty was brought forward by the Acting Governor, yet it was eventually rejected.   
From the mid-1920s until the end of the Second World War, the government’s position 
regarding the developments within the Turkish-Cypriot community resulted in a twofold policy: 
the imposition of restrictions on communal autonomy and the continued patronage of the 
traditionalist elite. Few deviations from this policy can be observed during this period. Maybe 
the most important one was the adoption of the new Turkish alphabet in the documentation of all 
administrative sectors. From 1930, all Turkish legislative texts were printed in Latin characters, 
and from 1932, the same applied to all official communications emanating from government 
departments.76 Special instruction was given to all Turkish-Cypriot government officials and 
clerks, and a grant was given to the Education Department for the cultivation of teaching the new 
characters in schools.77 The introduction of the new alphabet was met with satisfaction by the 
modernist Turkish-Cypriot leadership and the Kemalist press.   
 At the elections for the legislative council in October 1930, the influence of the modernist 
Kemalist intelligentsia became clearly evident. The elections were marked by the candidate of 
the modernists, Necati Bey, and his defeat of the most prominent figure of the traditionalist pro-
government elite, Münir Bey. The electoral campaign of Necati Bey encapsulated the struggle 
against the traditionalist elite during the previous period. The main points raised by the 
modernists were the concentration of powers in Münir Bey’s person, secured by his multiple 
appointments, and the defence of the political autonomy of the community from the 
government.78 Together with Necati’s victory, Zekia Bey, initially supported by the modernists, 
replaced the traditionalist Mahmut Bey. Eyoub Bey, who had also occasionally taken political 
initiatives supported by the modernists, was the only member of the pro-government camp to be 
re-elected to the Council.   
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 The result of the elections was characterized by the Kemalist press as a victory of the 
people and as a revolution similar to the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the anniversary of 
which Söz proposed should be celebrated every year. Immediately after the elections, the 
Turkish-Cypriot deputies issued a memorandum that codified the claims of the new leadership of 
the community.79 First, the memorandum denounced the renewed calls for enosis that had been 
issued by the Bishop of Kition after his own election. The Turkish-Cypriot deputies declared 
their opposition also to self-government and stressed that Greek-Cypriots were disproportionally 
employed in the higher posts of the public service. Most significantly, the memorandum declared 
that the new Turkish-Cypriot leadership was willing to continue the policy of cooperation with 
the government that had been employed by the previous leadership. As it appears, in the face of 
the continuous and ever louder calls for enosis from the Greek-Cypriots, the new leadership 
wanted to avoid losing government support against Greek-Cypriot nationalism and against any 
increase in the influence of that community. Nonetheless, the collaboration between Greek- and 
Turkish-Cypriot members of the Legislative Council on matters of common interest would soon 
prove increasingly threatening to the government’s ability to pass legislation. The rest of the 
memorandum dealt with the main questions that had preoccupied the community throughout the 
previous period. The deputies requested that the Muftiship be re-established, that the government 
pay the salaries of the Sharia judges, and that a committee be formed to reform the Sharia courts 
according to modern legal standards. The deputies also asked that the Evkaf delegates abstain 
from politics, and that the Evkaf estimates be prepared by a committee composed of the 
delegates and selected Turkish-Cypriot members of the Legislative and district councils, 
approved by the Governor.       
 Seeking to consolidate their electoral and political success, the new leadership convened 
the Turkish National Congress of Cyprus in Necati Bey’s house in Nicosia, in May 1931. The 
Congress, composed of some 140 persons from all over the island, issued a set of resolutions 
addressed to the colonial authorities, also publishing them in the press.80 The resolutions 
included longstanding demands of the modernists, now put forward more emphatically and 
decisively. Most importantly, the Congress decided to revive the Muftiship and declared Ahmed 
Said as Mufti and spiritual head of the Turkish community of Cyprus. The Congress asked the 
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139 
 
government to recognize his election, affirm the Mufti’s previous privileges and rights, and 
allow his office to operate free from government interference. It also requested that the Evkaf 
treasury finance the reorganization of the Muftiship, and that the Mufti’s specific responsibilities 
be defined by law. The Congress requested that the Mufti acquire part of the authority now 
enjoyed by the Evkaf delegates.   
Furthermore, the Congress demanded that the Mufti take responsibility for all religious 
functions previously exercised by the Evkaf, and that the latter be converted into an exclusively 
financial institution, whose revenue would be used for charitable and educational purposes for 
the benefit of the community. The administration of the Evkaf was to be entrusted to a new body, 
composed of six Turkish-Cypriot members elected by the Congress every three years, as well as 
one British member to be appointed by the government. The institution should be managed as a 
bank and be subject to new legislation, which would confirm its autonomous status.   
Moreover, the Congress demanded the independence of the Sharia Courts, stressing that 
their autonomous status was recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne. The current situation did not 
inspire confidence in the community nor did it protect family rights. The Congress also requested 
that the operating costs of the courts should be defrayed by the Public Estimates. If this was 
deemed undesirable, their jurisdiction should at least be transferred to regular civil courts and be 
exercised by Turkish judges appointed to them. Finally, the Congress emphasized the inferior 
position of the Turkish-Cypriots’ secondary education, compared to that provided to Greek-
Cypriots, and asked the government to provide for independent Muslim boards of education and 
increase the funding for the Muslim Lycée.     
Signs of cooperation between the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot members of the Legislative 
Council had further damaged the new leadership’s relations with the colonial authorities, and the 
government duly rejected the demands of the Congress. In mid-1931, Necati Bey voted together 
with his Greek-Cypriots counterparts against many government measures, such as the Customs, 
Excise and Revenue Bill and the Village Authorities Bill, to the detriment of the government. As 
Governor Storrs stated:  
The attitude of the Greek members, always disagreeable and sometimes trying, 
has been ineffective for so long as the Government could rely on loyal Turkish 
cooperation. This is no longer available as the Greeks … have been enabled to 
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buy or otherwise persuade a recently elected Turkish nonentity, Necati Bey, to 
vote with them… There is every reason to suppose that Necati Bey can be 
counted upon for full participation in all steps taken to embarrass the 
Government… It may therefore be necessary to seek recourse to Orders in 
Council.81 
A few days later, an official of the Colonial Office stressed that, given the stance of the Turkish-
Cypriot deputies, the ability of colonial administration to function efficiently depended on a new 
constitution, which would give the Governor complete control over legislation and the finances 
of the colony.82 A few months later, after the Governor passed the Customs, Excise and Revenue 
Bill through an Order in Council, the October revolt provided the government with a unique 
opportunity to impose an authoritarian regime in the colony. In the aftermath of the revolt, all 
legislative and executive powers were vested in the Governor.   
The entire Turkish-Cypriot leadership took great interest in how the revolt developed, 
and called on the community not to get involved in any way and to comply with government 
orders. No serious efforts were made for cooperation with the Greek-Cypriots, as the enosist 
character of the revolt meant that any potential for such attempts to succeed was minimal. 
Ioannis Kyriakides, a veteran politician, made a similar suggestion, but it was ardently rejected 
by the modernists.83 The militant manifestation of Greek-Cypriot nationalism throughout the 
revolt would in fact result, in such a moment of crisis, to a shift of the modernist leadership’s 
stance towards reconciliation with the government. The British were then considered as a 
powerful ally whom the Turkish-Cypriots had to support. Addressing the community, Necati Bey 
stated:    
The recent activities in Nicosia of our Greek compatriots … are not directed at 
our community but are events which occurred between Greeks and the 
Government. Therefore our duty in such an excited and extraordinary time is to 
maintain our perfect quietness and impartiality … and not to interfere with these 
activities … and to leave the matter entirely to be dealt with by the responsible 
authorities… It is for the general benefit of the community to bow … to all 
measures to be adopted and orders to be given by the Government… The safety of 
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the country and the peace of our community invite us to be alert and careful in 
every respect and to refrain from any miscalculated act.84 
 
Following the revolt, nationalist sentiment among both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots kept 
growing throughout the 1930s despite the government’s attempts to control it, and widened the 
gap between the two communities. At the same time, modernists gradually resumed their anti-
government politics. In the following years, the growth of the influence of Kemalism, 
accompanied by demands for autonomous education and emigration to Turkey, worried the 
colonial authorities.85 Notably, in 1937, some understanding emerged between the anti-
government parties in both communities. Their cooperation took the form of common moves 
against the authoritarian measures imposed after the revolt. In particular, the colonial authorities 
received applications for the founding of local political societies. Each society would elect a 12-
member committee, composed of five Turkish- and seven Greek-Cypriots.86 According to the 
applications, the societies would discuss local issues as well as general political matters, such as 
a recent speech of the British Prime Minister and the Governor’s speech to the Advisory Council. 
The Nicosia society included the editor of Söz, Remzi Okan, and Necati Bey; it proposed to put 
forward the termination of government control over the administration of the Evkaf, and the 
reintroduction of the old constitution.87 The government rejected the applications, and a few 
months later suspended the publication of Söz and Eleftheria, two newspapers that had promoted 
the initiative.88   
In the same year, in its effort to temper the increasing discontent within the Turkish-
Cypriot community, the government asked Münir Bey to visit the main Turkish-Cypriot towns to 
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convince the population that the colonial authorities were addressing its concerns.89 In his 
meetings with prominent figures of the community throughout the island, Münir Bey described 
in detail the recent coronation in London, which he had just attended, and stressed the benefits of 
living under the rule of a great power like Britain. In particular, he assured his audience that the 
question of rural debt was being carefully examined by the authorities. He also argued for the 
benefits of an air and naval base on the island, and promised that all questions of the community 
were under careful consideration. He further emphasized that political agitation of the Greek-
Cypriots for autonomy and a new constitution would threaten the safety of the community, 
which should remain loyal to the Crown. Despite his attempts, it seems that most participants 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the government and repeated the demands that the modernist 
leadership had put forward, such as the autonomy of education and the funding of the Muslim 
Lycée.   
Despite the government’s attempts to quell nationalist sentiment, the movement was still 
growing within the community. The advance of the Kemalist modernist camp over their 
opponents in the traditionalist elite had caused great concern among the colonial authorities. The 
British had been relying on the traditionalist elite to secure Turkish-Cypriot loyalty and to 
counter the anti-government political forces among the Greek-Cypriots. In April 1934, the 
Attorney General stressed that two opposing camps had emerged among the prominent figures of 
the community: one that favoured confessional politics, and another arguing for secular reforms 
along Kemalist lines.90 During the second half of the 1930s, Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot 
nationalisms continued to grow, while pro-government forces on both sides increasingly 
declined. This development indicated the failure on the part of the government to achieve the 
main objective it had set after the 1931 revolt: to make Cyprus ‘a real colony’.   
In mid-1938, the Governor himself admitted that Turkish-Cypriot nationalism could no 
longer be considered as a trend restricted to ‘a small circle of journalists, politicians and their 
friends’, but as a mass movement. Developments on the island were taking ‘the form of a 
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tendency for ‘enosis’ and Kemalism to make common cause’.91 Nevertheless, the government 
continued to rely on the support of the traditionalist elite, and specifically on Münir Bey. He had 
been reappointed to the Executive Council immediately after the revolt, and his salary had been 
raised after the Governor’s suggestion to the Secretary of State.92 With the abolition of 
representative institutions, the power of the loyal elite had been almost entirely restored. This 
policy was criticized even in the Colonial Office, which started favouring a rapprochement 
between the government and the younger Turkish-Cypriot generation that was increasingly 
attracted to Kemalism:  
In the past the Turks have been a loyal and valuable element from the British 
standpoint. It was their loyalty which enabled us to work the old constitution for 
half a century. But the rise of Kemalist Turkey … has naturally much affected the 
minds of the younger generation of Turks in Cyprus. They are beginning to get 
impatient of British rule and to turn their eyes to Turkey, where many of them 
have gone… I have long doubted the wisdom of Sir Richmond Palmer’s policy in 
the face of this problem. He has relied … far too much upon Munir Bey … as the 
link between Government and the Moslem community. Munir Bey … stands for 
the old regime and is everything which is opposed to modern Turkey. He is for 
the fez and the veil: while the younger generation of more educated Turks in 
Cyprus are all for more advanced ideas… I do not think that as an exclusive 
channel of contact he forms a really very reliable guide to Government.93           
 This change of line in the Colonial Office coincided with assurances from the Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs that if anyone of Turkish origin attempted to create hostility between 
Turkey and the Cyprus Government, he would become an enemy of Turkey. The minister 
distanced himself from ‘Turkish nationalism’ in Cyprus.94 The fate of the island would not 
constitute a national case (milli dava) for Turkey until the Second World War. The irredentist 
calls of the Turkish-Cypriot modernists, asking for union with Turkey in case Britain withdrew 
from Cyprus, were not compatible with Kemalist principles and were rejected by Turkey. 
Besides, Greek-Turkish cooperation during the interwar period, as well as Greece’s own refusal 
to consider Greek-Cypriot calls for enosis and Britain’s determination to retain the island, 
underpinned the status quo. Furthermore, during the second half of the 1930s, and especially in 
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the period before the outbreak of the war, Turkey attempted to establish a closer relationship 
with Britain. In October 1939, a treaty was signed between Turkey and the governments of 
Britain and France, which guaranteed that the Allies would defend Turkey in the case that 
Germany attacked it.95     
 Despite Turkey’s disavowal of any irredentist views, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism 
continued to grow during the following years. In April 1943, an article in Söz stated:  
We, Turks, … absolutely believe that if we ever come under the administration of 
the Greek majority we will be suppressed… [T]he powerful Turkish Republic … 
will undoubtedly take measures to protect us, her children outside her territory. 
The Turkish government will undoubtedly deal with Cyprus … after the end of 
the war.96  
Meanwhile, following the appointment of Governor William Battershill in 1939, the Colonial 
Office’s desire to improve relations between the Cyprus Government and the Kemalists began to 
impact Turkish-Cypriot politics. During the war, the colonial authorities had attempted to control 
nationalist politics by coming to an understanding with the modernist camp. The authorities 
encouraged the establishment of Turkish-Cypriot associations that would include both the pro-
government elite and the modernists. Most importantly, the British became alarmed by the major 
decline of traditionalist influence over the community, evidenced in the absolute victory of the 
modernists in the 1943 municipal elections. It is indicative that, in the face of the great appeal of 
the modernists, the traditionalists could not find candidates for the district of Nicosia. As a result, 
the candidates supported by the modernists took all four Turkish-Cypriot seats of the Nicosia 
municipal council unopposed.97   
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On 18 April, less than a month after the elections, the Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlıklar 
Kurumu [Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus – KATAK] was founded.98 
The founding meetings were held at the Evkaf offices and were attended by some 80 
representatives.99 The first governing committee of the association was composed of Necati Bey, 
Fazıl Küçük, Münir Bey and five others. In his speeches, Necati Bey stressed the need to 
overcome the differences that had divided the community since the 1930 elections. Küçük 
expressed similar views.100 Although the participation of Münir Bey secured a role for the 
traditionalist elite within the KATAK, the association very soon became involved in Turkish-
Cypriot nationalist politics, as British officials admitted themselves. The association was in fact 
the result of a compromise between the traditionalist elite and the modernists. For the 
modernists, KATAK was particularly regarded as a pole that could promote anti-enosis politics 
more effectively as well as a modernist reorganization of the community. For the traditionalist 
elite and the government, the founding of the association was an attempt to co-opt the nationalist 
modernist leadership, whose influence could no longer be disregarded, and at the same time 
control its activities and appeal among the community. In this context, a few days after its 
foundation, the KATAK assured the Commissioner of Nicosia and Kyrenia that the association 
would encourage the cooperation of the community with the colonial authorities.101   
 The establishment of the KATAK was followed by that of Turkish-Cypriot trade unions 
and peasant organizations that seceded from the respective bi-communal organizations. 
Moreover, the association opened local branches in many towns and villages, widening its 
influence among the population. Notably, in October 1943, Turkish-Cypriot organizations 
celebrated the anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic. According to government 
reports, Turkish-Cypriot politicians stressed the support of Turkey for the Turks of Cyprus, and 
requested the restoration of the island to Turkey if the British ever left.102 In the same period, 
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however, many Turkish-Cypriots enrolled to the Cyprus Regiment, despite the fact that Turkey 
still held an official position of neutrality in the war.103    
 Despite the appeal of the association, soon after the first steps of cooperation between the 
traditionalist and the modernist parties fractures appeared in their alliance. In April 1944, a year 
after the establishment of the KATAK, Küçük and his associates seceded from the association 
and founded the Turkish Cypriot National Union Party (KTMBP).104 According to Rauf Denktaş, 
future leader of the community, the confrontation revolved around the competing set of goals put 
forward by each party. The traditionalist elite was in favour of maintaining cooperation with the 
government, while the modernists promoted the demand for treatment equal to that of the Greek-
Cypriot community and put forward the claim for the restoration of Cyprus to Turkey in case of 
any change of the status quo. This claim would be vigorously put forward by the KTMBP until 
early 1947. The government proposals in the Consultative Assembly, which were received as a 
threat to the position of the community, forced the group to adopt a more pragmatic approach. 
Promoted by Halkın Sesi (People’s Voice), the paper edited by Küçük, and other newspapers, the 
KTMBP’s politics soon gained great influence among the community.105   
The new party became particularly active in calling for the reorganization of the 
community along Kemalist lines and in promoting nationalist politics. Notably, on 25 February 
1945, two days after Turkey entered the war on the side of the Allies, Küçük, in his capacity as 
the General Secretary of the KTMBP, asked for permission to campaign for the enlistment of 
volunteers for the Turkish army. That particular appeal was rejected, but the party was allowed 
to fundraise for the Red Crescent.106 A year later, the KTMBP stated its intention to boycott 
municipal elections, unless Turkish-Cypriots were given access to municipal government as 
deputy mayors and, for five out of each fifteen years, as mayors. When the demand was not 
satisfied, the KTMBP and the KATAK, in the municipality of Nicosia, decided to abstain from 
the elections. Explaining their decision, Küçük mentioned that Greek-Cypriot councillors had 
been asking for the union of Cyprus with Greece on every occasion and that the Turkish flag was 
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not raised in Nicosia Town Hall on official holidays.107 As a result, the three seats of the Nicosia 
municipal council were given to non-politicians, while independent candidates and candidates 
supported by the KATAK were elected in the other districts.108   
 Political developments in the Turkish-Cypriot community that had been previously 
underestimated by the Greek-Cypriot elite and had been given attention only by the Left now 
attracted the notice of a large part of the Greek-Cypriot press. Already in early 1943, newspapers 
reported on the results of the municipal elections for both communities, while the establishment 
of the KATAK received broad coverage.109 In 1946 the decision of the KTMBP to abstain from 
the elections attracted extensive criticism from the Greek-Cypriot press, and was characterized as 
harmful to the interests of the Greek-Cypriot community. A year later, the Turkish-Cypriot 
position at the Consultative Assembly was further discussed and criticized.110 Although the 
dominant perception of Turkish-Cypriots as outsiders was maintained, political developments 
within the community could no longer be ignored.111 Until the mid-1940s, the position of the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership in favour of maintaining the status quo was considered as indicative 
of the absence of any national consciousness within the community – a view that still dominates 
Greek-Cypriot historiography.112 From then on, all Greek-Cypriot political forces would realize 
the significance of the community for politics on the island. This still did not signal to the Greek-
Cypriot leadership that Turkish-Cypriot views needed to be taken into account. Indeed, the 
tendency of the dominant Greek-Cypriot political discourse to be deaf to the voices of that 
community became accentuated at this stage.       
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3.4 New Government Policy and the Redefinition of Turkish-Cypriot Politics  
As discussed in Chapter 2, following the end of the Second World War, the colonial authorities 
came to realize the necessity of redefining their policy on the administrative and the 
constitutional future of Cyprus. In July 1947, the Governor announced the prospect of forming a 
Consultative Assembly, to be composed of local representatives and leading personalities from 
both communities. The Assembly was to discuss in collaboration with the government the 
reinstitution of a legislative body and the granting of a constitution. The Assembly first convened 
on 1 November 1947 and was terminated ten months later without securing its objectives. As in 
the case of the Greek-Cypriot community, the Assembly led to great political transformations 
within the Turkish-Cypriot community.   
Already in late 1946, on the occasion of the departure of Governor Woolley from Cyprus, 
and after the intentions of the colonial authorities had become known to the public, articles in the 
Turkish-Cypriot press warned that the proposed reforms would signify the degradation of the 
community’s position and denounced the possibility of introducing self-government.113 As was 
the case throughout British rule, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership considered that any form of self-
government based on proportional representation would undermine the community’s position 
and would eventually lead to enosis. Rejecting any reforms that could grant institutional powers 
to the Greek-Cypriot community proportionate to their demographic majority, the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership asked for the application of the principle of equal representation. The fear of 
undermining the community’s position against the Greek-Cypriot majority had a major impact 
on the relations between the traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite and the modernists as well as on 
those between the latter and the government. Turkish-Cypriot concerns were reinforced by the 
negotiations on the fate of the Dodecanese, which started in mid-1946 and led to the transfer of 
the islands to Greece. Most significantly, given the escalating intransigence of the Greek-
Cypriots in response to the British proposals, the modernists realized the necessity of a solid 
cooperation with the pro-British elite as well as with the government.  
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In April 1947, Halkın Sesi published a welcome statement to the new Governor, Baron 
Winster. The newspaper expressed its satisfaction with the continuation of British governance in 
Cyprus, and gave assurances that the government would receive the full support of the 
community in the Consultative Assembly.114 Two weeks later, Küçük stated in an article in the 
same newspaper:   
[T]he Greek compatriots should better … enjoy the comfort and prosperity which 
always accompany this [the British] flag and should recognize that it is their 
‘Savior’ whom they ask … ‘to withdraw from this island’… This … movement in 
favour of Enosis may immediately be declared as unlawful by the Government, 
while those who have sworn loyalty to this movement may return to their mother 
country without a minimum waste of time.115     
After a long period of opposition to the government, the modernists were now forced to change 
their attitude towards the colonial authorities. They now sought an alliance against the possibility 
of introducing a liberal constitution that could lead to majority self-government and eventually to 
enosis. Any claims that jeopardized cooperation with the government in the Consultative 
Assembly, most importantly that of union with Turkey in case of a change of Cyprus’ status quo, 
were abandoned. The new position of the KTMBP in support of government proposals would be 
reaffirmed a few months later, as it became apparent that all Greek-Cypriot parties would reject 
them. In a series of articles in Halkın Sesi, the young lawyer Rauf Denktaş argued that the 
proposed constitutional governance should be accepted by Greek-Cypriots, and that the Turkish-
Cypriot community preferred social reforms over the union of the island with Turkey.   
In the same period, the KATAK, the KTMBP, the Association of Turkish Farmers and 
the Kıbrıs Türk İşçi Birliği Kurumu [Association of Turkish Trade Unions of Cyprus – KTIBK] 
submitted a joint memorandum to the Governor, indicating the growing consensus within the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership.116 The memorandum repeated the longstanding demands of the 
modernists regarding communal affairs, which had been stipulated as early as 1931 by the 
Turkish National Congress of Cyprus, and put forward some new claims along similar lines. 
Most importantly, the memorandum asked for the reform of the legislation on municipal 
councils. First, the councils should elect by rotation a Turkish- and a Greek-Cypriot to the 
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respective offices of mayor and deputy mayor. Decisions of the councils that did not secure the 
consent of Turkish-Cypriot councillors should be subject to veto from the Governor. The 
memorandum further asked for provisions for the equal participation of Greek- and Turkish-
Cypriots in the public service. It also called for the modernization of family law and the abolition 
of Sharia law, and demanded the replacement of the term ‘Muslim’ with ‘Turkish’ in all official 
documents. Finally, the Turkish-Cypriot organizations asked for full representation in the 
Consultative Assembly and declared their opposition to the introduction of any form of self-
government, as well as their support for the government.117 Of course, the demand for restoration 
of Cyprus to Turkey in case of a change of the status quo was dropped, although self-
government, to which the constitutional talks in the Consultative Assembly could lead, would 
constitute a definitive change in that direction. It would reappear even more insistently right after 
the resolution of the Assembly in August 1948.     
The modernists were now forced to cooperate with the traditionalist elite and to openly 
support the government. At the same time, the codification of the claims that they had been 
advocating for almost two decades, which for the first time had united the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership, signified the prevalence of their social and political programme within Turkish-
Cypriot politics. During the following period, Halkın Sesi published a series of articles on the 
demands included in the memorandum, reaffirming again the community’s opposition to enosis. 
Seeking to consolidate this programme, Denktaş suggested that a Turkish-Cypriot Committee be 
elected to legislate on all communal affairs and represent the community in a future Legislative 
Council.118 The government took these proposals into consideration and, after the failure of the 
Consultative Assembly, it founded the Committee on Turkish Affairs - although with a role 
different from that envisaged by Denktaş.   
 In this context, the announcement of the convocation of the Consultative Assembly in 
July was welcomed by the entire Turkish-Cypriot leadership. Both Halkın Sesi and Hur Söz 
[Free Word], the mouthpiece of the KATAK, denounced the prospect of autonomy and self-
government based on proportional representation. The Turkish-Cypriot leadership reaffirmed its 
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commitment to cooperate with the government.119 As indicated by the Turkish-Cypriots’ 
invitation to participate in the Assembly, the British still considered the KATAK their most loyal 
ally, despite the KTMBP’s new conciliatory stance. The leader of the Association of Turkish 
Trade Unions, Hasan Sasmaz, and Denktaş were the only KTMBP members to be invited, 
compared to the five persons who were selected from the KATAK. After the composition of the 
delegation was finalized the mayor of Lefka, Niyazi Fadıl convened a meeting of the delegates to 
the Assembly and 30 other leading individuals of the community, 12 of which – among them the 
editors of Halkın Sesi and Hur Söz – were selected as assistants to the delegation.120       
 A few weeks after the convocation of the Assembly, in December 1947, the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership organized a rally in Nicosia, attended by more than 6000 persons. The 
demonstrators approved a resolution against self-government and enosis, and submitted it to the 
Secretary of State, Arthur Creech Jones.121 In the following months, as the Greek-Cypriot 
representatives’ intention to withdraw from the Assembly was becoming ever more apparent, the 
Turkish-Cypriot representatives gradually moved towards adopting all British proposals.122 
Ultimately, delegates were asked to express their final positions in the crucial sessions of 20 and 
21 May 1948, and the entire Turkish-Cypriot delegation accepted the proposed reforms. The 
trade union representative Sasmaz stressed that the rights of the minority should not be 
undermined by the majority and that the two communities should be treated separately but 
equally. His speech echoed the demands of the KTMBP and its nationalist discourse and 
included no direct reference to loyalty to the government.123 İrfan Hüseyin from the KATAK 
focused on the tradition of peaceful coexistence between the two communities, and stressed the 
advantages of belonging to the British Commonwealth. Notably, Sübhi Kanaan, the 
representative of the Turkish-Cypriot municipal councillors and also from the KATAK, referred 
to the ‘Turkish principles of the community’, indicating the ideological prevalence of the 
modernists even among their rivals in the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. Finally, Denktaş, in his 
speech, codified the modernists’ demands for communal autonomy and stressed the community’s 
opposition to enosis.   
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The collapse of the Assembly in August 1948 pacified Turkish-Cypriot fears, and 
signalled the beginning of a period of cooperation between the colonial government and the 
united Turkish-Cypriot leadership. They joined forces against a radicalized Greek-Cypriot 
nationalism, mobilized around the slogan ‘enosis and only enosis’, which had been adopted by 
all Greek-Cypriot political forces, including the Left.124 The alignment between the colonial 
authorities and Turkish-Cypriot politicians on this basis was maintained until 1958, and would 
determine the form and extent of broader cooperation and consensus on communal affairs. In 
June 1948, the government announced the establishment of the Committee on Turkish Affairs, 
making for the first time clear its intention to address at least partially the demands of the 
modernists on the institutional reorganization of the community.125 Two months later Küçük 
stated:  
[W]e Turks will … rally around our governor, who proved clearly how much he 
values the protection of our rights… Neither self-government nor enosis will save 
us. We will secure our dignity, existence and honour through legal and broad 
rights granted by democratic England.126     
Zekia Bey, former member of the Legislative Council and Judge at the Nicosia-Kyrenia 
District Court, presided over the Committee, which was composed by seven other prominent 
figures of the community. In contrast to the composition of the delegation in the Consultative 
Assembly, most members of the Committee belonged to the modernist camp. The questions to be 
discussed concerned the institutional organization of the community, and included the majority 
of the demands that had been put forward by the modernists since late 1920s: the reorganization 
of the Evkaf and Education departments, the reestablishment of the Muftiship and the 
modernization of family law and the Sharia Courts. Besides its formal composition, the 
Committee reserved right to name additional members to contribute to its final proposals, and 
leading figures of the community were indeed called to elaborate upon the questions raised.  
Seeking feedback from the government, the Committee decided initially to submit an 
interim report. In the opening speeches that were also attended by the Governor and the Turkish 
Consul, Zekia Bey declared the Committee’s loyalty to the colonial authorities, and affirmed that 
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the sole aspiration of the community was the maintenance of British rule.127 The task of 
preparing the interim report proved an unprecedented process for the community. A large 
number of Turkish-Cypriots participated in the debates that preceded the publication of the 
report, and the process mobilized a broad section of the population in dealing with crucial 
communal issues. By mid-November, representatives from all districts and towns with a Turkish-
Cypriot population, as well as all elected representatives of the community (presidents and 
members of municipal and district councils), about 1000 individuals in total, had agreed to the 
final form of the interim report.128   
The report focused on bringing all communal institutions under the control of elected 
representatives, which would secure their autonomy from the colonial administration. First, it 
criticized the government for handing the administration of Evkaf property and revenue to 
individual Turkish-Cypriots based on their loyalty, and empowering them in the community. In 
that respect, the report requested the abolition of the office of the delegate of the Evkaf and its 
replacement by an elected administrative council. Together with the head of the Evkaf 
Department, the council would exercise all powers that had been vested in the delegates and the 
Governor. Furthermore, the report demanded that control over educational affairs be restored to 
the community, and suggested the establishment of elected educational councils to deal with all 
educational questions, from the selection of the curriculum to the introduction of new textbooks. 
The report also suggested the introduction of legislation on compulsory schooling, and the 
adoption of Turkish bank holidays. Finally, the report called for the reestablishment of the 
Muftiship, the replacement of Sharia courts by special family civil courts, and the adoption of a 
civil code similar to that in force in Turkey.129   
 The Committee’s proposals demonstrated that the modernists had successfully imposed 
their politics on the entire Turkish-Cypriot leadership, which was now firmly consolidated under 
Küçük. Nevertheless, the government made clear that the aspirations of the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership for communal autonomy could not be met. The submission of the report had 
coincided with the replacement of Governor Winster by Sir Andrew Wright.  As the new 
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Governor stressed, very few of the proposals could be adopted, while none of them could be 
introduced without amendments, with the exception of a new family law. As he admitted, 
however, the establishment of the committee had served the goal of the government to empower 
the Turkish-Cypriot community with regard to the island’s politics.130   
     
3.5 Towards a Radical Nationalist Politics  
Following the dissolution of the Consultative Assembly, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership was 
faced with the radicalization of Greek-Cypriot nationalism. The community leaders opposed all 
attempts at enosis, and resumed agitation for the return of Cyprus to Turkey in case of any 
change in the status quo. Furthermore, the leadership began urging the Turkish government to 
intervene in support of this request, and to exert influence on Britain and the USA not to give in 
to the Greek-Cypriot leadership’s enosist demands.     
In November 1948, a few days after a pro-enosis demonstration organized by AKEL, the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership organized one of the largest demonstrations in the history of the 
community – more than 6000 Turkish-Cypriots participated. The speakers at the demonstration 
criticized AKEL and denounced the participation of Turkish-Cypriots in bi-communal trade 
unions that were controlled by the party. The organizers renounced enosis and self-government, 
and stressed that Cyprus should be returned to Turkey if Britain left the island.131 A few weeks 
later in January 1949, AKEL formally abandoned its line for ‘self-government – enosis’ and 
readopted the intransigent enosist discourse. Küçük stressed: ‘Cyprus is Turkish and will remain 
Turkish. Communism is the greatest enemy of Turkey and the struggle against communism must 
be held as well’.132   
In the same period, Turkish-Cypriot mobilizations aroused the interest of pan-Turkic 
organizations and part of the press in Turkey. In late 1948, a series of articles in the Turkish 
newspaper Hürriyet [Freedom] argued that neither the Dodecanese nor Cyprus should ever be 
given to Greece, even to the detriment of Greek-Turkish friendship. One of the paper’s headlines 
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bore the title ‘Cyprus is ours’.133 In September 1949, the newspaper made even clearer its 
position on Cyprus:   
There is no Cyprus question. Even as a dream it is not possible for anyone to 
imagine a day that the island next to Turkey’s coast will be given to the Greeks. 
Cyprus is entrusted to the administration of England. For the moment the 
sovereignty will not change. If such a question occurs it can be only returned to 
Turkey. The Greeks of Cyprus should know that well.134      
In the same period the Cypriot Turkish Cultural Association was founded in Ankara, and Turkish 
student unions organized demonstrations in opposition to both Greek-Cypriot nationalism and 
communism.135 The Turkish official position, however, remained that the Republic had no 
claims on Cyprus, and that it would by no means support the Turkish-Cypriot leadership’s calls.  
 Turkish-Cypriot opposition to enosis and calls for union with Turkey in case Britain ever 
left Cyprus gained in intensity in the period before and after the Greek-Cypriot enosist plebiscite. 
In September 1949, all Turkish-Cypriot organizations joined forces as the Federation of Turkish 
Cypriot Associations, founded under the guidance of Nevzat Karagil, a pan-Turkist of Cypriot 
origin. A month later, the KTMBP and the KATAK also united under the Kıbrıs Türk Partisi 
[Cypriot Turkish Party]. In December of the same year, the Turkish-Cypriot municipal 
councillors of Limassol, Famagusta and Larnaca reacted to a petition of Greek-Cypriot mayors in 
favour of the plebiscite announced by AKEL. A large-scale demonstration against the plebiscite 
and enosis took place in Nicosia.136 Fadıl Korkut, General Secretary of the Cypriot Turkish 
Party, encapsulated the position of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership:   
The plebiscite concerning the claim for the union of Cyprus with Greece 
constitutes an unprovoked political maneuver… Turks ... believe that the island 
must remain under British occupation for economical, military, geographical and 
political reasons. If Britain ever left Cyprus the island should be returned to its 
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previous owner, Turkey. Union would bring distress and would pave the way for 
the advance of communism in Middle East.137   
At the same time, the efforts of Turkish-Cypriots and pan-Turkists and their campaign in 
the press resulted in a slight change in Turkey’s position on the question. A few days before the 
plebiscite, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Necmettin Sadak, stressed to the British 
Ambassador that if Cyprus was to be abandoned this would constitute a major question for the 
Turkish government and that negotiations should necessarily be carried out with it beforehand.138 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of Turkey in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 1947 as 
well as its entry into NATO together with Greece in 1952 signalled the country's incorporation 
into the US sphere of influence. These developments necessitated the avoidance of any move 
that could result in a dispute between the two countries, and resulted in the maintenance of the 
official refusal to intervene in any way.     
 Following the plebiscite, the Turkish-Cypriot reaction reached its peak. In February 1950, 
a Turkish-Cypriot delegation visited Turkey to ask for the government’s assistance in countering 
the efforts of the Greek-Cypriot leadership to internationalize the Cyprus question and in 
blocking its attempt to present the results of the plebiscite to the United Nations.139 After the 
meetings, the Turkish-Cypriot delegation stated that they had produced satisfactory and definite 
results. Conversely, the Turkish government did not issue a statement, and the Turkish Foreign 
Minister called upon young Turks to abstain from activities that could harm Turkish foreign 
policy, referring to the large-scale student demonstrations in Istanbul, Ankara and Sivas.140 A 
few months later, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership asked the Arab League to abstain from any 
support to a possible Greek-Cypriot appeal to the UN. In the same period, Turkish organizations 
and student unions continued actively to promote the Turkish-Cypriot community’s demands, 
and, in August, 50 teachers arrived on the island from Turkey, encouraging new demonstrations. 
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Notably, the Ottoman conquest of Nicosia conquest in 1571 was commemorated in September, 
with slogans such as ‘Long live Union with Turkey’ and ‘Cyprus is ours’ dominating the 
celebrations.141  
 Meanwhile, the British had begun considering the usefulness of using Turkish-Cypriot 
nationalism against Greek-Cypriot demands of enosis.142 Soon after the plebiscite, the 
government encouraged the Turkish-Cypriot leadership to submit a memorandum of its own to 
the United Nations. The Turkish-Cypriot memorandum, submitted in April 1950, attempted to 
counter past and present Greek-Cypriot claims for self-government and enosis and to prove the 
Turkish character of Cyprus. The memorandum described the Greek-Cypriot community as a 
minority when compared to the Turkish population in Anatolia, of which Cyprus formed a 
part.143 Notably, the argumentation of the text did not focus on countering the principle of self-
government, but on the disastrous results of a potential union with Greece. Given the rise of anti-
colonial movements in the post-war period, the argument for the maintenance of British rule in 
Cyprus could not convincingly stand. Furthermore, the memorandum used the support enjoyed 
by AKEL among the Greek-Cypriots as evidence of a ‘communist threat’ and the inevitability of 
a civil war in the colony in the case of enosis. Conversely, the memorandum presented Turkey as 
the only force in the Near East that could protect the island and stressed that Cyprus should be 
restored to it if ever abandoned by Britain.144 Notably, the cold war argument regarding the 
‘communist threat’ in part echoed the official American position on Cyprus, stipulated at a 
conference in Istanbul a few months earlier: Britain should enhance moves against communist 
groups in the colony and the USA would make clear to Greece and Turkey that it did not support 
their claims on the island.145     
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 In the following period, Turkish-Cypriot calls for union with Turkey would intensify. In 
late 1950, Karagil argued that union would be attempted as soon as the international situation 
became convenient, while two years later Halkın Sesi called for a national struggle by the 
Turkish-Cypriot people for the restoration of Cyprus to Turkey.146 The official demand of the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership would remain, however, that Cyprus be restored to Turkey only if 
Britain abandoned the island. Nevertheless, the demand, as well as the calls for a Turkish 
intervention against enosist agitation, remained unrealistic as long as Turkey maintained its 
unwillingness to reconsider the question. That position would not change until the mid-1950s.    
  
Conclusion 
In contrast to the Greek-Cypriot community, in which the Orthodox Church adopted an 
increasingly radical nationalist discourse and legitimated its politics in the name of the Greek 
nation, the Turkish-Cypriot traditionalist elite was eventually overcome by the Turkish-Cypriot 
advocates of nationalism. Following the foundation of the Turkish Republic, a rising tendency 
towards Kemalist modernism and, increasingly, nationalism emerged within the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. By the beginning of the 1930s, the modernists had secured their own political space. 
Turkish-Cypriot nationalism underwent a process of transformations until its consolidation in 
communal politics in the late 1940s. Certain distinct features, however, were maintained 
throughout this period.   
First, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism adopted to a great extent the principles of Kemalist 
ideology, yet adapted them to the local political context. Faced with the government’s support 
for the traditionalist elite, the modernists sought to create a distinct political space, if necessary 
in contradiction to fundamental Kemalist axioms. Demands for the protection and 
reestablishment of the Muftiship, a religious institution par excellence, though incompatible with 
the principle of secularism, encapsulated the attempts of the modernists for communal autonomy. 
Hence, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism did not involve conflict with religion, as did Kemalist 
nationalism in Turkey. Notably, a determining factor in the abolition of the Muftiship in 1929 
was the government’s fear that the Mufti could emerge as national leader of the Turkish-Cypriot 
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community, with an authority analogous to that of the Orthodox Archbishop. The same 
considerations determined the Mufti's obligation to abstain from any political and non-religious 
activity when the Office was re-established in 1950.    
Furthermore, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism from its inception had to cope with a 
radicalized Greek-Cypriot nationalism, which was perceived as a threat to the very existence of 
the community. As a result, it developed from early on an irredentist element, contrary to 
Kemalist principles. Turkey, however, did not regard Cyprus as an issue of national importance, 
nor did it adopt the Turkish-Cypriots as an unredeemed population until the Second World War. 
In fact, the very demand for restoration of Cyprus to Turkey in case Britain ever left the island 
was initially formulated as a counter-claim to that of the Greek-Cypriot leadership’s for enosis. 
The first appearance of the demand for restoration of Cyprus to the Ottoman Empire occurred in 
December 1918, after the attempts of the Greek-Cypriot leadership to raise the question of enosis 
at the Paris Peace Conference. In the following years, the claim would be put forward ever more 
insistently, especially in periods of intense enosist agitation. Nevertheless, demands for 
restoration of the island to Turkey lacked any realism as long as the Republic remained officially 
unwilling to consider the Turkish-Cypriot leadership’s calls for intervention.   
Finally, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism was not essentially anti-colonial. In the face of 
growing Greek-Cypriot agitation for union with Greece the Turkish-Cypriot nationalist 
leadership decided that the interests of the community would be better protected if Cyprus 
remained a British colony. Thus, despite their general opposition to the government, the 
modernists from early on cooperated with or supported it in moments when the position of the 
community was seen as threatened by the Greek-Cypriot majority, such as the 1931 revolt, the 
Consultative Assembly in 1947-48, and during the 1950s. Notably, Britain itself began from the 
early 1950s to explore ways to use Turkish-Cypriot nationalism against Greek-Cypriot enosist 
politics.    
 Until the late 1940s, government efforts focused on controlling the appeal of nationalist 
politics, as promoted by the modernists, and to maintain the influence of the traditionalist elite. 
The British refused to endorse the modernizing socio-political programme put forward by the 
new Turkish-Cypriot leadership and its calls for communal autonomy. Nevertheless, as in the 
case of Greek-Cypriot nationalism, government policy failed in that respect. In fact, the colonial 
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authorities were forced to recognize the prevalence of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism and the 
ongoing transformation of the community as facts. They eventually redefined their position 
towards the new leadership after the definite manifestation of its prevalence within the 
community in the mid-1940s. In contrast to the traditionalist elite of the community, the 
modernists’ cooperation with the colonial authorities would depend on political conjunctures 
until the end of colonial rule.  
 In the case of the Greek-Cypriot community, the emergence and consolidation of the 
Left, a secular modernizing political force, had challenged the confessional politics of the 
community. For the Turkish-Cypriots, it was the emergence of Kemalist modernist politics that 
posed a great threat to the traditionalist elite. Although both the leadership of the Left and the 
modernist Kemalist intelligentsia demanded modernizing reforms and opposed confessional 
politics, cooperation between them on a modernist platform was rarely contemplated. Some 
opportunities of joint action appeared on two specific occasions. The first occurred in the context 
of the Consultative Assembly, the Left being the only group to participate along with the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership. The eventual withdrawal of AKEL from the Assembly in order to 
secure its national credentials within Greek-Cypriot politics, however, doomed any form of 
cooperation. The second, much more successful occurrence was the Collaboration Protocol 
signed in January 1948 between the Pan-Cypriot Labour Federation, controlled by AKEL, and 
the Association of Turkish Trade Unions of Cyprus, controlled by the KTMBP, under the 
pressure of the labour movement. The protocol provided for large-scale common action on 
labour issues, as will be analysed in the next chapter. The growing division of Cypriot society 
along ethnic lines, however, evident by the end of the 1940s, and the further strengthening of 
both the Greek- and the Turkish-Cypriot nationalisms in the following period would prevent 
further collaboration between the two trade union bodies after 1948.   
 Therefore, the most important factor that hindered the formation of a large-scale 
understanding between the modernist Turkish-Cypriot leadership and the leadership of the Left 
was the growing nationalist element in the politics of both. In January 1950, a few days before 
the conduct of the enosist plebiscite, AKEL issued a declaration in Turkish, arguing that the 
Turkish-Cypriot community’s duty was to respect the demand of the Greek-Cypriots for 
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enosis.147 Furthermore, Kemalist ideology, both in Turkey and Cyprus, gradually acquired a 
strong anti-communist element, especially after the Second World War. Finally, the modernist 
platforms suggested by both the Left and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership met with government 
opposition, thus minimizing the chances of a potential cooperation to achieve the implementation 
of respective reforms. However, common Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot action materialized 
extensively at the grassroots level, within the political space of the Left. From its very first steps, 
the Cypriot labour movement constituted the main space of cooperation between the two 
communities.
                                                 
147 NA, FO 371/87716, AKEL declaration, 12 January 1950. 
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 Chapter 4: The Attempt to Escape the Ethnic Divide: The Labour Movement 
and the Left 
 
This chapter examines the emergence and political representation of the Cypriot labour 
movement. It highlights how the working class of the island developed a political consciousness, 
and the politics of the parties of the Left, the Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK) and its 
successor, the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL). Despite the government's legal 
and administrative attempts to stem the expansion of trade unionism and the direct repression of 
communist organizations, a broad left-wing and secular political space had been consolidated by 
the early 1940s, drastically reshaping the Cypriot political landscape. The Left opposed both the 
confessional and the nationalist Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot elites and the colonial government, 
and developed a militant political discourse and set of practices. Its demands ranged from 
introduction of labour legislation to the democratization of the administration. Most 
significantly, the labour movement appealed to both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, crossing the 
established ethnic and religious boundaries. By the end of the 1940s, however, it would become 
increasingly evident that an ethnic divide in Cypriot society had not been averted.        
As mentioned in the Introduction, there have been very few historiographical attempts to 
explore the history of trade unionism and labour mobilizations in Cyprus. The majority of 
existing studies that address the subject were produced by trade union bodies and leaders. At the 
same time, there is also a lack of scholarly works examining the politics of the parties of the Left 
during the period 1931-1950. This chapter, therefore, attempts to contribute to overcoming this 
gap, and suggests a narrative for the politics of the labour movement and the Left and their 
significance for Cypriot society.    
 
4.1 The Emergence of the Political Space of the Left 
In order to understand the context within which the political space of the Left emerged, it is 
necessary to examine the socio-economic transformations taking place in Cyprus during the 
1920s and 1930s. During this period, the economy was increasingly focused on exports, and 
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Cypriot society underwent a process of industrialization and a related process of urbanization. 
The first process led to the gradual collapse of the economic model that had depended on peasant 
smallholders, and to a rapid growth of the share of wage labour in total employment. At the same 
time, the experience of town life contributed, together with other factors, to the development of 
more communication and a sense of solidarity among the lower strata of society. The emerging 
working class would form the backbone of the nascent labour movement and would respond 
favourably to the politics of the newly-founded Communist Party.    
During the 1920s, the collapse of peasant smallholdership, which had sustained economic 
activity on the island, was evident. That process was attributed to the indebtedness of the 
smallholders to moneylenders, when high interest rates resulted in the expropriation of their 
property, leading to financial ruin. In 1924, there were records of 3,304 forced sales of 
properties, totalling 56,862 donums - compared respectively to 2,470 properties and 36,752 
donums in 1923. The sales included 665 houses and buildings, with a total estimated value of 
£170,323 and a total price of £158,030.1 A memorandum of the Governor in January 1929 stated 
that 80% of the peasantry was in debt to moneylenders.2 According to a survey on rural 
economic and social conditions, conducted by the Limassol Commissioner Brewster Surridge, 
16% of the peasantry owned no land, worked as agricultural labourers, and lived in extreme 
poverty. Half of the peasantry lived in slightly better but still difficult conditions, and only about 
25% could be considered prosperous.3 This situation, which deteriorated even further during the 
1929 crisis and its aftermath, can be traced to developments of the previous decade. During the 
First World War, agricultural production expanded rapidly, as indicated by the rise of exports.4 
The decline in agricultural production in the countries participating in the war created a 
profitable state of affairs for the Cypriot peasantry, who took out large loans in order to increase 
their productive capacity to match the growing external demand. As a result, the peasants went 
into debt, borrowing from moneylenders, who charged them very high interest rates. The demand 
created due to the war, however, proved only temporary. After 1919, exports started falling 
sharply, and the brief recovery after the mid-1920s would only last until the end of the decade, as 
shown in the following table:  
                                                 
1 Georghallides, 1979, p. 429.  
2 Katsourides, 2014, p. 25. 
3 Brewster Joseph Surridge, A Survey of Rural Life in Cyprus (Nicosia: Government Printing Office, 1930). 




Table 1. Value of Exports in Pound Sterling, 1910-19355 
 
 
 The fall of external demand after the war combined with rising debts resulted in greatly 
deteriorating conditions for the peasantry. While peasant debt in 1914 totalled about £100,000, 
by the end of the war it had reached £3,000,000, forcing a large part of the agricultural 
population to sell its land.6 Thus, as early as the 1920s, Cyprus witnessed an important change in 
its economic structure. In the following decade, the transformation of the Cypriot agricultural 
economy together with ongoing urbanization would accelerate. At the same time, the economic 
crisis that followed the end of the First World War caused discontent among the lower classes. 
The anger of the population was mainly directed against the moneylenders and the largest 
landowner on the island – the Church. Discontent with the established local political forces 
became increasingly evident, and was demonstrated in 1925. The elections of that year for the 
                                                 
5 Sources: Cyprus Blue Books, Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1910-1936. 













































































































Legislative Council constituted a serious blow for the traditionalist Greek-Cypriot elite, to the 
benefit of new politicians.7    
 Most importantly, the transformation of the Cypriot economy during the 1910s and 1920s 
contributed to a parallel transformation of Cypriot society as a whole, bringing about the 
emergence of new social groups and gradually leading to the establishment of a new class 
structure. By the end of the 1920s, the consolidation of the Greek-Cypriot bourgeois and middle 
classes, which had begun already during the Ottoman period, was complete. Merchants had 
gained the most from the period of economic growth, enjoying high prices for exports. The 
agricultural crises that followed, especially in the years immediately after the First World War, 
enabled merchants and moneylenders to foreclose on the land that farmers had mortgaged. Until 
at least the late 1910s, Cypriot capital was thus almost exclusively based on commerce and 
money lending. Furthermore, the investment on infrastructure, and especially on transportation 
and communication networks, allowed for the expansion of internal economic activity. This 
process facilitated the development of small-scale manufacture and industry, including activities 
such as wine and tobacco production.   
Together with the emergence of a bourgeoisie consisting of merchants, moneylenders and 
professionals, a middle class of craftsmen (shoemakers, carpenters, masons, tailors, lace makers, 
weavers, dressmakers, bakers, blacksmiths and others), retailers and employees was also 
experiencing considerable growth. The number of individuals involved in commercial activities 
grew from 405 in 1891 to 3,220 in 1921, while in 1923 there were 107 lawyers, 117 medical 
doctors, 1,178 teachers, 5,929 merchants and thousands of employees in commercial houses.8 
The census of 1931 registered 2,204 public servants, compared to 500 in 1891. By the early 
1930s, agriculture was still the main occupation of Cyprus’ inhabitants, but a significant part of 
the population was by now occupied in the craft industry and the service sector, as shown in the 
following table.   
  
                                                 
7 At the 1925 elections, eight out of the twelve Greek-Cypriot members of the body were elected for the first time. 
Protopapas, 2012, p. 263. 
8 Panayiotou, 1999, p. 30. 
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Table 2. Occupations in Cyprus, 19319 
Occupation Labour force 
Agriculture: 
Farmers and cultivators, ploughmen and agriculture 
workers, gardeners, shepherds, muleteers 
68804 
Craft industry: 
Boot and shoemakers, carpenters, masons, mason 
labourers, tailors, lace-makers, weavers, 
dressmakers, bakers, blacksmiths 
24094 
Services: 
Chauffeurs, clerks and employees, professors and 
teachers, domestic servants, barbers, clergy, waiters 
13242 
Trade: 
Commission agents and merchants, grocers and 
fruiterers, coffee shop proprietors, butchers, hawkers 
5674 
Labour: 




 In the early 1930s, the economy of the island had to cope with the combined effects of 
the world economic crisis that followed the 1929 slump and a three-year drought (1932-1934). 
The agricultural sector, already weakened by farmers’ indebtedness and heavy dependency on 
                                                 
9 Sources: Cyprus, General Abstracts of the Census of 1931, (Nicosia: Government Printing Office, 1932); Annual 
Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Cyprus, 1931 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, 1932). Part of the features presented here refer to seasonal work, as a large part of the population, mostly 
peasants seeking paid work when not working on the land, had two or more occupations.  
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export trade, witnessed a further decline in the prices of primary products and a further increase 
in the rates charged by moneylenders. This again resulted in an increase in forced sales of land 
and property.10 A significant number of landless ex-proprietors, who started working in mines 
and quarries, emerged from these developments. Two large mining companies operated on the 
island, the American Cyprus Mines Corporation and the Cypriot Cyprus and General Asbestos 
Company.11 The impoverished peasants of the early 1930s also looked for employment in 
smaller, urban-based companies, such as the American Cyprus Sulphur and Copper Company, 
the Greek Hellenic Company of Chemical Products and Manures and the British-Swedish 
Cyprus Chrome Company, and in factories manufacturing bricks, tiles, cigarettes, soap, and 
other products.12 Finally, some workers were employed in the construction sector, mainly in 
works for the improvement of the road network.   
 An examination of the numbers of male workers employed in agriculture and in industrial 
production, and their respective proportion in the working male population from the early 1910s 
until the end of the 1950s indicates two trends: a general decrease in the agricultural population 
and an expansion in the number of production workers. As shown in the following table, the 
proportion of male workers in agriculture had been constantly falling since at least 1921. As the 
concomitant trends of relocation of peasants to urban areas and detachment from agriculture 
were growing, the Cypriot working class was acquiring ever more discrete and concrete 




                                                 
10 See Surridge, 1930, pp. 35-44; Sir Ralph Oakden, Report on the Finances and Economic Resources of Cyprus 
(London: 1935), 104-108.  
11 The Cyprus Mines Corporation was founded in 1916 and run by the Mudd family in Los Angeles. The 
management of the company had close relations with the Cyprus Government, with which it collaborated throughout 
the 1930s and 1940s against labour unrest. The Cyprus and General Asbestos Company was owned by the 
Koukoulla family. Rappas, 2008, p. 232; NA, FCO 141/2628, Trade Unions; attitude of mining companies towards 
formation of, meeting of mine managers with the Nicosia Commissioner, 31 March 1939.  
12 The Hellenic Company of Chemical Products and Manures was owned by the Bodosakis family.  
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Table 3. Agriculture and Production Male Workforce in Cyprus, 1911-196013 
 Male agricultural workers Male production workers 
 Total Percentage Total Percentage 
1911 49700 64 11400 15 
1921 53600 63 13500 16 
1931 55300 56 16900 17 
1946 55200 41 28500 21 
1960 43300 26 54300 34 
 
 Already in the 1920s, Cyprus was experiencing a still small-scale but observable socio-
economic transformation, which led to the emergence of new social and political forces. The 
emergence of a class of landless agriculturalists, seasonal mines workers and craftsmen was 
disruptive to the established social equilibrium, and signalled that the proletarianization of the 
impoverished peasantry was under way. This working class began to formulate its demands 
through the labour movement, emerging tentatively during the second half of the decade, under 
the influence of local communist organizers.   
 
The First Labour Organizations and the Communist Party of Cyprus 
During the 1920s, growing popular discontent, coupled with the growth of the labour force, had 
laid the foundation for the first occurrences of labour action on the island. While the 
confrontation between intransigent and moderate unionists occupied the attention of the Greek-
                                                 
13 Source: John Jones, The population of Cyprus: demographic trends and socio-economic influences (Southampton: 
Camelot Press Ltd, 1983), 143 (data taken from the censuses of 1911, 1921, 1931, 1946 and 1960). The category 
‘production workers’ includes here workers in manufacturing, processing and repairing. The divergences between 
the data of tables 2 and 3 are due to differences in the method of occupations’ categorization and the fact that the 
data of table 3 refer to the male workforce only.        
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Cypriot elite, a new, organized, left-wing political space would emerge. By the early 1930s, the 
Cypriot Left had come out in opposition to bourgeois politics, and had developed a militant, 
secular, non-nationalist political discourse.    
The first trade unions appeared in Limassol, where the first labour actions also took 
place. The town had a long tradition in the formation of syntechniai (guilds) and other 
associations from the late 1880s, and had been the manufacturing centre of the island as well as 
the centre of the rising bourgeoisie since the 1910s.14 Being a port town, Limassol lay outside the 
reach of the traditionalist landowning elites and the Church, so it evolved into the main locus of 
new ideas and information on international developments. Limassol became the point of arrival 
on the island for a number of the ideological currents that included dimotikismos,15 socialism and 
communism. These reached the town mainly through Greek ships from Athens and Alexandria.16     
 In the late 1910s, two pioneers of Cypriot socialism, G. Iliades and P. Fasouliotes, joined 
the Λαϊκή Συνεργατική Ένωση [People’s Cooperative Union – LSE], a club in Limassol that 
aimed at teaching workers how to build up savings.17 Following the tradition of such clubs that 
                                                 
14 During the second half of the 1880s and the 1890s, voluntary associations of tradesmen and master-craftsmen 
named variously as brotherhoods, saving societies and guilds, replaced esnafs (guilds) and other traditional 
institutions of the Ottoman period. Their main role was to regulate relations between masters on the one hand and 
journeymen and apprentices on the other. At the turn of the twentieth century, some more organized associations 
were formed, such as the Cypriot Teaching Association, while more organized forms of blue-collar labour 
associations appeared in the mid-1910s. Some associations of this period, such as builders and dockers in Limassol, 
put forward more militant claims, and backed them by strikes and other forms of concentrated actions. Nevertheless, 
such associations remained composed of both employees and employers, and they functioned mainly as vehicles for 
the – usually electoral – interests of their founders. Katsiaounis, ‘Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the 
second half of the nineteenth century’ (King’s College London D Phil Thesis, 1996), pp. 285-299; Fantis, 2005, p. 
52; Christos Zavros, Από την ιστορία του κυπριακού συνδικαλιστικού κινήματος [From the history of the Cypriot 
trade union movement] (London: Venus Printers Ltd, 2000), 11; Pan-Cypriot Labour Federation, Συμβολή στη 
μελέτη της ιστορίας του συντεχνιακού κινήματος της Κύπρου [Contribution to the study of the history of the trade 
union movement of Cyprus] (PEO publications, 1958), p. 6.  
15 The intellectual trend of linguistic dimotikismos arrived in Limassol during the 1910s. Its advocates supported a 
‘popular’ version of Greek (dimotiki) and opposed a ‘pure’, or archaic, version of the language (katharevousa). Both 
in Greece, where it originated, and in Cyprus this linguistic conflict took on a political dimension, as katharevousa 
was seen by dimotikistes (the advocates of dimotiki) as an elite language, incomprehensible to the people. From 
within the group of dimotikistes, a group emerged at the end of the 1910s in Limassol which was attracted by the 
Russian Revolution and saw the struggle for a language of the people linked with the struggle for the liberation of 
the lower classes. See Yiannis Lefkis, Οι ρίζες: ιστορική μελέτη [The roots: historical study] (Limassol, 1984), pp. 
45-50. 
16 According to Yiannis Lefkis, one of the first members of the Communist Party, communist books, newspapers 
and periodicals were secretly brought to Limassol by ships’ stewards. Describing his own experience, he notes that 
he was first made aware of Humanité by stewards working for the French shipping company Messageries 
Maritimes, who distributed the newspaper in the town. Lefkis, 1984, pp. 63 and 109. 
17 Alexis Alekou, ‘Η ίδρυση του ΚΚΚ, 1926 (The foundation of the KKK, 1926)’, in Giorgos Georgis and Giannos 
Katsourides (eds.), Η Κυπριακή Αριστερά στην Πρώτη Περίοδο της Βρετανικής Αποικιοκρατίας: Εμφάνιση, 
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were flourishing at the beginning of the century, the LSE functioned as a venue for public 
meetings and lectures. Although the club initially tried to avoid involvement in politics, the two 
socialists had soon formed a group around them, and became active in publishing political 
articles and organizing lectures on socialism and the French Revolution. The socialist group 
gradually acquired significant influence in the town, and in April 1919, at the instigation of 
Fasouliotes, construction workers founded the first union with an aim of defending the 
professional interests of its members. A year later, Fasouliotes was elected as president of the 
LSE, illustrating the influence of the socialist group within the club.18   
 In 1922, reacting to the success of the group, part of the Greek-Cypriot elite moved to 
establish the People’s and Farmers’ Association, aiming at splitting the LSE.19 Although the 
attempt was not successful, the socialist group itself decided to dissolve the LSE. Cypriot 
socialists moved from operating within progressive clubs to actively promoting trade unions as 
an organizational model. In the same year, the socialist group, which had now been reformed as 
the Εργατικό Κόμμα [Labour Party], began the publication of the newspaper Pyrsos [Torch] 
under the editorship of Fasouliotes. As described in a 1923 article, the goal of the party was to 
mobilize workers and peasants with a view to establishing a socialist state.20 The party further 
denounced the politics of the Church and the Greek-Cypriot elite and rejected enosis, on the 
grounds that Greek capitalism would exploit the Cypriot lower classes as much as the British.   
The new party brought together intellectuals and skilled workers of different ideological 
origins, including socialists, communists and δημοτικιστές [dimotikistes]. Soon after its 
foundation, it was rocked by a conflict over its ideological and organizational direction. From 
1923, the communists began developing a distinct faction in opposition to the socialist group, 
which drew inspiration directly from the British Labour Party. The communist group soon 
prevailed within the party and by the end of the year it had been renamed as the Κυπριακό 
Εργατικό και Αγροτικό Κόμμα (Κομμουνιστικό) [Cypriot Labour-Peasant Party (Communist].21 
                                                                                                                                                             
Συγκρότηση, Εξέλιξη [The Cypriot Left during the First Period of British Colonialism: Emergence, Formation, 
Development] (Athens: Taxideftis, 2013), 91. 
18 The construction workers union was the first to adopt a charter stating that membership to the union was open to 
all workers, irrespectively of their ethnicity or gender. History of the PSE-PEO, 1991, p. 14. 
19 Lefkis, 1984, pp. 63-65. 
20 History of the PSE-PEO, 1991, p.15. 
21 The affiliation of the Cypriot Labour Party with the British Labour Party was declared in the first issue of Pyrsos 
in 1922. Lefkis, 1984, p. 66. 
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In the following year, the communist faction, which was by now numbering 35 members, named 
their organization Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Κύπρου [Communist Party of Cyprus - KKK] and 
applied for membership to the Communist International. In the same period, Fasouliotes was 
expelled from the party.22  
Meanwhile, five more unions were founded under the influence of the party, modelled 
after the construction workers union.23 In early 1925, the unions joined together to form the 
Εργατικό Κέντρο Λεμεσού [Limassol Labour Centre], which came to replace the LSE. The 
Centre, whose charter was written in both Greek and Turkish, created a public space where 
Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot workers could meet and organize. The Centre also held classes and 
lectures on labour issues and political questions. Although technically separate, the Centre was 
directly influenced by the Communist Party. It soon became very popular with local workers, as 
indicated by the significant amount of workers participating in its activities. A few weeks after 
its foundation, organizers from Limassol assisted in the establishment of a Labour Centre in 
Nicosia.24   
From 1925 and throughout the 1920s, the Centre held celebrations on May Day, which 
took the form of a public festival for the workers. In 1925 and 1926, participants in celebrations 
published resolutions that called for unity among Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot workers, and 
codified the demands of the nascent labour movement: freedom to establish trade unions as well 
as the legal recognition of existing trade unions, an increase in daily wages, the introduction of 
an eight-hour work-day; compensation for work accidents and dismissals; protective legislation 
for working women and the abolition of child labour. The 1926 resolution demanded government 
measures to reduce unemployment, and proposed the establishment of a fund for workers’ 
healthcare and called for reform of the taxation system.25  
                                                 
22 After his expulsion, Fasouliotes founded in 1925 the short-lived Εργατοαγροτικό Κόμμα [Labour-peasant Party] 
and issued the party newspaper Paratiritis [Observer]. Katsourides, 2009, pp. 386-387. 
23 These were the union of barbers, the union of bakery workers, the union of carpenters, the union of tailor workers 
and the union of unskilled construction workers. During 1922-23, the unions of construction workers, bakery 
workers and tailor workers went on a strike that led to the partial achievement of their demands. Lefkis, 1984, pp. 
61-63 and 171-172; CSA, SA1/950/1923, The Limassol Builder Association, Police report, 27 June 1923. 
24 According to Lefkis, the first lecture organized in the Limassol Centre was on working conditions in Russia and 
was attended by 500 persons. Lefkis, 1984, p. 131. 
25 History of the PSE-PEO, 1991, pp. 20-21; CSA, SA1/935/1926, Declaration of the Centre, 1 May 1926. 
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The growing appeal of the Centre and the Communist Party became evident in the 1926 
municipal elections. Notably, the candidates supported by the Greek-Cypriot elite attempted to 
appeal to the workers during the pre-election period, and asked to give speeches at the Centre.26 
Although some of the workers were in favour of adopting a neutral position in the upcoming 
elections, the majority ultimately decided to hold their own candidates. For the first time, the 
Left would be participating in the institutional framework of established politics. The three 
candidates of the Centre received about 15% of the vote. In repeat elections a year later, the 
candidates of the Centre, now supported openly by the Communist Party, received 14% of the 
vote.27 In the 1930 municipal elections in Limassol, the candidates of the Communist Party again 
received about the same share of the vote, indicating that the Left had managed to create a 
distinct political space in the town.   
By mid-1931, trade unions had been established in all towns of the island, and Labour 
Centres had also been founded in Famagusta and Larnaca. Cypriot workers had also founded a 
central organization aiming at the financial support of persecuted workers, the Εργατική Βοήθεια 
Κύπρου [Cyprus Workers’ Support].28 The Cypriot labour organizations had by now adopted a 
standardized structure and declared their purpose: to advance labour rights and to represent the 
interests of the emerging working class. In the eyes of the law, however, due to the government’s 
refusal to recognize the existence of the labour question in line with the then Labour Party’s 
colonial labour policy, they were seen as informal associations similar to clubs and trade 
companies.29  
Most importantly, the trade unions and labour actions mobilized both Greek- and 
Turkish-Cypriots, and constituted the principal field of inter-communal cooperation. As 
indicated in the trade union resolutions, this was considered a precondition for successfully 
winning labour rights. Seeking to promote the interests of the working class as a whole, the 
emerging labour movement was in stark opposition to the politics of the two communities’ elites. 
                                                 
26 Lefkis, 1984, p. 135. 
27 Protopapas, 2012, pp. 275-276. 
28 CSA, SA1/607/1931, Famagusta sub-Inspector of Police’s report, 20 July 1931; Nicosia Commandant of Police’s 
report, 13 August 1931. 
29 The first coherent attempt of the second Labour government (1929-1931) to devise guidelines on labour issues 
was made in early 1931.The initiative, however, was abandoned in August of the same year when the National 
Government was formed. Stephen Ashton and Sarah Stockwell, Imperial policy and colonial practice, 1925-1945 
(London: HMSO, 1996), lxxxiv-lxxxv. 
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Labour politics were uniting Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots at the grassroots level, thus 
challenging the established ethno-religious boundaries. Gravely concerned about the influence of 
the communist-affiliated trade unions, the Greek-Cypriot elite attempted until the 1931 revolt to 
form rival, anti-communist and nationalist trade unions with very limited success.30   
 
Alongside their efforts to organize the labour movement, Cypriot communists moved to 
consolidate their position on the island through solidifying their own distinct structures. The 
Founding Congress of the Communist Party of Cyprus took place in 1926, yet the political 
programme of the KKK had been made public much earlier. It had been published on New 
Year’s Day in 1925 in the first issue of the party’s newspaper, Neos Anthropos [New Man]. The 
text described the goals and positions of the party regarding the political and economic situation 
on the island, the Cypriot political elites and the national question:   
Our first concern is to eliminate any racial hatred that exists between the 
inhabitants of our island, to teach the masses that the people should no longer 
think themselves Greeks and Turks and remain at each other’s throats over the 
glories of their respective motherlands, but as poor and plutocrats… [W]e will 
oppose all … nationalist politicians and will work for the independence of Cyprus 
under a workers’ and peasants’ government…31   
 The emergence of the Communist Party and its discourse, radically opposed to that of the 
Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot elites, constituted a major change for Cypriot politics. The party 
addressed the entirety of workers and peasants on the island, and called for their collective 
organization on a class basis, aspiring to form a bi-communal political space. Although 
antagonistic to both communities’ elites, the KKK’s main front within the local political context 
was against the Greek-Cypriot leadership. The ‘nationalist politicians’ whom the KKK opposed 
were mostly those supported by the Church and the Greek-Cypriot elite, rather than the emerging 
Kemalist nationalist elite of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Accordingly, the demand for 
independence was in essence a response to enosis, not to the pro-British position of the 
traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite. This should be partly attributed to the fact that the party’s 
                                                 
30 In September 1931, the Limassol Labour Federation was founded, the charter of which stated that its members 
should not be communists. CSA, SA1/1039/1931, Limassol Commandant of Police’s report, 28 September 1931. 
31 Neos Anthropos, ‘Our programme’, 1 January 1925. 
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leadership consisted exclusively of Greek-Cypriots and that its appeal to Turkish-Cypriots was 
limited – a failure recognized by the KKK itself at its Second Congress in November 1928.32   
Although the KKK focused mainly on the emerging working class both in political and 
organizational terms, the party attempted from its very early days to expand its influence among 
the rural population as well. As early as 1924, representatives of the communist group 
participated in a conference for small landowners, proposing a demand for the five-year 
suspension of the debts that had been accrued during the First World War. In the following 
period, the party put forward a series of measures that would allow for the economic recovery of 
the peasants. These included the abolition of the Tribute, the reform of the taxation system, the 
establishment of an agricultural bank and the expropriation of monastery and Church lands. 
Similar proposals were put forward at the First Congress of the party, which further asked for the 
enactment of legislation providing for disposal of the budget surplus for low-interest loans to be 
given to small landowners.33  
 Despite the KKK’s efforts, and although the influence of the traditionalist politicians was 
waning in the context of growing popular discontent, the party’s positions on religion and against 
enosis alienated a large number of peasants. The party’s calls for the abolition of private property 
and the expropriation of Church property, as well as its philosophical adoption of atheism, 
resulted in a constant polemic from the traditionalist elite and especially the Church.34 Given that 
the economic survival of the peasantry was to a great extent dependent on the Church, as it was 
the island’s biggest landowner, the KKK’s attempts to appeal to the rural population remained 
largely unsuccessful.          
In August 1926, the party moved to convene its Founding Congress, with the assistance 
of members of the Communist Party of Greece, which had been formally founded two years 
earlier. The Congress was attended by about 25 delegates who represented the KKK’s 
organizations across the island, the recently founded Κομμουνιστική Νεολαία [Communist 
                                                 
32 Political Decisions, Second Congress of the KKK, pp. 41-49, Decision on the report of the Central Committee. 
33 Political Decisions, First Congress of the KKK, 14-15 August 1926, pp. 23-40.   
34 The KKK rejected religion in principle, and denounced the economic and political role of the Church. It opposed 
only the higher clergy, however, not religion or faith as such. Articles in Neos Anthropos accused the Church of 
serving the capitalists’ interests, while Jesus Christ was characterized as a great revolutionist. Neos Anthropos, 
‘What is our attitude towards religion’, 1 March 1925; ‘Plutocracy and clericalism’, 25 April 1925; ‘The Church, at 
the service of the capitalist regime’, 25 April 1925.  
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Youth] and the Κομμουνιστική Ένωση Γυναικών [Women’s Communist Association].35 The 
Congress debated political, economic and organizational questions, and approved the party’s 
charter: the purpose of the KKK was the improvement of the economic condition and the 
organization of workers and peasants; the independence of Cyprus from Britain; and the 
establishment of the Labour-Peasant Soviet Republic of Cyprus.36 Furthermore, the party aimed 
to coordinate the Cypriot labour and peasant movement with the international labour movement, 
especially within the British Empire. The specific goals set for the labour movement were 
modelled on the demands codified at the Limassol Labour Centre’s resolution on May Day a few 
months earlier. At the same time, the Congress also stressed the need for the establishment of 
more trade unions, and stated self-critically that they should be independent from the party. The 
positions and decisions of the Congress were codified in a manifesto, addressed to the Cypriot 
people, which denounced enosis and called for the island’s independence. Moreover, the 
Congress elected a central committee for the party; its first action was to submit a protest to the 
government, demanding the abolition of all measures taken in the previous period against the 
KKK and its members.37    
Government concern about communist activities had begun since their very first 
appearance on the island and had predated the official foundation of the Communist Party by 
some years. As early as 1923, the police stopped a group of allegedly communist unemployed 
workers who attempted to raise funds in Limassol.38 Since then, all activities of suspected 
communists were closely supervised and direct measures against them were often taken.39 In 
mid-1925, the government deported a leading figure of the party, Nicos Yiavopoulos, and a few 
months later imprisoned the editor of Neos Anthropos, forcing the temporary suspension of the 
newspaper’s circulation.40 In the same year, the police entered the KKK’s offices, and houses of 
                                                 
35 Lefkis, 1984, pp. 213-219; Perdios, 1968, p. 29. 
36 CSA, SA1/1678/26, Communist Party of Cyprus. Articles of Association, 29 December 1926. 
37 NA, FCO 141/2404, protest forwarded to the Government for transmission to the Secretary of State, General 
Secretary of the KKK to Governor Malcolm Stevenson, 19 October 1926. 
38 Five years later, contributions and donations were prohibited under the 1928 Criminal Code. CSA, SA1/594/1923, 
Bolshevism. Alleged existence of – in Limassol, Limassol Commissioner to the Chief Secretary, 12 March 1923. 
39 See CSA, SA1/607/1931, Communistic activities; Police reports etc.; NA, FCO 141/2455, Spread of communism 
in the colony; measures taken for its suppression, 1931-1959.  
40 The editor of Neos Anthropos was later released and imprisoned again a few months later, causing again the 
temporary suspension of the newspaper’s circulation. Neos Anthropos had often become the target also of the Greek-
Cypriot elite and faced lawsuits against its content. See CSA, SA1/1444/1927, Seditious articles in ‘Neos 
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party members, seized all printed material and arrested leading communists.41 Such operations, 
as well as searches of suspected communists, were common, while in many cases the authorities 
censored the correspondence of party members, as well as public party documents.42 
Furthermore, the police kept a special registry with information on all communists on the island. 
The Colonial Secretary cooperated with police authorities in Greece and Egypt to track 
movements of communists.43 Notably, the police had managed to infiltrate the party and was 
constantly informed of the KKK’s plans and activities, while it was always present at trade union 
and communist party meetings.44   
Most significantly, in 1928, the government amended the Criminal Code with the 
intention of suppressing the party’s activities. The new Code was specifically ‘directed against 
the revolutionary and subversive methods and doctrines of Communism’, and stated that an 
association that advocated for the violent overthrow of the colony’s constitution or government, 
or encouraged any other seditious intention, would be considered unlawful and its members 
would be liable to imprisonment.45 As numerous party documents had called for the end of 
British rule, the party could be outlawed and its members imprisoned whenever needed. 
Following the enactment of the new Code, the government prohibited the circulation of certain 
communist books. Five years later, the Code would be amended again, so as to outlaw the party 
and all its affiliated organizations completely.46 In 1930, the government enacted legislation that 
obliged all newspaper editors to submit the sum of £200 as a guarantee for continuing the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Anthropos’; Neos Anthropos, ‘The trial of Neos Anthropos’, 15 May 1925; ‘Neos Anthropos in court’, 1 July 1925; 
Eleftheria, ‘Libel trial’, 16 July 1927. 
41 Eleftheria, ‘Arrest of communists and seizure of their correspondence and books’, 25 November 1925. 
42 NA, FCO 141/2606, Police reports on communism, report ‘Brief History of Communism in Cyprus’, 28 February 
1941; Lefkis, 1984, p. 125; Perdios, 1968, p. 24. 
43 CSA, SA1/1192/1930, Question as to whether communists can be supplied with certificates of good conduct, 
Chief Commandant of Police to the Colonial Secretary, 18 August 1930. 
44 The police reports to the colonial administration contain specific details concerning the place, time and the 
number of participants in trade union gatherings. Special mentions were made for committee members and their 
ideological positions. Neos Anthropos, ‘The celebration of May Day at the Labour Centre’, 21 May 1927; CSA, 
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SA1/1078/1931, Communist School-teachers, Limassol Commandant of Police to the Chief Commandant, 11 
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45 NA, FCO 141/2455, Attorney General’s memorandum on the 1933 Criminal Code, 4 March 1933; The Cyprus 
Gazette, 1928, Laws Nos. 15 and 37, pp. 298-299 and 581-582.  
46 Neos Anthropos, ‘The prohibited books’, 12 September 1928. 
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publication of their newspapers, causing the permanent suspension of Neos Anthropos’ 
circulation.47  
By the beginning of the 1930s, however, the KKK had successfully secured its position 
as a significant political force on the island. In the 1930 elections for the Legislative Council, 
candidates supported by the KKK received about 16% of the vote. During the same period, there 
is evidence that KKK also managed to extend its influence among the Turkish-Cypriot 
community more successfully, triggering the reaction of the modernist Kemalist Turkish-Cypriot 
intelligentsia. In mid-1931, Turkish-Cypriot speakers participated in several meetings organized 
by the KKK in Limassol, Nicosia and Paphos, which were attended by members of both 
communities.48 In July of the same year, the KKK held a meeting in Paphos at a Turkish-Cypriot 
coffee-shop. The meeting was originally scheduled to take place in a Greek-Cypriot coffee-shop, 
but changed venue, when the owner was threatened by men sent by the mayor and the town’s 
bishop. A few days later, leading Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communists addressed an appeal 
to the workers of the town, stressing the need for bi-communal cooperation in labour 
mobilizations. That appeal caused the reaction of the newspapers Hakikat [Truth] and Söz, which 
denounced the participation of Turkish-Cypriots in the Communist Party, and stressed that 
communism constituted a threat for both the community and Turkey.49 In August of the same 
year, Söz published an article entitled ‘Whoever leaves the congregation will be devoured by the 
Wolf’. The article emphasized that the communist movement on the island was instigated by 
Greek-Cypriots and promoted Greek-Cypriot nationalism.50           
 
4.2 Government Policy and Labour Organization 
Although the KKK did not play a major role in the outbreak of the October revolt and the riots 
that followed, the events provided an ideal opportunity for the British to take action against the 
                                                 
47 The Cyprus Gazette, 1930, Law No. 23, ‘Newspapers, Books and Printing Presses Law’, pp. 761-772, section 4. 
The law was apparently amended in order to force Neos Anthropos to close down. The newspaper and the KKK 
attempted to collect the sum required through donations and subscriptions but failed; no other newspaper closed 
down due to this provision of the law.   
48 Panayiotou, 1999, p. 236. 
49 CSA, SA1/607/1931, Paphos Commandant of Police’s to the Chief Commandant, 21/7 and 4 August 1931; 
Nevzat, 2005, p. 329. 
50 CSA, SA1/517/1926, article in Söz, 13 August 1931. 
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party. The colonial authorities introduced a series of repressive measures against the KKK, most 
of which had been discussed in the previous period. Following the revolt, the government 
outlawed the party itself as well as all organizations affiliated with it, and attempted to suppress 
its activities in total. In this context of illegality and repression, the KKK channelled its action 
mainly through the trade unions. The party successfully maintained its leading role in the labour 
movement during the 1930s, making sure that its appeal would keep growing.      
  Within a few days of the outbreak of the revolt, the colonial authorities arrested many 
leading figures of the party. On 25 October, a demonstration of about 400 persons outside the 
Nicosia Labour Centre protesting against the arrests of communist leaders was dispersed by 
soldiers. The Centre was ransacked and the KKK offices sealed.51 Three days later, the 
remaining leaders of the party were also arrested. By early November, Charalambos Vatis, who 
had played a leading role in the October revolt, and Costas Christodoulides (known as Skeleas), 
General Secretary of the KKK since 1925, were deported. About 50 more cadres were 
imprisoned or internally exiled.52 A few weeks later, the government also took measures to keep 
foreign communists, especially Greek nationals from Greece, Egypt, Syria and Turkey, from 
coming to the island.53 From 1932 until early 1934, almost all known cadres of the KKK were 
arrested and tried on charges of seditious conspiracy. They were internally exiled or received 
sentences of up to four years’ imprisonment.54   
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As the poet Tefkros Anthias, a party member, stressed in his protest to the Governor in 
mid-1932, communists were often flogged with whips and clubs by the police, in order to force 
their cooperation against arrested party cadres:  
The organs of order [policemen] … [have treated the Communists] with … 
Inquisitional measures, with cruel flogging with whips and clubs, searching for 
false evidence against the pioneers of the Communist party… They whip and beat 
them … until they bleed and they insult them most vulgarly.55 
Anthias also stressed that in many cases the authorities detained communist workers for days and 
charged them with offences which were eventually not tried due to lack of evidence.    
 In 1932, police interrupted the preparations for the May Day celebrations in Nicosia, 
arresting about 20 Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots; two of the detainees were severely beaten while 
in police custody.56 The event received extensive publicity within Cyprus, but also reached the 
House of Commons, with James Maxton, an MP of the Independent Labour Party, criticizing the 
Secretary of State, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, and requesting an inquiry into the circumstances of 
the event.57 The inquiry that followed eventually confirmed, as expected, the government’s 
allegations. The publicity given to the workers’ reports incited the criticism of the colonial 
authorities. The Attorney General and the Chief Commander of Police asked the Colonial 
Secretary to ensure that reports on police practices in Cyprus were not made available to British 
MPs in the future. Only such discretion would allow it to deal effectively with the communists, 
the ‘enemies of the State’.58 The government’s determination to suppress the KKK’s activities 
would be demonstrated in the following period, when the relevant measures that had been 
debated prior to the October revolt would take full effect.    
Up until the revolt, the authorities had difficulty obtaining sufficient evidence against 
communists, while the government complained that the courts in many cases took a very lenient 
view of communist activities.59 In August 1931, the Chief Commander of Police proposed that 
                                                 
55 CSA, SA1/726/32, protest by Anthias, mid-1932.   
56 CSA, SA1/900/32, Alleged arrest and ill treatment by the police of certain persons, reports by the two assaulted 
workers, May 1932. 
57 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 267 (27 June 1932), cc. 1477-8, question by Maxton and answer by the 
Under-Secretary of State. 
58 CSA, SA1/900/32, Attorney General to the Colonial Secretary, 17 August 1932. 
59 NA, FCO 141/2455, Acting Governor to Secretary of State Lord Passfield, 21 August 1931. The Acting Governor 
referred specifically to the unsuccessful prosecution of Vatis in the summer of 1931. Vatis was charged under the 
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the government amend the Criminal Code again, so as to outlaw all communist and fellow-
traveller organizations. The Commander also suggested the introduction of further legislation 
that would prohibit the appointment of Cypriots to Soviet commercial agencies on the island, and 
would empower banks to sequester accounts that belonged to communists.60 A few days later, 
the Acting Governor proposed that the Secretary of State should pass legislation that would 
further restrict communist publications, introduce the censorship of telegram correspondence of 
communists and deport non-Cypriot communists from the island.61 The Attorney General further 
proposed that such legislation should extend to Cypriot communists, and suggested that the laws 
recently passed in Greece against communist activities and associations could be used as a model 
for Cyprus.62   
 Cyprus was the first British colony to legislate comprehensively against communist 
activities. As Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Secretary of State, noted himself, the 1931 revolt was an 
ideal opportunity for the British to apply such legislation, despite the very minor role played by 
the KKK in the events.63 By the end of 1932, legislation had been enacted providing for the 
deportation of Cypriot and non-Cypriot communists and other undesirable persons from the 
island. The authorities banned communist and other seditious publications, and prohibited 
political meetings and the assembly of more than five persons.64         
Most importantly, in 1933, the Criminal Code was re-amended, so as ‘to enable the 
Government to deal effectively with the menace of Communism’.65 The new Code empowered 
the Governor to ban outright any organization that had among its aims the promotion of a general 
strike.66 Furthermore persons charged with taking part in or encouraging the activities of an 
unlawful association would from then on be triable in a court of Assizes, and the possession of 
seditious printed material became an offence. The amendments also gave additional powers of 
search, seizure of documents and arrest to the police. The day after the enactment of the 
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61 Ibid., Acting Governor to the Secretary of State, 21 August 1931. 
62 Ibid., Attorney General to the Colonial Secretary, 5 and 15 September 1931. 
63 Ibid., Secretary of State Cunliffe-Lister to Governor Storrs, 21 March 1932. 
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65 NA, CO 67/250/12, The Cyprus Criminal Code (Amendment) Law, 1933, Objects and Reasons. 
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amendments, the government proscribed the KKK and all organizations affiliated to it.67 In 
August of the same year, further legislation providing for the censorship of telegram 
correspondence was enacted, followed by a law providing for the suspension of newspapers’ 
publication a year later.68  
 By the mid-1930s, the KKK had suffered a severe blow. Most party cadres had been 
imprisoned and most underground activities of the now leaderless KKK had been suppressed.69 
The party’s printed material and newspapers had been declared seditious, their publication 
suspended, and their illegal distribution could only be limited.70 Moreover, party members and 
supporters were excluded from job offers and promotions and were often suspended or 
dismissed. In this context, the party developed a double-action policy: a small-scale underground 
activity, consisting of setting up illegal cells and distributing proclamations; and a legal one, that 
is channelling its action through the labour movement. Until the end of the 1930s, trade 
unionism, which was treated differently by the government in comparison to communist activity, 
became the main organizational structure for the party to re-establish its presence on the island.    
 
Towards the Consolidation of the Labour Movement  
At the end of the 1910s and during the 1920s, Britain and many other European countries came 
to recognize trade unions as social partners and participants in the planning of social policy. This 
development can be predominantly attributed to the socio-economic effects of the First World 
War and the impact of the October Revolution on European politics. The Treaty of Versailles in 
1919 provided for the establishment of the International Labour Organization. The organization 
aimed at promoting a new direction in trade unionism, opposing that advocated by the 
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Comintern, so as to address the post-war crisis and at the same time control the expansion of 
communism. Because of their membership in the ILO, Britain and other colonial powers were 
typically obliged to apply its guidelines on labour policy in the colonies. Nevertheless, the 
extension of the labour question in the colonies was not recognized, and labour legislation in 
British overseas territories would not be introduced before the 1930s. Britain’s overall colonial 
social policy was after all predominantly defined by economic priorities and precondition for the 
introduction of a new institutional framework was that it would leave economic policy intact.        
 In the mid-1930s, the global economic crisis created the potential for extensive social and 
labour unrest. This gradual development led Britain to redefine its colonial labour policy, with 
colonial officials deciding that legal oversight over the labour movement would be more 
effective than direct repression.71 In this context, and despite the objections of the Cyprus 
government, labour legislation on the island was reluctantly introduced in 1932. The first 
decisive steps towards the introduction of worker’s rights and the protection of workers would 
only be taken during the last decade of colonial rule on the island, under the pressure of the 
labour movement.72 As late as May 1938, Governor Palmer stressed to the Secretary of State:  
I note that you urge the enactment of further legislation to provide for the 
establishment of wage-fixing machinery and for the compulsory payment of 
compensation to injured workmen… But in this connection I desire to emphasize 
the very serious danger even to the present degree of economic progress and 
development, which any too drastic and too direct interference with labour 
conditions … might occasion.73  
As in all colonies, the government considered that Cypriot society, being essentially uneducated 
and backward, was not ready for extensive, modern labour legislation. In 1941, while discussing 
the planned reform of the trade union regulatory framework, the Acting Governor argued that:  
[T]rade unions of Cyprus are in a backward state educationally and politically. It 
is a misuse of terms to call the present combinations of various workers here trade 
unions, if by that is meant something comparable to trade unions in England… 
Their officials have little ability… Most of the members are … mentally … 
groping in the dark and pursuing imperfectly understood ideas… The trade unions 
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here [do not] understand collective bargaining… I must admit to grave misgivings 
as to the wisdom of granting … wide powers and privileges to the trade unions in 
their present undeveloped and uneducated state…74  
Besides, the government did not recognize the presence of any class distinction on the island and 
denied the existence of a distinct working class.   
 The 1932 Trade Union Law stood as the first institutional framework for trade unionism 
in Cyprus. The law reflected official scepticism as the government attempted to control the 
expansion and militancy of the labour movement on the island as well as restrict communist 
influence over the unionists. The law provided that trade unions should be registered within two 
months of their formation, provided that their charter was in accordance with the provisions of 
the law. Most importantly, extensive powers were granted to the Registrar of Trade Unions, who 
was appointed by the Governor. He had the right to refuse the registration of any union without 
justification; to demand alterations of trade union charters and the replacement of unions’ 
officials; and to exclude workers from membership in a union.75 The law stipulated no specific 
rights for the unions, and did not preclude the involvement of employers. In the same period, the 
government created the post of Inspector of Mines and Labour to supervise labour activities and 
the implementation of the new legislation.76  
 This exceedingly restrictive regulatory framework that reflected ‘deliberate government 
policy’ along with practical and bureaucratic difficulties impeded trade union registration.77 In 
mid-1938, the Registrar reported to the Colonial Secretary:   
[T]here has been a good deal of discouragement [for registration]… If it has not 
been possible to find fault with the character and antecedents of the organizers, 
then the rules have been searched for grounds on which the application could be 
refused. Some applicants have submitted the rules of a trade union already 
registered, but nevertheless they find that their rules are criticized and 
amendments demanded. Two applicants submitted identical rules 
simultaneously… [O]ne set was considered to meet statutory requirements, the 
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other was not… [S]ome trade unions are still unregistered although their 
applications were made two years ago.78       
In this context, only five trade unions had been registered by 1937. The delays attracted severe 
criticism from trade union leaders, but also by part of the press that expressed the views of the 
Greek-Cypriot elite. Government policy would become more tolerant after 1938, and especially 
after the end of Governor Palmer’s term. In total, 62 trade unions had been registered by 1941.79   
Under these circumstances, organized labour was dealt a serious blow during the first 
years after the 1931 revolt. The proscription of the existing trade unions and labour 
organizations, and measures such as the imprisonment of leading trade unionists, the banning of 
labour newspapers and police supervision, neutralized the movement.80 The sparse and 
unorganized protests that followed were quickly suppressed, without achieving the workers’ 
demands. The most important event of the period was the Nicosia builders’ strike in 1933, which 
involved 800 workers, who demanded the reduction of work hours and an increase in their daily 
wages. The strike was quickly terminated after its suppression and the imprisonment of 20 of the 
participants.81 During the second half of the decade, however, the KKK was gradually 
reorganized under the leadership of Ploutis Servas. Labour mobilizations became much better 
organized and more effective.82 By the end of the decade, the labour movement had again grown 
significantly. Its membership included both men and women, Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, and 
it had cultivated solidarity among workers from different unions and workplaces.  
 In late 1935, the shoemakers’ union in Nicosia – the first that had been registered under 
the 1932 Law – mobilized its members (Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots and Armenians). The 
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union began campaigning for its recognition by employers, the establishment of the eight-hour 
workday, and the increase of wages.83 After six months of demonstrations, public assemblies, the 
signing of petitions and strike, the employers agreed to part of the demands and established a 
cooperative shoe factory in which the workers could participate as shareholders.  
Among the most significant events of the period was the miners’ strike in 1936. Although 
the workers ended the strike without fulfilling their demands, the action attracted great interest 
from the press, creating a broad public debate. The American-owned Cyprus Mines Corporation 
(CMC) was the island’s largest private employer, with a daily average labour force of more than 
3000 miners. Temporary employment in the mines contributed significantly to the control of 
unemployment.84 After 1933, a significant drop in wages, coupled with an inflation in the prices 
of staples, caused a serious exacerbation of the miners’ already precarious position. In August 
1936, workers in the two main sites operated by the CMC, Skouriotissa and Mavrovouni, both in 
Nicosia district, convened assemblies and formed committees to present a list with demands to 
the management of the company. Their demands ranged from an increase in their salaries to the 
establishment of an insurance fund for the compensation of injured workers. After the company 
rejected the demands, the miners went on a large-scale strike and organized protests.85 
Nevertheless, these were quickly repressed by the police; nine strikers, including the strike 
committee members, were charged with organizing a public meeting and were sentenced to a 
£10 guarantee, payable within a year.86   
Two years after the miners’ strike, in June 1938, female workers at the cotton factory in 
Famagusta went on strike. The action, whose demands ranged from a salary increase to the 
improvement of work conditions and notice before dismissal, lasted a month and a half.87 During 
the strike, the factory continued operation by employing male strike-breakers. The strike, 
however, characterized by the participants as ‘the first militant manifestation of the women of 
Cyprus’, immediately received the solidarity of the trade unions. A few days after the beginning 
of the strike, the unions of builders, barbers, tailor workers, carpenters, shoemakers, shop tenants 
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and blacksmiths sent a joint communiqué to the District Commissioner, asking for his 
intervention on behalf of the workers, and declaring their support of the struggle.88 After six 
weeks of conflict between strikers and strike-breakers, 13 strikers were arrested, four of whom 
were imprisoned and seven fined; all of them were dismissed from employment.  
  Despite the constant cooperation between employers and the government, some of the 
mobilizations of the period led to victory for the workers. The first successful strike was the 
Famagusta builders’ strike in 1937, which achieved recognition of the trade union by the 
contractors, salary increases and the establishment of an eight-hour workday during winter. 
Another such example was the Limassol builders’ strike in 1938, which also achieved salary 
increases and the reduction of working hours.89 Most significantly, the Nicosia builders’ strike in 
1939 led to the signing of the first collective agreement, and constituted a turning point for the 
Cypriot labour movement. In April 1939, an assembly of the Nicosia builders and builders’ 
employees trade union submitted a set of demands to the contractors, ranging from the increase 
of wages to the recognition of the trade union. After most contractors refused to meet the 
demands, a large number of workers went on a four-day strike. The action resulted in the signing 
of a collective agreement, which incorporated the majority of the workers’ demands, including 
the employers’ obligation to employ only members of the trade union. In the following weeks, 
the Nicosia carpenters also secured collective agreements.    
Until the end of the 1930s, both trade unions and non-union workers constantly pushed 
for the introduction of protective labour legislation and the protection of labour rights, including 
the freedom of organization.90 In parallel, attempts towards the consolidation of trade unions, 
initially on the district and later on pan-Cypriot level, indicated the organizational advances of 
trade unionism, which would be made vividly manifest at the end of the decade.91 The existing 
legal framework did not provide for amalgamation of trade unions, but it did not preclude it 
either. The government responded to this trend with great reservation, fearing that amalgamation 
would further encourage workers’ membership in unions. In a period of growing communist 
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influence within the trade unions, this would make exercising control over the labour movement 
much more difficult.92 As the obstruction of amalgamation was not legally possible, however, 
and as it would further result in the decrease of the unions’ leading positions, the government 
only ensured that the new unions operated under a strict regulating regime.    
In early 1939, many trade unions requested permission to convene a conference that 
would lay the foundation for all of the unions in Cyprus and the formation of an island-wide 
federation. By rejecting the request, Governor Palmer caused a strong reaction among unions and 
criticism by part of the Greek-Cypriot press. Pressure led Palmer’s successor, William 
Battershill, to grant permission eventually. The Conference was convened on 6 August in 
Famagusta and was attended by 101 representatives of the 44 trade unions that were officially 
registered on the island, as well as some additional unions that had not yet completed the process 
of registration. The unions had a total membership of 2500 workers, most of them Greek-
Cypriots.93 The main issues discussed were the coordination of the unions and the demands for 
which the labour movement should campaign. The demands were codified in a 16-article 
resolution, which was to be submitted to the government. The action was cancelled, however, 
because of disagreements between communist and right-wing representatives, who considered 
that this would enhance the Left’s already great control over trade unionism.94 Furthermore, 
similar disputes made the election of a central union leadership at the conference impossible, 
indicating the organizational limits of trade unionism. Despite these failures, the realization of 
the Conference constituted the first systematic attempt towards the consolidation of trade 
unionism across the island. A second more organized attempt would occur in the early 1940s, 
when a second conference would convene, signalling the beginning of a period of more effective 
organization of the labour movement.  
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4.3 Foundation of AKEL and the Institutionalization of Trade Unionism   
On the eve of the Second World War, the need for the British to secure the cooperation of 
colonial populations led to the introduction of a series of reforms in colonial governance. In the 
case of Cyprus, the replacement of Governor Palmer by the more moderate Battershill in July 
1939 facilitated a departure from the authoritarian regime of the 1930s. At the same time, the 
outbreak of the war brought about intense economic dislocation to the island, adversely affecting 
employment figures and the cost of living. During the war, many sectors of the economy that 
employed a large proportion of the population, especially the commercial, mining and 
construction centres, under-performed or even ceased functioning. The case of the islands’ mines 
is indicative. The CMC ceased operations at its two main sites, due to the closure of the German 
market, laying off more than 3000 miners in 1940.95 At the same time, the constant rise of the 
inflation rate caused a great increase in prices of primary products.96     
            Attempting to reduce unemployment, the government initiated a series of small-scale 
public relief projects in villages and towns. With the exception of the period from July to 
November 1941, however, levels of employment remained very low.97 The government sought 
to address the rising inflation through administrative measures by centrally determining the price 
of staple products and by attempting to decrease the production and wage costs.98 The 
ineffectiveness of the measures drew strong protest from the trade unions and workers, who 
demanded further intervention by the government as well as the enactment of protective labour 
legislation.  
 During February and March 1940, strikes occurred for the first time in a number of 
government departments. The most notable, the strike in the Public Works Department, caused 
unrest in all major towns. All demonstrations were harshly dispersed by the police and many 
workers were arrested. In telegrams of protest sent to the Governor as well as to British 
politicians, the trade unions denounced the police violence.99 At the end of the year, trade union 
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representatives submitted a series of suggestions concerning the drop of prices, which were 
rejected by the government.100 Until mid-1941, male and female unemployed workers organized 
large protests outside administration and government offices in the major towns, demanding 
employment and the opening of relief works. The protests were followed by arrests and 
prosecutions.101 At the same time, successful strikes that involved both Greek- and Turkish-
Cypriots, such as those of the builders working on the Nicosia Military Hospital, the Nicosia 
shoe-labourers, the Limni (Paphos) miners and the Famagusta railway workers, illustrated the 
dynamics of the labour movement during the first years of the war.102     
 Meanwhile, since the beginning of the war, Britain began to change its overall labour 
policy in the colonies, with a view to stemming growing labour mobilization and social turmoil. 
In this context, the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act provided that colonies could 
under certain conditions be eligible for grants for the establishment of trade unions.103 In Cyprus’ 
case, labour conditions and the lack of relevant legislation on the island attracted the criticism of 
part of the British press, Labour MPs and numerous district organizations of the Labour Party. 
Under pressure from the Cypriot labour movement, the government was forced to revise its 
labour policy.104   
 The new direction was determined mainly by four labour laws enacted in 1941 and 1942. 
Before introducing the laws, the government had asked the trade unions to express their position, 
but eventually chose not to take it under consideration.105 The main rationale of the reforms was 
that the extremely restrictive framework of the 1932 Labour Law often forced trade unions to act 
outside it. In early 1941, the Colonial Secretary stated:  
If we try to restrict development [of trade unions] to statutory objects, we get 
either an abortion or an explosion. We shall perpetuate the atmosphere of 
illegality which surrounds Cyprus trade unions under the present law because if 
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we do not give them freedom to develop they will do the things to which 
objection is seen by a persistent process of acts outside the law and in defiance of 
the Government.106    
The same view was expressed by the Acting Governor: 
We can proceed no longer under the existing Trade Union Law …, which [does 
not give] the Government any real safeguards and control… [W]e shall have in 
[the proposed] Bill as good an instrument as … to enable the Government to meet 
any industrial unrest…107 
 The new legislation introduced an institutional framework which was relatively liberal 
when compared to the existing one and to laws enacted during the same period in other parts of 
the empire. The law expanded trade union freedoms and met part of the unions’ demands on the 
protection of the working class. It excluded many categories of workers from its provisions, 
however, and its implementation revealed the government’s concern to control the spread of 
trade unionism on the island.108 It thus received intense criticism by the unions, mainly because 
of the provision that excluded unemployed persons from registration, the limitations to the right 
to strike and the exclusion of domestic servants and land workers from any form of 
compensation.109  
 At the same time, alongside the shift in its labour policy, the government was forced to 
revise its policy towards communist activities on the island as well. During the first years of the 
war, reports on the KKK’s attempts to extend its appeal beyond labour mobilizations and 
influence broader strata of the society had alarmed government officials. In April 1940, the 
Commissioner of Police reported to the Colonial Secretary on a party pamphlet that stated that 
the Soviet Union had taken control of the balance of power in Europe. The pamphlet also called 
for the workers’ support for the USSR, so that communism could spread to the rest of the 
world.110 Most alarmingly for the government, the pamphlet stressed that the KKK leadership 
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had begun to re-organize the party, with the aim to be able to overthrow the colonial government 
at a moment’s notice and assume power itself. In May of the same year, the KKK held its Fourth 
Congress in secret. The Congress decided that the party would form a political organization 
which would allow the Left to return to a legal existence and which would appeal to a much 
broader audience.111   
 Despite increasing communist activity, international conditions and internal 
developments in Britain did not allow the government to maintain its repressive policy against 
communist activities on the island. After the outbreak of the war, Britain was increasingly reliant 
on help from the colonies. German encroachment in the Eastern Mediterranean to reach the 
Middle East oilfields meant the British needed to cultivate good relations with the colonial 
populations. In the case of Cyprus, which the German propaganda was targeting with radio 
programmes, the new policy signalled the reintroduction to some degree of representative 
government, which had been suspended during the previous decade of authoritarian rule.112 
Moreover, Britain’s alliance with Greece and the Soviet Union favoured a more tolerant 
treatment of the Greek-Cypriots, which included communists.      
 In line with the new policy, in early 1941, the Labour Adviser – whose post succeeded 
that of the Inspector of Mines and Labour – proposed the abolition of the communists’ registry. 
Although the Governor and the Colonial Secretary paid lip service to the idea, the order they 
gave the Attorney General was altogether different. The Colonial Secretary advised him to ‘put 
this file away: it should been seen by no one other than yourself and … must not be referred 
outside the CSO [Colonial Secretary’s Office] without my authority’.113 Later in the year, when a 
number of communists unsuccessfully asked for permission to travel to the Soviet Union and 
join the Red Army, their full particulars were requested.114     
Most importantly, in April 1941, the government gave permission to the liberal politician 
George Vassiliades, who had been formerly appointed to the Advisory Council, to organize a 
political meeting at Skarinou, in Larnaca. On 14 April, Vassiliades and other liberal politicians 
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met with the KKK leadership and cadres from across the island. The meeting led to the 
foundation of AKEL.115 The meeting was chaired by Pheidias Kyriakides, a lawyer and 
industrialist, and speeches were delivered by Servas and Vassiliades, who represented the 
communists and the liberal wing of the party, respectively. As indicated by the composition of 
the meeting, the new party was aimed at appealing to both the labour and the middle class, and 
aspired to form a political space broader than that of the KKK.116 The participants at the meeting 
discussed and approved the charter of AKEL, and elected a Pan-Cypriot Organizational 
Committee as well as four local Organizational Committees for the towns of Nicosia, Limassol, 
Famagusta and Larnaca.   
 A few months later, on 5 October 1941, AKEL held its first Congress, attended by 90 
representatives of the 1,284 members of AKEL, as well as about 100 non-party persons.117 The 
congress elected Ploutis Servas as General Secretary, thus putting him in charge of both the 
KKK and AKEL. It also elected a Central Committee for the party, consisting of 17 members, 
the majority of whom were communists, and also approved the programme of the party, which 
analysed and codified the demands which AKEL would put forward.   
In particular, the programme called for the abolition of the entire authoritarian legislative 
framework that had been introduced in the aftermath of the 1931 revolt. The programme 
specifically called for the establishment of civic rights: freedom of the press, freedom of speech, 
freedom of assembly and freedom of association.118 It further suggested the establishment of 
representative municipal and peasant councils, the introduction of responsible government on the 
island, and the founding of a  Parliament elected with universal voting, its composition 
proportional to the population of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities. Moreover, it 
called for the enactment of extensive protective labour legislation and the introduction of 
                                                 
115 NA, FCO 141/2736, formation of Cyprus Workers' Reform Party, Postal Censor’s report, 14 April 1941; 
Anexartitos, ‘Yesterday’s meeting for the foundation of a political party of principles’, 15 April 1941. 
116 It appears that 24 of the 36 participants in the meeting were members of the KKK, while in terms of profession 
the breakdown was the following: nine were workers; four were artisans or shopkeepers; one was involved with 
agriculture; seven were lawyers; five were journalists; four were doctors or pharmacists; two were teachers; and four 
were involved with trade. Strikingly, Turkish-Cypriots were not represented at the meeting. NA, FCO 141/2736, 
Commissioner of Police to the Colonial Secretary, 30 April 1941; Anexartitos, ibid.; Panayiotou, 1999, pp. 342-343; 
Adams, 1971, p. 23. 
117 NA, CO 67/314/14, Reports on the Working People's Reform Party, Commissioner of Police to the Colonial 
Secretary, 9 October 1941; Anexartitos, ‘Report of the Central Committee of AKEL’, 6 December 1941. 
118 See Πρόγραμμα και Καταστατικό του Ανορθωτικού Κόμματος Εργαζόμενου Λαού [Programme and constitution of 
the Progressive Party of Working People] (Limassol: 1941). 
193 
 
measures for the protection of the peasantry. Furthermore, the programme suggested the 
establishment of universal compulsory education for children up to the age of 14, and a series of 
reforms on government economic policy, most importantly on the taxation regulatory 
framework. Notably, the programme asked for ‘recognition of the national status’ of the Greek- 
and Turkish-Cypriot communities, for education based on national traditions and consciousness, 
and for the lifting of the restrictions on the archiepiscopal election. Most demands stipulated in 
the programme were repeated in a proclamation addressed to the Cypriot people by the 
Congress. In its first public statement, AKEL called on all political forces to unite on the side of 
the Allies against fascism and for the financial support of Greeks and other peoples under 
attack.119  
 The Congress thus suggested a number of reforms for the democratization of the 
administration and the improvement of the living conditions of the population, especially the 
lower strata. Moreover, AKEL’s programme revealed its new policy towards the Church and its 
new position on the national question. In contrast with the party’s newspaper Anexartitos, the 
programme did not specifically call for enosis, as this could cause the proscription of the party. 
After all, many KKK cadres were still opposed to the idea and favoured an opening up of the 
new party to the Turkish-Cypriot community. The reference to a national status and conscience 
of the Greek-Cypriot community, however, constituted a major departure from the KKK’s 
position.120 In the following months, the party would call more openly for enosis in its addresses 
to the colonial authorities, while the demand was directly promoted in public speeches and the 
left-wing press.   
An important factor for this change in the party line, as well as for the opening up to non-
communist allies, was undoubtedly the new policy of the Communist International, as decided at 
its Seventh Congress in 1935. The KKK had been a member of the Comintern since 1931, and 
the organization’s strategy was then inviting communist parties to seek and form popular fronts 
with all forces that opposed fascism, regardless of their class identity.121 The Comintern 
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Congress had further decided that in colonies and semi-colonies, communist parties should first 
participate in the national-liberation struggle for a proletarian revolution.122          
 Nevertheless, the national question was a point of disagreement within the party, 
reflecting debates that had started within the illegal KKK and were now brought over to the new 
party. The initial question revolved around the composition of AKEL's leadership. One group 
contended that this should consist mainly of communists, who would secure the organizational, 
political and ideological purity of the new party. Others warned that the new party, in order to 
become a truly mass party, should court the active participation of non-communists and open up 
to the dominant discourse of nationalism. As indicated by the composition of the first Central 
Committee of AKEL, the former group eventually prevailed. From the very first steps of the 
party, however, the ideological shift on the national question was clearly visible. Together with 
its desire to represent the Cypriot working class and the lower strata as a whole, the new party 
also attempted to emerge as the leading political force of the Greek-Cypriot national-liberation 
struggle. Despite its attempts to include Turkish-Cypriots in the party procedures, and its 
constant assurances that a potential union with Greece would benefit Turkish-Cypriots as well, 
their participation in the party remained limited, in contrast with the bi-communal character of 
the labour movement.123   
Soon after its foundation, AKEL was involved in the establishment of a number of 
affiliated organizations, such as women’s and educational associations. The trade unions, 
however, remained its main source of support and the primary target for its recruiting efforts.124 
A month after the party’s first Congress, the Second Pan-Cypriot Trade Union Conference was 
held in Nicosia on 16 November 1941. The conference was attended by 194 delegates 
representing the 7500 workers that were organized in 66 trade unions across the island. The 
conference proceedings were preoccupied with labour and organizational issues and the anti-
fascist struggle. The conference also self-critically discussed the low participation of women and 
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Turkish-Cypriots in the trade unions.125 Although membership numbers are not broken down 
according to communal affiliation, there is evidence that the participation of Turkish-Cypriots in 
the labour movement was much higher than in trade unions, compared to the respective rate 
among Greek-Cypriots. Most importantly, the Conference decided to introduce the organization 
of the unions according to a federal model. The Παγκύπρια Συντεχνιακή Επιτροπή [Pan-Cypriot 
Trade Union Committee – PSE] was founded to serve as a central body for all Cypriot unions. Its 
foundation allowed the effective cooperation between the island’s trade unions, and the PSE 
would henceforth play a crucial role in the organization of the labour movement. Furthermore, 
the foundation of the PSE led to the establishment of connections between the labour movement 
in Cyprus and labour organizations abroad. Over the objections of the colonial authorities, the 
PSE members represented the Cypriot unions at the World Trade Union Conferences held in 
London and Paris in 1945 and other international events.126  
The founding of the PSE not only reflected the organizational progress of trade unionism 
in Cyprus, but also signalled its institutionalization, both in terms of its internal operational 
structure and in its correlation to the state. According to the charter of the PSE, all district trade 
union committees had to follow the decisions of the body. Furthermore, the PSE organized 
campaigns against gambling and alcohol abuse and prohibited both in trade union premises, 
while it occasionally imposed sanctions on trade union members who did not comply with 
respective instructions. It also set up libraries and formed educational and theatrical associations, 
administered by workers.127 At the same time, the federation’s role was to be formally 
recognized by the government, as indicated by its participation in the committee set up by the 
government in late 1942 to suggest measures for the decrease in the cost of living. In 1947, the 
successor organization to the PSE would again be invited to participate in the Consultative 
Assembly. In other words, the PSE functioned as an institution on two levels: on one hand, it 
acted as a central guiding body to trade unionism on the island, and applied a set of social rules 
that regulated its members’ behaviour; on the other, it was recognized both by the public and the 
colonial government as the institution that represented the Cypriot working class.   
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4.4 Intra-communal and Inter-communal Divisions: The Impact on Labour Politics 
In the years after the foundation of AKEL, during the period when the party operated in parallel 
with the KKK, another dispute emerged besides the disagreement on the national question. The 
question was whether both parties should continue their parallel course, with the underground 
KKK guiding AKEL, or whether the former should dissolve. The dispute culminated in 1943 and 
1944, and was finally resolved in 1945, with the dissolution of the KKK and its incorporation 
into AKEL. The majority opinion among KKK cadres contended that AKEL could not be 
considered as a communist party but rather as a broad petit-bourgeois organization that therefore 
needed the KKK’s guidance. Conversely, a minority of the KKK’s leadership that included 
Servas considered AKEL a proletarian party, which shared the same programme with the KKK, 
and argued that any weaknesses in line would be gradually surpassed.128   
On a second level, the growing appeal of AKEL among the population meant that the 
debate would complicate election strategies and alliances.129 In March 1943, Servas was elected 
mayor of Limassol while still serving as the General Secretary of the KKK and AKEL. 
Following his election, he refused to comply with the decision of AKEL that he move to Nicosia, 
where the party’s headquarters were. The issue was eventually resolved in July 1945, when the 
Central Committee of AKEL stripped him of his position as General Secretary and expelled him 
from the party. The Central Committee accused Servas of repeatedly ignoring party decisions 
and of having formed a faction in opposition to the party majority.130 The decision was put to a 
vote at the fourth Congress of AKEL a month later and it was approved by the delegates. The 
Congress allowed Servas to return to the party, but it denied him the right to be candidate for any 
important party position.131 Fifis Ioannou was elected to the position of the General Secretary.   
                                                 
128 ASKI, F-20/21/14, ‘A brief report’. 
129 The party membership was also growing rapidly. The 220 members of the KKK and AKEL in 1941 rose to 3,224 
in May 1942 and to 5,000 by 1945. NA, FCO 141/2606, Commissioner of Police’s report on communism, 2 
February 1942; ASKI, F-20/21/14, ‘A brief report’; Katsourides, 2014, p. 186. 
130 ASKI, F-20/21/40, AKEL’s report, ‘The course of the Cypriot movement’, 6 August 1951; Anexartitos, ‘On the 
question of the removal of Ploutis Servas from AKEL, Communiqué of the Central Committee’, 3 August 1945.   
131 Anexartitos, ‘The proceedings of the Fourth Congress of AKEL are finished’ 21 August 1945. The decision for 
Servas’ return to AKEL was taken due to the great personal influence he had acquired in Limassol during his term 
as mayor. His personal network was also the reason for the decision of his party opponents to demand his relocation 
to Nicosia, as well as for his own refusal. Although Servas’ relations with the party worsened in the following 
period, AKEL was forced to support him at the May 1946 municipal elections as well, and secure his re-election as 
mayor. Clientelist politics and local rivalries remained a standard feature of Cyprus’ political and social life, 
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During the same period, the debate on the parallel operation of two parties peaked in 
intensity, before the line in favour of dissolving the KKK prevailed. In August 1944, 16 
members of the Central Committee of the KKK resigned and elected a five-member caretaker 
committee, which organized the fifth Congress of the party. The introductory text of the 
committee questioned AKEL’s credentials as the vanguard of the working class, because of the 
active participation of opportunistic and petit-bourgeois elements in the party - a development 
for which the caretaker committee held Servas responsible.132 The report of the committee was 
also very self-critical with regards to past policies of the KKK. Most importantly, it considered 
the position for an independent socialist Cyprus as a mistake. It had constituted treachery to the 
Cypriot people, denied its right to self-determination and justified Britain’s imperialist 
exploitation of the island. The report, in line with AKEL’s official position, stated that the KKK 
should have adopted the slogan of enosis, and have led the people’s struggle for self-
determination. Three months later, the Fifth and final Congress of the KKK decided its 
amalgamation with AKEL.   
Despite the dynamic promotion of enosis by AKEL, which sealed the increasing 
homogenization of Greek-Cypriot politics on the national question, the political confrontation 
within the Greek-Cypriot community between the Left and the Right was constantly growing. 
The growing appeal of the Left and the affiliation between the PSE and AKEL – manifest in the 
PSE’s participation in the party’s election campaign in 1943 – alarmed the Greek-Cypriot 
nationalist elite. The foundation of the Cypriot National Party (KEK), immediately after the 
elections, was followed by the formation of trade unions independent of the PSE. The Νέες 
Συντεχνίες [New Trade Unions], supported by the Greek-Cypriot elite and many employers, 
acquired a clearly nationalist and anti-communist character.133 In October 1944, the 20 New 
Trade Unions amalgamated into the Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Κύπρου [Cyprus Workers’ 
Confederation – SEK], while in the same period the Third Pan-Cypriot Trade Union Conference 
formally placed the PSE under the guidance of AKEL.134 Although the levels of participation in 
                                                                                                                                                             
applying equally to both the Greek- and the Turkish-Cypriot communities. In the Greek-Cypriot community’s case, 
this was predominantly demonstrated at the long-lasting rivalry between local Orthodox Bishoprics and was 
manifested in trade unionism as well, causing occasional criticism by trade unionists. 
132 Katsourides, 2014, p. 190. 
133 See newspapers I foni ton Neon Sintechnion [The New Trade Unions’ voice] and Ergatiki Foni [Labour Voice], 
published by the New Trade Unions and the SEK. 
134 Proceedings of the Third Pan-Cypriot Trade Union Conference, 24-25 September 1944, p. 80.  
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the new body remained low until 1949, as shown in the following table, its appearance 
constituted the beginning of a schism within the labour movement, reflecting the growing 
polarization within Greek-Cypriot politics.   
 




1944 10619 735 
1945137 12961 1032 
1946 11101 991 
1947 11259 1145 
1948 9604 2641 
1949 9447 3599 
1950 10581 2625 
 
 The schism would be consolidated in the 1950s, but was already evident in the second 
half of the 1940s, most notably during two major events of Cyprus’ political history. Following 
the policy of the Greek-Cypriot elite, the SEK would take a neutral, if not favourable, position on 
government action against the PSE in 1945-1946, while both bodies would follow party lines on 
the convocation of the Consultative Assembly in 1947-1948. Their support of different means of 
struggle, the mutual accusations and the encouragement and recruitment of strike breakers from 
the SEK would cause frequent tensions between the federations.138 The growing polarization of 
Greek-Cypriot politics, which echoed the civil confrontation in Greece, culminated during the 
                                                 
135 The PEO was the Federation which succeeded the PSE in 1946. See next section. 
136 Sources: Proceedings of the Third, Fourth and Seventh Pan-Cypriot Trade Union Conferences, held in 1944, 
1946 and 1952 respectively, which contain data taken from the Trade Union Registry; NA, FCO 141/2819, KEK, 
government report on the party and the organizations affiliated to it, 22 June 1949.   
137 In 1945-46, the eight trade unions that were not affiliated with either federation were formed. They had around 
650 members in total, reaching about 800 in 1947 and falling to around 700 in 1948.   
138 Eleftheria, ‘The work continues in Asbestos’, 4 August 1948. 
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second half of the decade. The period after 1947 was marked by the participation of AKEL and 
the Pan-Cypriot Labour Federation (PEO) in the Consultative Assembly, as well as the election 
of Makarios II as Archbishop. In 1948, a year of extensive labour unrest on the island, there were 
numerous confrontations between the PEO and the SEK members, with the latter opposing the 
strikes and protests organized by the Left. By the end of the decade Cypriot trade unionism 
would be fully incorporated into the cold-war context. In late 1949, following the split within the 
World Federation of Trade Unions, the SEK joined the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions, while the PEO remained under WFTU.139  
 In the same period, the strengthening of the calls for enosis from all Greek-Cypriot 
political forces, and the prevalence of the nationalist modernist Turkish-Cypriot leadership in the 
municipal elections set the context for a second secession from the PSE. As discussed in Chapter 
3, a few weeks after the elections, the traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite and the modernist 
leadership proceeded to establish the Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus 
(KATAK). In May 1943, the new party encouraged the formation of separate Turkish-Cypriot 
trade unions, federated under the Lefkosa Türk Amele Birliği [Nicosia Turkish Workers Union – 
LTAB).140 Soon after its formation, and in line with the KATAK’s policy, the LTAB complained 
to the Labour Adviser about the difficulties that Turkish-Cypriots faced in finding work, due to 
the fact that the majority of public works supervisors were Greek-Cypriots. The LTAB proposed 
a set of regulations to be adopted by the government to secure their equal employment with 
Greek-Cypriots. The proposals were rejected, and the Labour Adviser assured the petitioners that 
Turkish-Cypriot applications for work in government departments were treated equally to those 
of Greek-Cypriots. The Adviser urged the LTAB leadership to cooperate with the bigger trade 
unions affiliated to the PSE on labour issues so as to maximize the possibilities of achieving their 
demands.141   
                                                 
139 Grigoriades, 1994, p. 351. 
140 The party also encouraged the foundation of the Turkish Farmers Association, whose members seceded from the 
Pan-Cypriot Farmers’ Union (PEK), a right-wing association founded in May 1942 by well-off farmers with the 
support of the Greek-Cypriot elite. Ahmet An, Kıbrıslı Türklerin Siyasal Tarihi (1930-1960) [Turkish-Cypriots’ 
Political History (1930-1960)] (Nicosia: Özyay, 2006), 137; Eleftheria, ‘The resolution of the Pan-Cypriot Rural 
Conference in Athienou’, 1 June 1942; Anexartitos, ‘The rural conference: the real aims of the union’, 2 June 1942.  
141 CSA, SA1/658/1943/1, LTAB to the Labour Adviser, 8 August 1943; Labour Adviser’s reports, 31 January 1944 
and 11 September 1945.  
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 A year later, after the modernist Turkish-Cypriot leadership seceded from the KATAK in 
April 1944 and founded the Turkish Cypriot National Union Party (KTMBP), the new party 
encouraged the formation of the Turkish Trade Unions, which were soon federated under the 
Association of Turkish Trade Unions of Cyprus (KTIBK). The Turkish-Cypriot federation 
initially consisted of seven unions, which absorbed the majority of the LTAB membership.142 
Similarly to the LTAB, the KTIBK and district Turkish-Cypriot unions stressed the oppression 
of their community by Greek-Cypriots, denounced the inequality in employment opportunities 
and the promotion of enosis by municipal authorities, and expressed its support for the reforms 
on communal administration that were being promoted in the same period by the KTMBP.143 
Following in large part the political line of the KTMBP and mirroring the SEK, the KTIBK 
developed a nationalist and anti-communist discourse. As in the latter’s case, however, the 
KTIBK was largely unsuccessful in absorbing Turkish-Cypriot workers from the PSE (after 1946 
PEO). In 1945, the PSE counted 629 Turkish-Cypriots, compared to 843 registered KTIBK 
members, while in the following years membership in the KTIBK dropped constantly, as shown 
in the following table.144 Nevertheless, in 1945, overall Turkish-Cypriot membership in trade 
unions was about twice as low as that of Greek-Cypriots in 1945, compared to each community’s 
population.145 Thus, despite the second secession, the PSE and the labour movement as a whole 
retained its bi-communal character throughout the period under scrutiny. Turkish-Cypriots 






                                                 
142 An, 2006, pp. 145, 155 and 279; NA, FCO 141/2794, Proposals to establish separate Turkish branches of trades 
unions, May – December 1944.  
143 CSA, SA1/658/1943/2, memoranda to the Colonial Secretary by the General secretaries of the Larnaca and 
Nicosia and Kyrenia Turkish Trade Unions, 8 May 1946.  
144 Proceedings of the Fourth Pan-Cypriot Trade Union Conference, 1946, p. 27. 
145 Calculation based on the 1946 census. John-Jones, 1983, p. 60. 
146 See Pantelis Varnava, Κοινοί εργατικοί αγώνες Ελληνοκυπρίων και Τουρκοκυπρίων [Common labour struggles of 
Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots] (Nicosia: 2004), pp. 49-58.  
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Table 5. Membership in the KTIBK147 








   
During the same period, the labour movement united in an unprecedentedly large-scale 
strike, which constituted a critical moment in wartime relations between the government and the 
Left. The so-called ‘cost of living strike’ lasted from 1 to 23 March 1944 and involved 1800 
workers. The strike represented the culmination of the protests of Cypriot workers against the 
increase of the cost of living. These had started in early December 1942 with a strike of workers 
at defence works, demanding the readjustment of salaries in proportion with the price index. By 
the end of the month, the government responded by forming a committee on the cost of living 
composed of representatives of the government and the PSE as well as prominent figures of the 
                                                 
147 Sources: Proceedings of the Third, Fourth and Seventh Pan-Cypriot Trade Union Conferences; NA, FCO 
141/2819, KEK, government report on the party and the organizations affiliated to it, 22 June 1949; History of the 
PSE-PEO, 1991, pp. 250-252. Notably, in 1954 the KTIBK counted 700 members, compared to 1700 Turkish-
Cypriots registered in trade unions affiliated to the PEO.  
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Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities.148 Following the failure of the committee to reach a 
decision, due to disagreements among its members, protests continued throughout 1943. They 
culminated on 1 March 1944, with a strike in the Army and Public Works Department in 
Nicosia, Famagusta and Larnaca. The strike, organized by the PSE, was principally supported by 
AKEL, but also by the KEK, the SEK, professional associations, leading political figures of the 
island, such as the Locum Tenens Leontios and Fazil Küçük, as well as the majority of the 
Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot press.149   
Despite the unanimous support the strikers received, the government declined to address 
their demands. After 11 days on strike, and following an unsuccessful meeting between the PSE 
and the Colonial Secretary, the government announced its intention to consider a review of 
wages in relation to the cost of living.150 The PSE, however, decided to harden its stance, and 
called for a one-day general strike. On 13 March, about 4000 employees at the War Department 
joined the strikers, and were joined by railway employees, as well as most Greek- and Turkish-
Cypriot newspapers.151 A week later, the strike entered a new stage when the government 
decided to fire the strikers and continue work on military schemes with the help of soldiers from 
the Cyprus Volunteer Force Reserve Company.152 On the following day, the leadership of the 
PSE met again with the Colonial Secretary, who assured them of the formation of a new 
committee, which would debate measures for the decrease of the cost of living, and guaranteed 
that the strikers would not be dismissed from employment. The PSE eventually terminated the 
strike and work resumed on 24 March. The action demonstrated the dynamics of the bi-
communal labour movement and the pressure it could exert on the government.153   
                                                 
148 Anexartitos, ‘The defence works strike and the price index’, 24 December 1942. For the composition of the 
Committee, see Pan-Cypriot Labour Federation, Αγώνες για τον τιμάριθμο 1940-44 [Struggles for the price index 
1940-44], (Nicosia: PEO publications, 1984), p. 15.    
149 Anexartitos, ‘Locum Tenens and the struggle of the public works employees’, 1 March 1944; Eleftheria, ‘The 
strike and the National Party’, 6 March 1944; Neos Kypriakos Phylax, ‘The strike’, 8 March 1944. 
150 Neos Kypriakos Phylax, ‘The Colonial Secretary rejected the strikers’ demands’, 8 March 1944.  
151 Anexartitos, ‘Yesterday’s pan-labour protest strike’, 14 March 1944; Yiangou, 2012, p. 119. 
152 NA, CO 67/323/2, political report for March 1944; Eleftheria, ‘The replacement of strikers started yesterday’, 21 
March 1944. 
153 NA, CO 67/327/10, Labour unrest and establishment of wages commission, Governor to the Colonial Secretary, 
21 March 1944. The strike and its bi-communal character left strong memories with the strikers. One of the 
participants, Alexandros Petrou, wrote 40 years later: ‘[At Famagusta square] everybody seeing us, both Greeks and 
Turks, were applauding us. This was happening every day’. Similarly, Anna Pitsili recalled: ‘The solidarity and 
donations of Greeks and Turks … were so moving that they will always live in our memory’. Manuscripts of 
various leading figures of the struggle of 1st March, collection of the PEO, mid-1980s, manuscript of Alexandros 
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In the same period, lower and middle-class Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots participated in 
the parochial committees of the municipality of Limassol, established in early 1944 on the 
initiative of the mayor Ploutis Servas.154 On his election, Servas stated that both the Greek and 
the Turkish flags would be flown at the Town Hall, while his overall policy had gained the 
support of the Turkish-Cypriot municipal councillors. This development caused the reaction of 
the Kemalist press, which called upon the community to isolate AKEL members and 
sympathizers from within.155 In the following years, the continuation of joint labour 
mobilizations led to the signing of the Collaboration Protocol between the PEO and the KTIBK 
on 8 January 1948. The agreement provided for the formation of district committees composed 
of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, which would coordinate joint activities; both federations 
pledged to support each other in labour disputes. It also provided for the formation of a pan-
Cypriot Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot committee, which would attempt to resolve disputes 
between trade unions, in the hope of improving relations between the two communities. 
Furthermore, the protocol invited Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot workers to general assemblies to 
be held in all towns, and denounced ‘the racial hatred and the racial discrimination from 
wherever it may come as a weapon in the exploiters’ hands for the disruption of the working 
class’.156 The agreement reflected the political experience of the labour movement of the 
previous two decades, while its very provision for the improvement of the overall inter-
communal relations reflected the significance of the bi-communal labour movement as a political 




                                                                                                                                                             
Petrou and transcription of Anna Pitsili’s speech at the Fourth PEO Limassol Conference of female employees on 20 
February 1984. 
154 The parochial committee of Arnaoutia was presided over by a Turkish-Cypriot carpenter and consisted of three 
more members, a tavern owner, a barber and a boatman. The Castro-Ayios Antonios parochial committee was also 
presided over by a Turkish-Cypriot tailor and consisted of two other members, a convenience store owner and a 
tailor. Katsiaounis, 2000, pp. 179-180. 
155 Anexartitos, ‘The new Municipal authorities took office’, 2 April 1943; NA, CO 67/314/12, Political situation: 
monthly reports from the Governor, report for October 1943. 
156 The agreement is cited in Varnava, 2004, pp. 22-25. 
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4.5 New Government Policy, Inter-communal Cooperation and Intra-communal 
Polarization 
In the spring of 1945, as the Second World War was coming to its end, the government 
dramatically changed its previously tolerant attitude towards the Left. Measures resembling the 
ones that had been implemented during the 1930s were introduced again on the island. These 
included the restriction of press freedom and proscription of trade unions. The police also began 
dispersing public meetings again. The first signs of this change of policy appeared in March, on 
the occasion of the anniversary of the Greek War of Independence.157   
 A few days before the 25 March anniversary, the organizers of the celebrations in the 
village of Lefkoniko had agreed to let a schoolmaster give a speech at the churchyard after the 
service, on the understanding that the event would have no political character. After the speech, 
however, an AKEL member attempted to speak at the gathering, triggering the reaction of the 
right-wing attendees. After a minor dispute and some pushing most of the right-wing attendees 
left and gathered at a local right-wing club. The rest of the crowd, around 200 AKEL members, 
marched towards their own offices, following a route which led them across a small bridge 
opposite the right-wing club.158 Before a physical confrontation could break out, the police 
intervened, ordering the crowd to disperse, and opened fire, killing three people and wounding 
several others.159   
Immediately after the incident, the authorities ordered all newspaper editors to refrain 
from publishing news on the event until an official enquiry was opened. The government 
appointed a Commission of Enquiry, which failed to produce a unanimous report, even after 
conducting daily hearings for more than a month.160 Although the event gave rise to severe 
criticism against the government in the House of Commons, the Governor described the incident 
                                                 
157 Direct action against the KKK and trade union members had occasionally occurred during the war years, often 
drawing criticism to government by Labour MPs. In mid-1940, a KKK member was sentenced to six months’ hard 
labour and another one to a fine of £10 for possession of communist propaganda. In late 1942, seven trade union 
members were sentenced to 18 months imprisonment each for causing threatening injury to a strike-breaker. NA, 
FCO 141/2606, Commissioner of Police’s Intelligence reports on Communism, 1/6 and 20 July 1940; Hansard, 
House of Common Debates, 385 (25 November 1942), cc. 742-3W, question by Denis Pritt; Kypriaka Nea (Cypriot 
News), ‘News from Cyprus and Activities of the Committee for Cyprus Autonomy’, 22 January 1943. 
158 Yiangou, 2012, p. 155. 
159 Anexartitos, ‘How police shot against the celebrating crowd’, 29 March 1945. 
160 NA, CO 67/324/1, Disorders in Lefkonico Village, Commission of Enquiry’s report, 19 June 1945. 
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as isolated, and saw it as further proof that the government should close down all trade union 
premises. The colonial authorities chose not to release the commission’s report to the public.161   
Less than two months after the Lefkoniko incident, the government’s repressive actions 
reached a climax. On 11 May 1945, the police raided the offices of AKEL, of its recently 
founded youth wing Ανορθωτική Οργάνωση Νεολαίας [Progressive Youth Organization – 
AON], of trade unions and of several educational associations affiliated to the party.162 Four days 
later, the colonial authorities announced charges against the leadership of the PSE, having 
gathered a vast amount of material. In January 1946, after the largest political trial in Cyprus’ 
history, the organization was dissolved and its leadership imprisoned.  
 The government justified its actions by claiming that the PSE was ‘the nucleus of 
Communism and of Enosis’.163 The search had allegedly uncovered illegal documents that 
included directions for inciting the population of the colony to seditious activities.164 The PSE 
itself was considered unlawful, as it was not registered as a trade union under the 1941 Trade 
Union Law. Following the government action, the court of Assizes tried and convicted 18 leaders 
of the PSE on a series of charges under the Criminal Code.165 First came the conduct of 
propaganda in support for the violent overthrow of the government and the constitution of 
Cyprus. Second, the incitement of hatred and disaffection among the population against the 
government, with the purpose of removing British sovereignty over the island. Finally, the 
promotion of strife and hostility between different groups and classes of the population.166 After 
a 34-day trial, the 18 trade union leaders were convicted on 21 January 1946, and given prison 
sentences of up to 18 months. The PSE was declared illegal and dissolved. A few days later, the 
                                                 
161 In April 1945, the Labour MP and future Secretary of State Arthur Creech Jones questioned government’s 
handling of the situation, especially with regards to the police action and the ban on the press. A few weeks later, 
Jones had a meeting with AKEL cadres in London, during which the question of enosis was discussed, among other 
issues. His stance was reluctantly favourable, yet it allowed AKEL to consider him as one of their strong allies in 
Britain. Anexartitos, ‘The Cypriot labour delegation in London’, 3 May 1945; Yiangou, 2012, p. 156. 
162 Eleftheria, ‘Police search in AKEL clubs and trade unions’, 12 May 1945; NA, FCO 141/2894, police search of 
AKEL premises, Solicitor General to the Attorney General, 25 October 1945; NA, FCO 141/2942, AON, youth 
organisation of the AKEL, Governor Woolley to Secretary of State George Hall, 1 November 1945. 
163 NA, CO 67/323/5, Future status of Cyprus and prosecution of trade unionists, Governor’s note, November or 
December 1945.   
164 NA, CO 67/323/8, Prosecution of Pan-Cyprian Trades Union Committee, Under-Secretary of State’s note, end of 
1945. 
165 Anexartitos, ‘The PSE’s members are led before the court accused for conspiracy’, 14 July 1945.  
166 Eleftheria, ‘The trade unions’ trial’, 16 January 1946; ‘The Nicosia Assize Court’s judgment on the trade union 
leaders’ case’, 22 January 1946. 
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convicted trade union leaders applied for appeal from the Assize judgment to the Supreme Court, 
which was refused.      
  The trial caused a strong reaction in public opinion, both in Cyprus and abroad. Strikes 
and demonstrations took place in all towns of the island during and after the trial and fundraising 
campaigns were organized for the coverage of the judicial costs and the support of the families of 
the accused.167 Right-wing organizations, however, warmly welcomed the prosecution of the 
PSE. Some expressed publicly their relief at the imprisonment of the trade union leaders, while 
the SEK abstained from all solidarity demonstrations.168 The same attitude was held by right-
wing newspapers, such as Nea Politiki Epitheorisi [New Political Review] and Esperini (The 
Evening Standard). At the same time, AKEL and the transitional central trade union committee 
that was formed after the arrest of the trade union leaders attempted to attract extensive publicity 
to the prosecution of the PSE and the trial. They despatched memoranda to the Greek Trade 
Union Confederation (GSEE), the British Labour Party, the British Trades Union Congress 
(TUC), the World Federation of Trade Unions and also to the Governor and the Colonial 
Office.169 Similar telegrams were sent by the Committee for Cyprus Affairs, which represented 
the Greek-Cypriot community in London and was controlled by AKEL.170     
 The outcome of the trial and the conduct of the government were highly criticized by 
members of the House of Commons who belonged to the governing Labour Party. A few weeks 
after the trial the Labour MP Leslie Solley questioned the democratic nature of the trial’s 
conduct and denounced the overall authoritarian labour policy of the Cyprus government.171 In 
parallel, dozens of protest petitions were sent to the British government and the House of 
                                                 
167 NA, CO 67/323/4, report on political situation, January 1946; History of the PSE-PEO, 1991, p. 99. 
168 As the Governor noted, all organizations opposing the Left were relieved by the prosecution of the PSE, hoping 
that the government would prosecute all organizations affiliated to AKEL. NA, CO 67/323/4, Governor’s report, 
May 1945; Efimeris, ‘The voice of the facts – communist cynicism’, 14 September 1946.   
169 The World Federation of Trade Unions was also informed about the PSE’s prosecution personally by Michalis 
Montanios, General Secretary of the transitional PSE, who, together with Miltiades Christodoulou, represented the 
Cypriot trade unions at the First World Trade Union Conference, held in Paris in October 1945. CSA, 
SA1/876/1945, report on World Trade Union Conference, October 1945.  
170 NA, CO 67/323/5, Committee for Cyprus Affairs to the Secretary of State, Oliver Stanley, 26 June 1945; 
Anexartitos, ‘The charges against the PSE’, 29 June 1945. 
171 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 420 (5 March 1946), cc. 298-306, question by Solley. 
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Commons by British trade unions and committees, while similar criticism was expressed by part 
of the international press.172  
 For Cypriot politics, the trial signalled the culmination of the government policy to 
control collective action and encapsulated the growing cold-war confrontation on the island. 
Both the colonial authorities and the Greek-Cypriot elite and right-wing organizations regarded 
the Left as their greatest political opponent. The PSE represented the most militant part of 
Cypriot society. The large-scale strikes and protests organized by the body represented a militant 
left-wing socio-political programme in opposition to British rule on the island. The activities of 
the PSE had alienated the Cypriot working class from the government and challenged the 
influence of the island’s political elites. By the end of 1945, there were 143 registered trade 
unions with a total membership of about 13,000 workers - the vast majority affiliated with PSE. 
Moreover, in September 1944, the federation had formally adopted the demand of enosis at its 
Third Conference, mainly due to its affiliation with AKEL.173 In the context of the colonial 
authorities’ policy against communism - which in this period was seen by the government as the 
equivalent of Greek-Cypriot nationalism - the trial served as a prosecuting mechanism against 
AKEL. The post-war climate, which was not easily compatible with direct repression, coupled 
with the lack of sufficient evidence, deterred the government from directly going after the party, 
although this was often discussed during this period. Conversely, taking recourse to the courts 
could even temporarily justify the prosecution of an organization that was considered as an 
AKEL front and demonstrate government decisiveness to restrict communist activities.174   
Pressure from British trade unions and Labour MPs, however, proved effective. In 
October 1946, ten months after their imprisonment, the government was eventually forced to 
release the trade union leaders.175 The release of the PSE’s leadership was considered as a great 
success for the Left, which recognized the significance which the intervention of the Labour 
Party, in government since July 1945, had on Cyprus government policy. Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
172 See indicatively NA, CO 67/323/10, Prosecution of Pan-Cyprian Trades Union Committee, article in the 
Palestinian newspaper The Palestine Post, 29 March 1946; article in the Italian weekly journal Otzi, 23 April 1946; 
articles in the Russian newspapers Evening Moscow and New Times, 18 April 1946 and 1 May 1946 respectively. 
NA, CO 67/323/5, Hemel Hampstead and District Trades’ Council to the Foreign Minister, 30 July 1946. 
173 Proceedings of the Third Pan-Cypriot Trade Union Conference, p. 33. 
174 NA, CO 537/2482, Trades Unions: Formation of a General Council, Acting Governor to the Secretary of State, 
21 February 1946.  
175 NA, FCO 141/4679, Communist Party activities in Nicosia district, Colonial Secretary to the Commissioner of 
Nicosia, 24 July 1948; Eleftheria, ‘The 18 trade unionists were released’, 19 October 1946. 
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change of government in Britain would not bring about much differentiation in the overall 
British colonial policy, including the attitude of the authorities towards trade unionism. Besides, 
229 out of 393 Labour MPs, many of them ministers, belonged to the Fabian Society, and they 
exercised a great influence on the labour politics of the government in the colonies. Published in 
June 1942, the Society’s suggestions on trade unions in the colonies were based on the 
Orientalist discourse of colonial inferiority. They included the view that ‘[in the colonies] 
workers remained primitive’ and thus trade unionism could not function in a way similar to that 
in Britain.176 The overall policy that the new government intended to follow on the island was 
largely based on the Society’s Colonial Bureau, founded in 1940 by the later Secretary of State 
Arthur Creech Jones (1946-1950). In October 1945, the Bureau issued a short report dealing 
specifically with Cyprus, Malta and Hong Kong.177 As in all British colonies, the Labour 
government policy in Cyprus would essentially be indistinguishable from that of its 
predecessor.178         
 In this context, the Cyprus government’s attempts to control the labour movement and 
restrict the appeal of the Left in general continued throughout the 1940s, especially after the 
dissolution of the Consultative Assembly in August 1948. Nevertheless, the trade unions 
adjusted successfully to the new circumstances, as indicated by the dynamics of the labour 
movement during the second half of the 1940s and Left’s victory in the 1946 municipal 
elections. Shortly after the dissolution of the PSE in March 1946, its former members convened 
the fourth pan-Cypriot trade union Conference and decided to found a successor organization, 
the Pan-Cypriot Labour Federation (PEO). The members of the Conference were preoccupied 
with the question of how to cope under the new conditions, and debated at length the goals of the 
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labour movement.179 Moreover, the Conference approved the right of trade union members to 
participate in any political organization apart from fascist parties and decided the PEO’s 
organizational independence from AKEL. Finally, it declared the PEO’s commitment to the 
struggle for self-determination and enosis, despite the disagreements posed by Turkish-Cypriot 
representatives. The success of the PEO to re-establish itself as a representative body for the 
Cypriot workers was demonstrated by the invitation from the government to participate in the 
Consultative Assembly a few months later. Nevertheless, the proceedings of the Assembly also 
demonstrated the affiliation of the federation with AKEL, with the PEO aligning itself with the 
party’s positions. That practice would be maintained in the following years.     
 
Culmination of Labour Unrest and Inter-communal Solidarity 
Following the establishment of the PEO, the organization of trade unionism was enhanced. The 
dynamics of the labour movement reached a peak in 1948. The period witnessed three major bi-
communal strikes, marked by the cooperation between the PEO and the KTIBK. It also signalled 
the re-emergence of bitter confrontation between the PEO and the SEK, reflecting the conflict 
between the Left and the Right within Greek-Cypriot politics. The strikes lasted a total of 266 
days and involved about 4300 workers – miners employed by the Cyprus Mines Corporation and 
the Cyprus and General Asbestos Company and builders. From early on, the action developed 
into violent confrontation on one hand between the strikers and the employers and the 
government, and on the other, between strikers and strike-breakers. All three strikes were harshly 
suppressed by the police, with strikers facing dismissals, prison sentences and even forced 
displacements. According to Pantelis Varnava, who had participated in the strike against the 
CMC, 76 persons (including 17 Turkish-Cypriots and 15 women – wives of strikers) were 
imprisoned for up to two years.180 All three strikes ended with the partial achievement of the 
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workers’ demands. They attracted a great deal of interest from all political forces of the island 
and received wide coverage in the local and international press.181    
 The strike at the mines operated by the CMC in the district of Nicosia occurred first and 
lasted from January to May 1948. It probably constituted the most highly contested labour 
dispute in Cyprus’ history. The strike occurred in a highly polarized background, marked by the 
culmination of the Greek civil war, the election of ardent anti-communist Makarios II as 
Archbishop, and the passionate confrontation between the Cypriot Left and Right on the issue of 
the Consultative Assembly. As such, the strike itself soon took on a cold-war character.   
 In late December 1947, Robert Hendrix, serving as the representative of the CMC, 
rejected the workers’ demand for renewing the 1946 contract, which had just expired. One of the 
first moves of the PEO after the CMC’s decision was to approach the leadership of the KTIBK. 
A few days later, the two federations signed the Collaboration Protocol mentioned earlier. 
Committees from the two bodies and workers’ assemblies worked on the set of demands to be 
put forward. These included an eight-hour workday, wage increases, the establishment of 13 
working days every year as bank holidays, payment for overtime work and provision for better 
medical care.182 Following the rejection of the demands by the company, on 14 January, workers 
began a provisional five-day strike. The CMC reacted immediately; it suspended the distribution 
of milk to the workers’ children, and ordered those patients who were able to move to leave the 
company clinic.183 Following the end of the provisional strike, the workers’ assemblies decided 
to move on to an indefinite strike.   
 In early February, a large meeting was held in Nicosia, with the participation of 
representatives of the PEO, AKEL and other left organizations; representatives of the KTIBK 
and the KTMBP; representatives of the SEK and the newspaper Ethnos; representatives of left-
wing and Turkish-Cypriot newspapers; and representatives of the municipal councils of Nicosia, 
Famagusta and three villages.184 Notably, the KEK and most right-wing newspapers declined the 
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invitation to participate.185 The SEK representative denounced the strike, as instigated by the 
communists, and called for its termination; all other participants signed a resolution in support of 
the strikers.    
On 10 February, the PEO and the KTIBK called for a twenty-four hour general strike in 
support of the miners, while the PEO organized a fundraising campaign in support of the 
strike.186 Throughout the month, strikers confronted strike-breakers who were being provided 
mainly by the SEK and moved to the mines under the protection of armed police. The clashes 
added to the already polarized climate within the population. In early March, the newspaper of 
the Bishopric of Kyrenia, Efimeris [Newspaper], came out in support of the strike-breaking 
actions. Its editorial stressed: ‘MINERS! Kick the communists who exploit you and go back to 
work’.187 During the same period, the Archbishop issued a circular denouncing the communists 
for instigating the strike and urging the miners to terminate it. Similar appeals were made by the 
Turkish-Cypriot mayor of Lefka.188 It seems, however, that the escalation of the strike, the 
support of a great part of the population to the strikers and the harsh measures that the police 
took to protect the strike-breakers led to a decrease of the number of strike-breakers, with some 
of them eventually joining the strikers.189  
 In April, the president of the CMC Henry Mudd arrived in person from the United States 
to start negotiations for the end of the strike. The failure of the negotiations led most Greek- and 
Turkish-Cypriot strikers to submit a memorandum to the government, calling for its 
mediation.190 After a period of confrontation between all the involved parties, an agreement was 
finally reached in mid-May, with the achievement of part of the miners’ demands.   
 Less than three months later, in early August, a second strike broke out, organized by 
miners employed by the General Asbestos Company. The company operated on Mount Troodos, 
located in the centre of the island. The strike lasted one month and involved 1000 out of 4000 
workers in the mine. The action was supported by the PEO and opposed by the SEK, following a 
course similar to the CMC strike of the previous spring. Within a week of the strike, the police 
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had arrested approximately 100 strikers, who were sentenced to up to 40 days imprisonment. A 
prominent figure of the PEO was forced to leave the area of the mine on the company’s order 
and with the consent of the colonial administration.191 Notably, as the strike coincided with the 
dissolution of the Consultative Assembly, the miners took part in the demonstrations in favour of 
self-government that AKEL was organizing at the time.192 Again, the director of the Asbestos 
Company was forced to come to an agreement with the strikers, and at the end of August the 
strike was terminated with the greater part of the miners’ demands fulfilled.   
 Meanwhile, on 26 August, the pan-Cypriot trade union of builders, which was a member 
of the PEO, started a third strike. The strike involved around 800 workers, mainly in Nicosia. 
The builders were demanding a more favourable collective agreement with the contractors, 
which would replace the previous one, which had just expired. Again, with tensions rising in 
anticipation of the May 1949 municipal elections, the strike incited an acute confrontation 
between the PEO and the SEK as well as between the Left and the Right. Throughout the strike, 
the SEK supplied the contractors with strike-breakers, who were protected from attacks from 
strikers by the joint action of the police and members of the paramilitary organization Xhi. The 
violence escalated to the point where AKEL had to ask the Secretary of State to intervene.193 In 
late October, the SEK signed a separate agreement with the contractors, forcing the PEO, which 
now faced great financial difficulties in supporting the strike, to follow a few weeks later. The 
new agreement provided for the equal employment of workers from both the PEO and the SEK 
and fulfilled only a few of the strikers’ demands.  
 By the end of 1948, the schism within the labour movement had advanced significantly, 
and would be consolidated in the following years. At the same time, workers’ participation in the 
SEK was growing, decreasing its relative disadvantage to the PEO. The polarization of Greek-
Cypriot politics reached a peak in the period prior to the 1949 municipal elections, which 
signalled the prevalence of the ethnarchic enosist politics and the decrease of the Left’s appeal 
within the community. Furthermore, the strengthening of nationalist politics within both AKEL 
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and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership in the same period enhanced the ethnic divide in Cypriot 
society and prevented the effective collaboration between the PEO and the KTIBK in the 
following years. Nevertheless, the militancy of the bi-communal labour movement and AKEL, 
considered as the government’s greatest adversary already since early 1945, alarmed the 
Colonial and the Foreign Office. Consequently, the British started to supply the Cyprus 
authorities with anti-communist propaganda, mainly from Greece, Turkey and Britain, to be 
published in the anti-communist and pro-government Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot newspapers on 
the island.194   
Most importantly, in April 1948, after the theft of about 20,000 sticks of dynamite during 
the CMC strike, the Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME) prepared a very detailed and well 
informed 90-page report on AKEL’s activities. The report was then forwarded to the colonial 
authorities, the War Office and the Security Service (MI5).195 It provided details on party 
membership; the origins, development and organization of the party; the organizations affiliated 
to it; its policy towards the government and the other political forces of the island; its methods of 
influencing the population; and its finances. Furthermore, the report stressed that in certain 
circumstances the government might have to proscribe AKEL or at least curb its activities and 
take action against its members, an assessment shared by the MI5 as well.196   
In that respect, in September of the same year, Governor Winster requested the Secretary 
of State to increase the size of the police force, and to appoint an officer trained in security-
intelligence, to assist the government in its action against the party.197 A few weeks later, the 
Police Adviser at the Colonial Office, a recently created post, arrived in Cyprus for a few days to 
supervise the police methods against communist agitation.198 By the end of the year, more than 
110 party cadres and members had been arrested and sentenced to various terms for participating 
                                                 
194 Some of the material for publication by Cypriot newspapers had to be purchased by the Foreign Office, due to the 
copyright. Such was the case for the serial rights of George Orwell’s 1984, which were purchased for £25. NA, CO 
537/6562, Communism in Cyprus, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 16 May 1949; NA, CO 537/6563, Communism 
in Cyprus: anti-communist propaganda, Information Department to Foreign Office, 24 January 1950.  
195 NA, CO 537/2639, report by SIME on AKEL, 13 April 1948. 
196 NA, CO 537/2639, Robertson (MI5) to Logan (Colonial Office), 5 May 1948. 
197 NA, CO 537/2770, Review of Colonial police and security forces in relation to Communist infiltration: Cyprus, 
Governor Baron Winster to Secretary of State Creech Jones, 27 September 1948. 
198 Ibid., Secretary of State’s circular despatch, late 1948. 
214 
 
in labour protests and demonstrations in support of self-government.199 In early 1949, the 
publication of the party newspaper Dimokratis [Democrat] was suspended for three months, and 
its editor was imprisoned for the same period, while the Acting Governor urged the district 
commissioners to be exceptionally and particularly harsh against the communists:  
The opportunity should be taken to move against the communists wherever they 
exhibit weakness… You have been trained always to exercise your administrative 
powers in favour of the individual… The rule is a good one, but circumstances 
have now forced upon us an exception. Where the individual is a communist … 
your attitude will cease to be helpful, and you will use your administrative powers 
to hamper and thwart the purpose of communism…200     
 
 The possibility of proscribing AKEL and its affiliated organizations was constantly 
discussed in the following period and by early 1950 cases against the party and the AON had 
been prepared.201 Such a move would be constantly postponed, however, as the government 
wanted to avoid moving to open conflict with the Left at this stage.202 For the time being, the 
colonial authorities’ policy against AKEL consisted of the prosecution of individual party 
members for seditious publications in the press and for disturbance of the peace and in violent 
repression of demonstrations.   
 
Conclusion  
Despite the government’s legal and administrative precautions and the use of repressive 
measures, the labour organizations, supported by the parties of the Left, managed to organize a 
large-scale labour movement that successfully appealed to broad sections of Cypriot society. 
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After their initial appearance in Limassol during the second half of the 1920s, bi-communal 
labour mobilizations re-emerged during the second half of the 1930s and expanded to all towns 
and mining areas in the following decade. By the early 1940s, a new political space had been 
consolidated, that of the Left and the labour movement, and evolved into a threat to the 
established socio-political order. The social and political programme put forward by the trade 
unions and the Left ranged from the enactment of protective labour legislation to the 
democratization of the administration. The mass mobilization in support of these demands, 
which cut across ethnic and religious boundaries, was an historic event in the history of the 
island. By the end of the Second World War, AKEL had come to be seen as the most powerful 
adversary of the government, which sought to repress its activities. The party and its affiliated 
organizations and newspapers would ultimately be proscribed in 1955.   
 Throughout the period under scrutiny, the labour movement proved generally successful 
in scoring victories, even partially, in labour disputes. From the mid-1930s onwards, Greek- and 
Turkish-Cypriot workers and employees joined forces against the local, predominantly Greek-
Cypriot, bourgeoisie – most significantly owners of mine companies and factories – and 
managed to achieve major concessions from their employers. As early as 1939, contractors and 
unionized workers of the Nicosia builders and builders’ employees union signed the first 
collective agreement. In the face of labour mobilizations, the government was forced to redefine 
its policy on the labour regulatory framework on several occasions. In the early 1940s, the 
government recognized the PSE as the representative body of the island’s trade unions, and 
enacted legislation that provided for a minimum wage. Although welfare state structures 
appeared in Cyprus only after independence, the enactment of the Social Insurance Law in 1956 
constituted a major achievement of the labour movement’s constant demands for protective 
labour legislation.      
 Furthermore, the labour movement and the trade unions, through which the KKK and 
AKEL channelled a great part of their action, constituted the main space of cooperation between 
the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities, challenging the nationalist politics of their 
leaderships. After the 1943 municipal elections, in an attempt to defend its economic and 
political interests, the Greek-Cypriot elite promoted a split in the PSE, which led to the formation 
of the nationalist and anti-communist SEK. The new body often aligned itself with employers 
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and provided strike-breakers in times of industrial action. Despite the growing polarization 
within Greek-Cypriot politics, however, membership in the SEK would only rise significantly at 
the end of the decade, and still insufficient to challenge the primacy of the PSE and its successor, 
the PEO, in the labour movement. Similarly, the decision of the nationalist modernist Turkish-
Cypriot leadership to support the formation of separate Turkish-Cypriot trade unions in the same 
period was not followed by a sizeable secession of Turkish-Cypriot workers from the PSE. 
Nevertheless, it signalled the Turkish-Cypriot leadership’s determination to define the 
community on an ethnic basis, and to detach it from communist influence. In the following years, 
the constantly growing dynamics of the labour mobilizations, the harsh labour conditions and the 
overall unwillingness of the government to meet labour demands allowed for the labour 
movement to retain its bi-communal character. In this context, in January 1948, the PEO and the 
KTIBK proceeded to sign the Collaboration Protocol, providing for cooperation between the two 
bodies and mutual support in promoting labour demands.   
 The close cooperation between the PEO and the KTIBK, however, was destined to be 
short-lived. As discussed in the previous chapters, in January 1949, one year after the signing of 
the Collaboration Protocol, the Central Committee of AKEL denounced the party’s participation 
in the Consultative Assembly and the support the party had given to the idea of self-government. 
AKEL declared that from then on the only goal of the party was enosis. The new line of AKEL 
was widely covered in the left-wing press and was confirmed by the Sixth Congress of the party 
in August of the same year. With AKEL’s shift, Greek-Cypriot politics on the national question 
were now homogenized, and the nationalist consensus would be demonstrated a few months 
later. In late 1949, AKEL would support the Church in organizing the enosist plebiscite, which 
was eventually held in January 1950. In the same period, in response to pro-enosis 
demonstrations organized by the Church and AKEL, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership organized 
its own demonstrations, denouncing enosis and self-government and demanding the restoration 
of Cyprus to Turkey if Britain left the island. The majority of the speakers at the demonstrations 
criticized AKEL, as well as the participation of Turkish-Cypriots in trade unions affiliated to the 
PEO, which had also supported the enosist plebiscite.203 In the following period, the nationalist 
politics of both the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaderships would become even stronger. 
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Although bi-communal labour mobilizations would continue, the consolidation of the ethnic 




This study has sought to explore the political and social history of Cyprus during the 1930s and 
1940s, while bringing in key background from the previous period, especially the second half of 
the 1920s. While exploring domestic politics and social transformations, it has focused on the 
colonial administrative policy on the island and has engaged with Britain’s broader imperial 
planning, employing an approach that situates Cypriot colonial history within the history of 
British colonialism. Through the reconstitution and interpretation of historical structures and 
events of this period, this study has aimed at both contributing to scholarship by bridging an 
important gap in the existing literature, and suggesting an analysis that examines intra-communal 
and ethnic divides on their own terms, in contrast with the binary conceptualization of Cypriot 
history into a Greek-Cypriot and a Turkish-Cypriot side, dominant in the Cypriot historiography. 
Alas, the much smaller Maronite, Armenian, Latin Christian, Roma and Jewish minorities must 
be left for a future study.   
Given the paucity of secondary sources on both the formation of Turkish-Cypriot politics 
and the history of the labour movement and the Left from 1925 to 1950, this study has suggested 
a narrative for these two themes; while others, most notably the politics of the Church, the 
formation of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and the colonial administrative policy, which have been 
in part examined by the literature – though the period 1931-1955 has been relatively neglected –
have been re-examined here in the light of previously unexplored material. This has entailed 
some re-conceptualization of Cypriot history which allows for the understanding of the political 
and social dynamics that shaped Cypriot colonial history and set the context for subsequent 
historical developments. Indeed, the radical rift between the colonial state and the local 
population as well as between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities during the last 
decade of British rule is traceable to the 1930s and 1940s.            
 In 1931, the outbreak of the October revolt, the most tangible manifestation of opposition 
to colonial rule, signalled the failure of the British to gain the loyalty of the local population. At 
the same time, the event provided an ideal opportunity for the colonial regime to suppress 
political activity in order to make Cyprus ‘a real colony’. From then on, any demonstration of 
social discontent would be smothered, just as the popular outcry created by the government’s 
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decision to override the Legislative Council’s rejection of the budgetary estimates for 1932 was 
met by the abolition of the Council itself.   
 Most importantly, the revolt had a great, and at the same time paradoxical, impact on 
Cypriot politics. A culmination of the late 1920s mobilizations and primarily triggered by socio-
economic and political factors, the revolt expressed major social discontent dating back to the 
previous period. Many Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot deputies were obliged to oppose the 
government, the former by resigning en masse from the Legislative Council on the eve of the 
uprising. The Greek-Cypriot nationalist elites and, most notably, the Church (the biggest 
landowner on the island), however, managed to hone the economic and socio-political demands 
of the insurgents into a single slogan: enosis. Hence, the revolt secured the power of the affluent 
Greek-Cypriot elites and, most significantly, enhanced the authority of the Church, all the while 
reinforcing enosist discourse. In other words, the Church managed to appropriate the revolt and 
harness the militant expression of popular discontent within its own political sphere. The Church 
thus represented itself as the political organization that could best express the demands of the 
Greek-Cypriot population by promoting union with Greece as the claim to encapsulate 
socioeconomic demands and anti-colonial politics. At the same time, the growing political 
consensus of the previous period between the Greek- and the Turkish-Cypriot leaderships in 
opposition to the government, rather than being reinforced through the revolt, decreased, 
widening the gap between the two communities.  
Despite the apparent tensions in popular politics and the partial success of the British in 
forming a bi-communal, pro-government political class in the 1930s, the revival of the island’s 
political life during the years of the war revealed that the political forces opposed to the colonial 
authorities were extending their influence among the population. In the end, the government 
failed in gaining the loyalty of the locals. During the 1930s and 1940s, Cypriot politics 
underwent several transformations, the outcome of which would largely define political 
developments until the end of colonial rule. The reinforcement of nationalist trends within 
Cypriot society, however, remained present throughout this period. Eventually, a nationalist 
political discourse was consolidated within both the Greek- and the Turkish-Cypriot 
communities.   
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In the years following the October revolt, the Church managed to promote successfully 
its nationalist politics, strengthening its position despite two major challenges against it: the 
restrictive framework imposed by the government and the politics of the Left. As in much of the 
British Empire, the Cyprus government, whilst proscribing the Communist Party and suppressing 
communist activity, maintained a more tolerant attitude towards trade unions during the 1930s. 
The government considered legal control of the unions as more effective in restricting the 
activities of the labour movement. In the early 1940s, the colonial authorities tolerated the 
foundation of AKEL, successor of the KKK. Yet, after the end of the war, the government 
pursued a repressive policy against the Left, this time prosecuting the trade union leadership 
directly. In spite of all this, the labour movement grew throughout this period and was 
consolidated by the early 1940s, achieving many of its demands for workers’ rights and 
challenging nationalist politics. Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots participated in common trade 
unions and labour mobilizations, promoting class solidarity and challenging the ethnic 
dichotomy. Nevertheless, the Left eventually failed to form a political space rejecting the 
nationalist discourses of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaderships. From its first steps, AKEL 
itself adopted and promoted the demand for enosis.   
At the same time, the growing appeal of the Left alarmed the nationalist and anti-
communist politicians from both communities. After AKEL’s success in the 1943 municipal 
elections, Greek-Cypriot nationalist politicians moved to set up a right-wing party and anti-
communist trade unions. Nevertheless, the right-wing political space was still dominated by the 
Church, preventing the formation of an organized secular right-wing politics. The appeal of the 
Cypriot National Party (KEK) and the Cyprus Workers’ Confederation (SEK), both founded in 
this period, remained limited, failing to impede the increasing influence of the Left. Yet, their 
appearance signified the growing polarization of Greek-Cypriot politics. In the same period, the 
establishment of the Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus (KATAK) and 
the Turkish Cypriot National Union Party (KTMBP), as well as separate Turkish-Cypriot trade 
unions, signalled the growing nationalist division within Cypriot politics. Trade union 
leaderships found themselves increasingly under the supervision of political parties, and 
eventually adopted the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot nationalist discourses. This trend anticipated 
the end of extensive bi-communal politics and the failure of the labour movement to dissuade the 
communities from nationalism. Although the distinctively bi-communal character of the labour 
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movement was maintained until the end of the decade, significant domestic and international 
developments during the years after the war led to the strengthening of divisions within Cypriot 
society.   
 The confrontation between AKEL and the Greek-Cypriot nationalist elite as well as 
between the party and the colonial authorities would grow significantly after the end of the war. 
It was then that AKEL had come to be seen as the government’s greatest adversary, especially 
after the outbreak of the Greek civil war in March 1946 and the party’s success in the municipal 
elections two months later. Following the death of Leontios and the election of Makarios II as 
Archbishop in December 1947, anti-communism would be a constant component within Church 
discourse. In the same year, the ratification of the Truman Doctrine, which replaced Britain with 
the United States in providing military and economic aid to the Greek government, enabled the 
Greeks to support the demand for enosis more openly. In 1949, the Left was defeated in the 
municipal elections, mostly due to its participation in the Consultative Assembly with the slogan 
‘self-government – enosis’. AKEL then denounced its previous position and called for the 
intensification of the struggle for enosis. The homogenization of Greek-Cypriot nationalist 
politics was now complete, and any chances of cooperation between the Greek- and the Turkish-
Cypriot communities were gone. Meanwhile, The Turkish-Cypriot leadership radicalized further 
its nationalist discourse and declared itself fundamentally against both enosis and communism. 
Following the 1950 plebiscite on enosis, which was organized by the Church and supported by 
the Left, as well as the subsequent attempts of the Greek-Cypriot leadership to internationalize 
the demand for enosis, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership sought the intervention of the Turkish 
government in support of its own demand for the restoration of Cyprus to Turkey in the case of 
Britain leaving the island. Turkish national policy on Cyprus was, however, determined by the 
priorities of its overall foreign policy, defined primarily by Turkey’s incorporation into the US 
sphere of influence. In contrast with the Greek government, the introduction of the Truman 
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in Turkey and, most notably, membership in NATO contributed 
to the formation of an officially intransigent stance towards the Turkish-Cypriot leadership until 
the mid-1950s.  
 As this thesis has sought to show, the nationalization of politics within the Greek- and the 
Turkish-Cypriot communities and, as would be demonstrated in the following decade, the 
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polarization of Cypriot society along ethnic lines, were anything but linear in their evolution. In 
fact, all political players were constantly redefining their positions and actions according to the 
changing social and political conjunctures and challenges.   
 Among the key political actors of the colonial period, the most influential was the 
Orthodox Church. Seeking to perpetuate its authority and secure its interests within the colonial 
context, the Church moved early on to redefine and modernize its politics. This institution 
adapted to the framework introduced by the British and claimed authority within it, taking 
advantage of the administrative division of the population into religious groups. The main 
political body through which the Church sought to maintain its authority under secular British 
rule was the Legislative Council, and the main political discourse which it came increasingly to 
employ was that of nationalism. By succeeding in the Legislative Council elections, the Church 
not only managed to maintain the political power it had during the Ottoman period as 
representative of the Orthodox Christian population, but also to modernize this power and 
enhance its authority within the British administrative context. At the same time, in its attempt to 
monopolize the politics of the Orthodox community, the Church strove to legitimize its authority 
in the name of the nation, so as to emerge as the unique, national authority of the community. 
Being the spiritual leader of the Orthodox Christian community, the Church, sought to become 
the political and national leader of the Greek community, incorporated into a secular 
administrative context. The revolt was, as this thesis suggests, a turning point in this process, 
which culminated during the 1933-1947 archiepiscopal question and was completed by the end 
of the 1940s. In the next decade, the Church would lead a militant, anti-colonial movement 
leading to the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, the first president of which would 
be the Orthodox Archbishop. This seemingly paradoxical role of the Church of Cyprus that this 
thesis has sought to explore can be further analysed if contrasted with the politics of other 
ecclesiastical institutions in the British colonial context, a subject of future research.1   
 Within the politics of the Church until the 1931 revolt, even calls for enosis were 
moderately expressed. The Church’s stance towards the colonial state, largely reduced to 
                                                 
1 For the most substantial comparative analysis of how the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Roman Catholic 
Church of Malta related with the colonial authorities, see Yiannos Katsourides and Antigone Heraclidou (eds.), 
‘Nationalism and Decolonisation in the Mediterranean; Cyprus and Malta compared, 1918-1964’, in Journal of 
Mediterranean Studies, 23/1 (2014).  
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demanding control over communal affairs, was not confrontational, and this policy was to a great 
extent maintained until the death of Archbishop Cyril in 1933. Rather than the colonial 
government, the main opponent of the Church was a political force that might threaten its 
influence over the Greek-Cypriot population. From the mid-1920s onwards, the secular political 
space being created by the Left challenged the politics of the Church. The Church, therefore, 
cooperated with the colonial authorities on several occasions against the Left, especially after the 
election of Archbishop Makarios II in December 1947.  
 In contrast with the Church, which claimed to represent the national interests of the entire 
Greek-Cypriot community, the Left claimed to represent the interests of the lower classes on the 
island. By the early 1940s, the Left had been consolidated, mainly through the trade unions and 
the labour movement, as a political force with a discourse challenging the established socio-
political order. From the mid-1920s until the early 1940s, the Left rejected Greek-Cypriot 
nationalism and pursued class politics. Not only did the party of the Left, the KKK, denounce 
enosis and call for independence, but, more importantly, bi-communal politics was materializing 
in practice through the labour movement. The militant politics of trade unionism managed to 
mobilize large parts of the working population across ethnic and religious boundaries, 
constituting the main space of cooperation between the Greek- and the Turkish-Cypriot 
communities. Despite the radical shift on the national question during the 1940s - characterized 
by AKEL’s abandonment of the claim for independence and the eventual adoption of enosist 
politics - the Left constantly promoted its modernist programme. By the end of colonial rule, the 
Left demanded a series of institutional reforms ranging from protective labour legislation to the 
democratization of Cypriot society as a whole (such as universal education for children and civil 
rights). Moreover, the dynamics of the Left shifted the entire spectrum of Cypriot politics, 
forcing rival political forces, especially the Greek-Cypriot elite, to adopt part of the Leftist 
discourse as early as the 1920s. Nevertheless, the appeal of the Left waned from the late 1940s 
onwards, as its main rival, the Church, had managed to emerge as the political force which 
defined the politics of the Greek-Cypriot community.     
 In contrast with the case of the Orthodox Church, the Muslim traditionalist elite, rather 
than modernizing its politics so as to adapt to the colonial administrative system, depended 
almost exclusively on the state to maintain its power. As under the Ottoman administration, 
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which secured the authority of Cyprus’ confessional elites over their communities, the 
traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite stood as the most loyal ally to the new government. Given the 
advantageous position of the Greek-Cypriot community in the administration of the island and 
the growth of Greek-Cypriot nationalism, this Turkish-Cypriot alliance with the government 
prevented a further undermining of the community’s political capital. The community’s 
precarious position was only further exacerbated by the official annexation of Cyprus by Britain 
in 1914, the offer of the island to Greece the following year and the official recognition of 
Cyprus as a British territory in 1923 under the Treaty of Lausanne.   
Although the British did not recognize most privileges of the Muslim traditionalist elite, 
the government greatly relied on this group’s cooperation in administering the colony 
consensually. Besides, maintaining the division of the population into religious groups was as 
useful to the Muslim religious elite as it was to the Orthodox Church. Given the composition of 
the Legislative Council, the cooperation between the British officials and the Muslim deputies 
was the only means to overcome the Christian representatives – who usually voted as a block – 
and legislate without resorting to Orders in Council. From the mid-1920s, when a Kemalist and 
modernist political force was becoming ever more influential within the Turkish-Cypriot 
community, the government would enhance the position of the traditionalist elite, granting it 
complete control over communal affairs. The cooperation between the government and the 
traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite was thus mutually beneficial, securing, for the former, the 
governance of the island, and ensuring the authority of the latter over the community.    
 As with the Greek-Cypriot community, the greatest challenge to the influence of the 
traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite – and, thus, the government’s administrative planning – came 
from a secular, modernist political force. By the end of the 1920s, the Kemalist Turkish-Cypriot 
intelligentsia had managed to form a distinct political space, opposing the traditionalist power 
structure of the community, and increasingly promoting nationalist politics. Although calls for 
the modernization of Turkish-Cypriot communal affairs provided some common ground with the 
Left, cooperation with this new Turkish-Cypriot political force was generally precluded, mainly 
due to its nationalist and anti-communist ideology. Besides, the modernist platforms suggested 
by both political movements met the general resistance of the government when implementing 
reforms.              
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 In contrast with the Orthodox Church, and despite the government’s best efforts, the 
traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite lagged behind the modernist Turkish-Cypriot leadership, 
which had prevailed by the early 1940s. Until the end of colonial rule, the new modernist 
leadership would constantly demand reforms, communal autonomy, equal treatment of the 
Turkish- and the Greek-Cypriot communities, and restoration of Cyprus to Turkey in case of any 
change of the status quo on the island. Towards the end of the decade, the radicalization of 
Greek-Cypriot nationalism and the adoption of the enosist discourse by all Greek-Cypriot 
political forces forged an increasing understanding between both the modernist leadership and 
the government, as well as a consensus between the former and the traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot 
elite, leading to the consolidation and homogenization of the nationalist politics of the 
community as well as a consensus on political and administrative matters. By the beginning of 
the 1950s, the British had begun to consider the usefulness of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism 
against the radical enosist Greek-Cypriot politics.   
 As this thesis has demonstrated, however, the radical rift between the colonial state and 
the Greek-Cypriots, which the British strove to avert in the years following the 1931 revolt, had 
become irreversible. Despite the government’s repressive measures, political activity on the 
island increased in both communities, marking the failure of Britain’s policy to make Cyprus ‘a 
real colony’. By 1950, the politics of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot nationalist leaderships had 
proved successful. AKEL and the traditionalist Turkish-Cypriot elite had by then adopted 
nationalist politics, and nationalist ideology was now dominant within Cypriot society. If 
government policy until the end of the 1940s constituted an ill-fated attempt to control nationalist 
politics, the labour movement proved unable to avert the ethnic divide at the grassroots level. 
Nationalist ideology was soon to be translated into action. In April 1955, the Greek-Cypriot 
Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών [National Organization of Cypriot Fighters – EOKA] 
would initiate its five-year armed campaign for enosis. A few months later, the Turkish-Cypriot 
organization Volkan [Volcano] was founded, eventually replaced by the Türk Mukavemet 
Teşkilatı [Turkish Resistance Organization – TMT] in November 1957, demanding taksim, or the 
partition of Cyprus. These events would shape the future of the island in highly damaging ways.
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